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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2017
The doctrine of the clausula rebus sic stantibus is the familiar rubric under which are classified various materials bearing on the revision or termination of treaties. Much that the phrase connotes proves on examination to be too mischievous or vague for serious consideration. Yet there remains “a legal residuum,” in Dr. Lauterpacht’s phrase, “which, although of a limited compass, is capable of application by a judicial tribunal.” English jurists have suggested, somewhat cautiously, that a discussion of the implied clause might be illuminated by an examination of the principle of frustration in the private law of contracts. And an analogy is also suggested between obsolescent treaties and restrictive covenants which, because of an essential change in circumstances, equity will no longer enforce. The matter is of such contemporary importance that international law cannot afford to leave unexamined any juristic material which promises to be suggestive. And if in the end the conclusion is reached that the principle of rebus sic stantibus can have only the most limited application to so-called obsolete treaties, this result will be none the less significant in clarifying the true nature of the problem.
The Havana Convention on Treaties (4 Hudson, International Legislation, 2378) contains a number of provisions relative to subject of this article. That convention, however, presents such a variety of problems that it is reserved for separate consideration.
2 The Function of Law in the International Community, p. 273.
3 Brierly, “Some Considerations on the Obsolescence of Treaties,” 11 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1926), 11, and The Law of Nations, p. 168 ff; Lauterpacht, op. cit., 272 ff; McNair, War-Time Impossibility of Performance of Contract, 35 L. Q. R. 84 (1919), and La Terminaison et la dissolution des traités, 22 Recueil des Cours, Académie de Droit International de la Haye (1928), 463, 467 ff; Sir John Fischer Williams, “The Permanence of Treaties,“ this journal, Vol. XXII (1928), p. 89 ff, and Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations, p. 86 ff. Professor Garner discusses the same subject in “Revision of Treaties and the Doctrine of Rebus sic Stantibus,” 19 Iowa Law Rev. (1934), 312. Dr. Chesney Hill has recently published a very able monograph on The Doctrine of ‘Rebus sic Stantibus’ in International Law, 9 University of Missouri Studies, No. 3 (1934). Interesting analogies might be drawn from the law of Rome, modern systems of civil law, and the law of the American States. The present article resorts only to the law of England.
4 The court shall apply: … (3) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.“
5 “[In the construction of treaties] it cannot be said that guidance is wanting. Apart from the technical effect of particular terms in this or that system, the main principles of interpretation are common to all civilized law, and the resources of jurisprudence and of historical criticism are no less open to arbitrators than to any other serious inquirer.” Sir Frederick Pollock, 35 L. Q. R. (1919), 320, 328. Cf. Prof. Le Fur's notes on the Philosophie du droit international, 28 Rev. gén. de dr. int. public (1921), 565, 587. The remarks of Despagnet are particularly pertinent: “Le caractère de contrats qu'il faut reconnattre aux traités publics permet de leur appliquer certains des modes d'extinction que le Droit privé etablit pour les conventions entre particuliers; mais ce sont seulement ceux quiderivent de la nature méne des choses et que le législateur consacre plutôt qu'il ne les crée; ceux qui, au contraire, impliquent une intervention directe de la loi ne sont pas applicable dans les rapports internationaux, faute d'un législateur supreme pour les imposer aux États.“ Cours de droit international public, 4th ed., sec. 453.
6 (1873) L. R. S C. P. 572, at 581; affirmed in the Exch. Ch., (1874) L. R. S. C. P. 125. McCardie, J., the last judge in the world to restrain the growth of the law, observed that “if these words of Brett J. are to be applied to their widest extent they may well effect a revolution in contract law.” Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, [1918] 1 K. B. 540, at 544.
7 F. A. Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co. [1916] 2 A. C. 397, at 403.
8 (1647), Aleyn 26 (K. B.). Followed recently in Redmond v. Dainton [1920], 2 K. B. 256, where leased premises had been struck by a bomb from a German airplane, and the covenant to repair was enforced.
9 Lord Kenyon, in Bullock v. Dommit (1796), 6 T. R. 650, and Company of Proprietors … v. Pritchard (1796), 6 T. R. 750. When Kenyon succeeded Mansfield, the movement to rationalize English law came to an end. Lord Ellenborough, the next Chief Justice of the King's Bench, took a similarly strict view: Atkinson v. Ritchie (1809), 10 East 530; Barker v. Hodgson (1814), 3 M. & S. 267. The case last cited, and Spence v. Chodwick (1847), 10 Q. B. 517, decided that impossibility of performance attributable to the law of a foreign country constituted no defence in an English court. The judgments would probably be otherwise today: [1920] 2 K. B. 291, 297, 303.
10 3 B. & S. 826 (Q. B.).
11 Cf. the remarks of Maule, J., in Moss v. Smith (1850), 9 C. B. 94,103, approved by Lord Blackburn in Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin & Co. (1881), 6 A. C. 38, 52: “It may be physically possible to repair the ship, but at an enormous cost: and there the loss would be total; for in matters of business, a thing is said to be impossible when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive or unreasonable cost.“
12 (1873), L. R. S. C. P. 572; aff. (1874), L. R. S. C. P. 125 (Ex. Ch.). Cf. Geipel v. Smith (1872), L. R. S. Q. B. 404.
13 Supra, p. 221.
14 Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin & Co. (1881), 6 A. C. 38, 53.
15 It is now clear that the contract need not be executory for the doctrine of frustration to be invoked: Bensaude v. Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co. [1897] A. C. 609, affirming [1897] 1 Q. B. 29; Noble's Explosives Co. v. Jenkins and Co. [1896] 2 Q. B. 326; Embiricos v. Sydney Reid & Co. [1914] 3 K. B. 45.
16 [1900] 2 Q. B. 298, [1901] 2 K. B. 126.
17 Elliott v. Crutchley, [1903] 2 K. B. 476, [1904] 1 K. B. 565; Heme Bay Steamboat Co. v. Hutton, [1903] 2 K. B. 683, [1906] A. C. 7; Henry v. Krell, (1902) 18 T. L. B. 823, [1903] 2 K. B. 740; Civil Service Co-operative Society v. General Steam Navigation Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 756; Blakeley v. Muller, [1903] 2 K. B. 760 n; Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K. B. 493.
18 [1903] 2 K. B. 683.
19 [1916] 1 A. C. 486.
20 [1916] 2 A. C. 397.
21 Anglo-Northern Trading Co. v. Emlyn Jones & Williams, [1917] 2 K. B. 78, [1918] 1 K.B. 372. Cf. the important discussion in Bank Line v. Capel & Co., [1919] A. C 435.
22 Robinson v. Davison (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 269.
23 (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 180. Cf. Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co., [1917] 2 K. B. 1, [1918] A. C. 119; Walton Harvey v. Walker and Homfrays, [1931] 1 Ch. 145, 274.
24 Supra, p. 222. The principle was extended in Howell v. Coupland (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 462; (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 258, to specific goods not in existence at the time of the contract.
25 “Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common Law,” 46 Harvard Law Review, 1281.
26 Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. Allen [1918], 1 K. B. 540, [1918] 2 K. B. 467; Jacobs, Marcus and Co. v. Credit Lyonnais (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 589; Ashmore & Son v. Cox & Co., [1899] 1 Q. B. 436; Lebeaupin v. Crispin, [1920] 2 K. B. 714. What Russell, J., said to the contrary in Re Badische Co., [1921] 2 Ch. 331, was obiter.
27 Sir John Fischer Williams brings this out clearly, loc. cit., p. 94.
28 Me plaçant done sur ce terrain [que les zones franches font partie d'un règlement territorial], je dis que le Gouvernement français ne saurait tirer argument du changement des circonstances pour conclure àla caducité des stipulations qui ont institué les zones franches. Et je crois bien que le Gouvernement français lui-même partage notre opinion, selon laquelle des règlements territoriaux ne peuvent pas être juridiquement affectés par des changements survenus dans les circonstances.
29 McNair, “Legal Character of Treaties,” 11 British Year Book of International Law (1930), 100, 110.
30 Publications of the P. C. I. J., Ser. C, No. 58, p. 109.
31 Ibid., p. 485.
32 Ser. A/B, No. 46, p. 156.
33 The facts precluded any serious effort by the distinguished counsel for the French Government to show that, irrespective of the abrogative effect of Art. 435, the old stipulations had lapsed by force of the clausula rebus sic stantibus. M. Paul-Boncour said- “Nous n'avions pas plaid6, et nous ne plaidons pas davantage aujourd'hui, que I'application de cette clause à l'espèce devait entrainer ipso facto l'abrogation des stipulations de 1815.” (Ser. C, No. 19-1, p. 67.) In the third phase Prof. Basdevant put the contention on higher ground, but seemingly with little confidence. M. Dreyfus, judge ad hoc, in his dissenting opinion, nowhere says that as a matter of general international law the engagements of 1815 and 1816 had lapsed: he speaks of the effect of changed circumstances as being “un seul problemè qui tient à la fois du caractère juridique et d'opportunité,” and says of the majority judgment that “sans doute, le droit strict aura été respecté, mais la Cour avait-elle été chargée par les Parties d'assurer coûte que coûte ce respect rigoureux du droit, sans avoir à se préoccuper de 1'opportunité?’ (Ser. A/B, No. 46, pp. 203, 212.)
34 Corns de droit international (Gidel, trans.), p. 462.
35 Cf. the Courts (Emergency Powers) Acts, 1914 to 1917, and the Beport of Lord Buckmaster's Committee on the Position of British Manufacturers and Merchants in Respect of Pre-War Contracts, Pari. Papers. (1918), Cd. 8975; Loi du 21 Janvier 1918(Loi Faillot).
36 Bolivian Reservations to the Havana Convention on Treaties (1928), 4 Hudson, International Legislation, 2378, 2385.
37 Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 466. The committee comprised MM. Scialoja (Italy), Urrutia (Colombia), and de Peralta (Costa Rica).
38 Elsewhere Judge Urrutia has drawn a sharp distinction between treaty provisions which should be revised because “inapplicable” and those which are terminated because impossible of execution. Le continent ame'ricain et le droit international, p. 284.
39 Lepeschkin v. Gosweiler (1923), Entscheidungen des schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, 49.1.188. The quotation is taken from Hudson's Cases, p. 100. The text is reproduced in the Bulletin de Vlnstitut Intermédiaire International (1923), IX, p. 31, and summarized in the Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1923-1924, Case No. 189.
40 E.g., Embiricos v. Sydney Reid & Co. [1914], 3 K. B. 45. By the charter-party, plaintiff's ship was to proceed to the Sea of Azoff, there to load a cargo of grain for a port in the United Kingdom. It was agreed that the contract should be mutually cancelled if any difficulty due to war arose previous to cargo being shipped, or if the Dardanelles should be closed when the ship arrived east-bound. In fact the ship reached its loading port and had part of the cargo on board when war broke out between Greece and Turkey. The ship, being Greek, was thereby indefinitely prevented from leaving the Black Sea, and the charterers were held justified in throwing up the contract.
41 Cf. the remarks of Judges Anzilotti and Huber on the interpretation of treaties, in the Wimbledon case, Publications of the P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 1, at p. 36; also the dissenting opinion of the former in the matter of the convention concerning employment of women during the night, Ser. A/B, No. 50, at p. 383. Where a treaty may be denounced after a short period, as five or ten years, it would be difficult to imply a resolutive condition. Cf. the judgment of the Trib. civ. du Caire in Rothschild v. Gouvernement égyptien (1925), 52 Clunet, 1091, Annual Digest, 1925-1926, Case No. 14; also Professor Wilson's note, this journal, Vol. 27 (1933), p. 104. The Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armament of 1922 expressly contemplated (Art. 21) the possibility of a change of circumstances requiring a reconsideration of the treaty even during the relatively short period for which it was concluded.
42 Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co., [1926] A. C. 497, at 510.
43 Collins, M. R., in Chandler v. Webster, supra, at 499. He agreed elsewhere that restitution in integrum would be desirable if it were feasible. Elliott v. Crutchley, supra, at p. 569. Viscount Finlay said the rule was “rough and ready,” and did not work badly in cases where consideration was given pari passu with performance on the other side. Cantiare San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding Co., [1924] A. C. 226, at 243.
44 The statement of Lord Parmoor in French Marine v. Compagnie Napolitaine (1921), 27 Comm. Cas. 69, 94, formed no part of the judgment of the House of Lords: per Lord Finlay, [1924] A. 0. at 241.
45 Cantiare San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding Co., supra, at p. 255. In deciding these frustration cases, from Taylor v. Caldwell on down, the English courts have turned for inspiration to the Roman law. Professor Buckland points out that in these excursions the judges went astray, but thanks to a double error they have come out of the woods nearer to the right point than might have been expected. “Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common Law,” 46 Harvard Law Rev. 1281, 1284.
46 Hudson, International Legislation, IV, 2378, 2381.
47 (1822), 2 My. and K. 552.
48 Dictum of James, L. J., in German v. Chapman (1877), L. R. 7 Ch. D. 271, approved byLindley, L. J., in Knight v. Simmonds, [1896] 2 Ch. 294, 299. A stricter view had been expressed by the Court of Appeal in Sayers v. Collyer (1883), 28 Ch. D. 103.
49 Cited in note next above.
50 Sobey v. Sainsbury, [1913] 2 Ch. 513, 529. Adversely commented upon by Farwell, J., in Chatsworth Estates Co. v. Fewell, [1931] 1 Ch. 224, 227.
51 “Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity,” 45 Harvard Law Review, 793, 822-6.
52 Who are selected according to rules made by a Reference Committee consisting of the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, and the President of the Surveyors’ Institution. Similar legislation on a smaller scale was contained in the Housing and Town Planning Act, 1919, § 27.
53 Fielden v. Byrne, [1926] 1 Ch. 620. 54 Sobey v. Sainsbury, supra; Sharp v. Harrison, [1922] 1 Ch. 502; Achilli v. Tovell, [1927] 2 Ch. 243.
54 Sobey v. Sainsbury, supra; Sharp v. Harrison, [1922] 1 Ch. 502; Achilli v. Tovell, [1927] 2 Ch. 243.