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The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2017

George Manner
George Manner*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
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Extract

Among the solutions to the highly controversial issue of the standing of the individual in international law is the theory that the individual is not a subject, but an object, of this law. This solution, moreover, represents the currently dominant doctrinal conception of the position of men in this law. For ever since its formulation in 1896 this theory has been expressly or tacitly accepted by nearly all of those jurists who may be collectively designated as the subjective positivist school of international law, and these jurists have ever since that time predominated in the science of this law. Nevertheless, the validity of this theory has also been questioned seriously.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , July 1952 , pp. 428 - 449
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1952

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References

1 Subjective positivism, because these jurists allege that a subjective factor, will or consent of, or recognition by states, provides the immediate or juridical foundation for the obligation of positive international law. As such, this school is opposed to an eclectic positivism basing the obligation of what it deems positive international law upon this subjective factor and some allegedly objective factor, such as society, reason, a fundamental juridical or moral hypothesis, principle, or norm, and to an objective positivism grounding the obligation of this law upon such an objective factor alone.

2 For express acceptance of this doctrine in subjective positivism see, e.g., Heilborn, Das System des Völkerrechts (1896), pp. 58–211, 372, 374, 382, 417; same, Grundbegriffe des Völkerrechts (1912), pp. 88, 95; Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (1899), pp. 13 ff., 21, 259 ff., 329; same, “Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international,” Recueil des Cours, Académie de Droit International de la Haye [hereafter cited as Hague Recueil], Vol. 1 (1923), p. 81; Knubben, Die Subjekte des Völkerrechts (1928), p. 487 ff.; Strupp, Grundzüge des positiven Völkerrechts (5th ed., 1932), pp. 1 ff., 32 ff., 95 ff., 103 ff.; same, “Les règles générales du droit de la paix,” 47 Hague Recueil (1934), pp. 456 ff., 536; Meier, Der Staatsangehörige und seine Rechte, insbesondere seine Vermögensrechte, im System des Völkerrechts (1927), p. 20 ff.; Diena, Principî di Diritto Internationale (2d ed., 1914), p. 260 f.; Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Internationale (3rd ed., 1928), “Vol. I, pp. 113, 121 ff.; same, Cours de Droit International (1929), pp. 132–136; Cavaglieri, Corso di Diritto Internanionale (1925), pp. 110 ff., 254 ff.; same, “Règles générales du droit de la paix,” 26 Hague Recueil (1929), p. 319 f.; Gemma, Appunti di Diritto Internationale (1923), pp. 55 ff., 161 ff.; Bustamante, Droit International Public, Vol. I (1934), pp. 4, 9, 136; Oppenheim, International Law (3rd ed., 1920), Vol. I, pp. 2, 17–19, 456–463; Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (6th ed., 1915), p. 72 f.; Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (1947), pp. 35, 53 f.; same, International Law (2d ed., 1949), pp. 75, 78 ff., 161 ff.; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915), pp. 16–18, 29 ff., 354, 355 ff.; Fenwick, International Law (2d ed., 1934), pp. 32 ff., 86 f., 189 ff.; Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law and Organization (1927), pp. 157, n. 2, 347; same, Essentials of International Public Law (1912), p. 92.

For tacit acceptance of this doctrine in this school see, e.g., A. Zorn, Grundzüge des Völkerrechts (2d ed., 1903), p. 26 ff.; Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (2d ed., 1905), pp. 324–329; Ullmann, Völkerrecht (2d ed., 1908), pp. 88 ff., 253 ff., 311, 344 ff.; E. Kaufmann, Das Wesen des Völkerrechts und die clausula rebus sic stantibus (1911), pp. 140–144; same, “Règles générales du droit de la paix,” 54 Hague Recueil (1935), pp. 320 ff.; Heilborn, “Die Subjekte des Völkerrechts,” in II Strupp’s Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatic (1925), p. 684 ff.; Kraus, “Système et fonctions de traités internationaux,” 50 Hague Recueil (1934), p. 317 ff.; Walz, “Les rapports du droit international et du droit interne,” 61 Hague Recueil (1937), pp. 387 ff., 409; Schoen, “Zur Lehre von den Subjekten des Völkerrechts,” 23 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht (1939), pp. 418, 436; Hold-Ferneck, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. I (1930), p. 251; de Louter, Le Droit International Public Positif (1920), Vol. I, pp. 1 ff., 11, 160, 163 ff., 168, 259 ff.; Vol. II, p. 1 ff.; Hammarskjöld, “La neutralité en général,” III Bibliotheca Visseriana (1924), pp. 53–141, esp. p. 113 f.; Despagnet, Cours de Droit International Public (3rd ed., 1905), pp. 79, 361 ff.; Renault, “De l’application du droit pénal aux faits de guerre,” 25 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1918), pp. 5–29; Redslob, Histoire des Grands Principes du Droit des Gens depuis l’Antiquity jusqu’d la Veille de la Grande Guerre (1923), pp. 13–15, 538–543; Foignet, Manuel Elémentaire de Droit International Public (14th ed., 1929), pp. 1 ff., 57 ff.; de Visseher, “La responsabilité des états,” II Bibliotheca Visseriana (1923), pp. 87–119; Phillimore, “Droits et devoirs fondamentaux des états,” 1 Hague Recueil (1923), pp. 26–69, esp. p. 33; Williams, Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations (1929), p. 5 ff.; Holland, Lectures on International Law (1933), pp. 1 ff., 55, 61; Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law (1901), p. 211; Moore, A Digest of International Law (1906), Vol. I, p. 17; Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States (2d ed., 1945), Vol. I, pp. 1 ff., 21 ff., 33 ff.; Garner, Recent Developments in International Law (1925), p. 25; Nielsen, International Law Applied to Reclamations (1933), p. 8 f.; Briggs, The Law of Nations (1938), pp. 54, 63 ff., 156, 373, 496, 507, 519, 593; and of. also Hudson, Cases on International Law (2d ed., 1936), pp. 17, 20.

3 Gorotsev, “La notion d’objet en droit international et son rôle pour la construction juridique de cette discipline,” 6 Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée (3° Ser., 1925), pp. 177 ff., 183. He does so on the assumption that the term “object of international law” can and does refer only to the end or subject-matter of this law rather than to the things which are the subject-matter of international rights and duties.

4 See, e.g., Krabbe, Die Moderne Staats-Idee (1919), pp. 275, 277 ff.; Politis, La Morale Internationale (1943), p. 84; Gorotsev, loc. cit., p. 181; Aufricht, “Personality in International Law,” 37 American Political Science Review (1943), p. 231; Scelle, Droit International Public (1944), pp. 12 f., 16 f.; Lauterpaeht, An International Bill of Rights (1945), pp. 5, 7; same, International Law and Human Rights (1950), pp. 5, 47, 67–72; cf. also Piore, International Law Codified (1918), pp. 32, 35, 38 ff., 105 ff.; de Brito, La Philosophic du Droit des Gens (1944), pp. 4 f., 13, 16 ff., 42, 81, 153 ff.

5 See, e.g., Westlake, International Law (1910), p. 1 ff.; Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (1928 ed.), pp. 128, 130 ff., 159 ff.; Krabbe, op. cit., p. 278; Duguit, Leçons de droit public général (1926), pp. 95 ff., 139 ff.; Scelle, op. cit., p. 408 ff.; Lauterpaeht, International Law and Human Rights, pp. 5 f., 10, 40–45; Stowell, International Law (1931), p. 8 ff.; and cf., further, Ross, International Law (1947), p. 33.

6 See, e.g., Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 128, 161, 317 ff.; Krabbe, op. cit., p. 277; Scelle, op. cit., p. 408 ff.; Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 5 f., 10, 40 ff., 46; and cf., further, Brierly, The Outlook for International Law (1944), p. 109.

7 See, e.g., Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894), p. 1 f.; Kaufmann, W., Die Rechtskraft des Internationalen Rechtes (1899), pp. 1 ff., 13 ff., 43 ff.; Krabbe, op. cit., pp. 272 ff., 278 ff.; Kelsen, op. cit., p. 162; same, “Les , rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public,” 14 Hague Recueil (1926), pp. 231 ff., 281 ff.; same, Peace Through Law (1944), p. 69 ff.; Fauchille, Traité de Droit International Public, Vol. I (1922), p. 210 ff.; Politis, Les Nouvelles Tendances du Droit International (1927), pp. 55 f., 64 ff.; Spiropoulos, L’individu en Droit International (1928), passim; Scelle, op. cit., pp. 410 ff., 416 ff., 422 ff., 686 ff., 691 ff.; Segal, L’individu en Droit International Positif (1932), passim; Ténékidès, L’individu dans l’ordre Juridique International (1933), passim; Taube, “Das ‘Ende des alten Völkerrechts’ und die Rechte des Einzelnen im internationalen Verkehr,” 2 Völkerbund und Völkerrecht (1935–1936), pp. 6 ff.; Verdross, Völkerrecht (1937), pp. 43 ff., 66 ff. (who then held, however, that men are otherwise objects of international law); Krylov, “Les notions principales du droit des gens (La doctrine soviétique du droit international),” 70 Hague Recueil (1947), p. 447 f.; Lauterpacht, op. cit, pp. 9–12, 27–60 (summarizing opinions expressed by him on this subject between 1927 and 1950); Fenwick, op. cit., (3rd ed., 1948), p. 134 f.; and cf., further, Moreno, Derecho International Público, Vol. I (1940), pp. 289–336; Ross, op. cit., pp. 109 f., 223 ff. Some of these criticisms were themselves in whole or in part provoked by the subjective positivist dissents discussed below.

8 See, e.g., Kelsen, Problem, pp. 103 ff., 122 ff.; Krabbe, op. cit., p. 264 ff.; Scelle, op. cit., pp. 18 ff., 49 f., 408 ff.; Ross, op. cit., p. 12 f.; Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 4, 6–9; and cf. also Spiropoulos, Théorie Générale du Droit International (1930), pp. i ff., 1 ff., 25 ff., 37 ff., 191 ff., 212 ff.

9 For this uncertainty and doubt see, e.g., Triepel, “Les rapports,” loc. cit.; Borchard, “Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territories to the Persons and Property of Foreigners,” this Journal, Vol. 20 (1926), p. 741; Garner, “Responsibility of States for Injuries Suffered by Foreigners within Their Territories on account of Mob Violence, Biots, and Insurrections,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, Vol. 21 (1927), p. 50; Briggs, The Progressive Development of International Law (1947), p. 29 f.

10 Op. cit. (note 2, supra), Vol. I, pp. 160, 259.

11 Gareis, Völkerrecht (1901), p. 148; Mérignhac, Traité de Droit Public International, Vol. II (1907), pp. 69 ff., 73; Borchard, op. cit., p. 18.

12 Heilborn, Grundbegriffe, pp. 13, 96 f.

13 For the final end modification see, e.g., Garner, “La reconstruction du droit international,” 28 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1921), p. 413 ff.; Ralston, Democracy’s International Law (1922), p. 10 ff.; Heilborn, “Die Subjekte,” loc. cit., p. 685 f.; Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (1928), p. 221; Séfériadès, “Principes généraux du droit international de la paix,” 34 Hague Recueil (1930), p. 292 ff.; Dunn, “The International Rights of Individuals,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, Vol. 35 (1941), p. 14 ff.; Briggs, remarks, ibid., Vol. 40 (1946), p. 40; Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 35. (The statement in the fifth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law to this effect is not that of Oppenheim himself, but of that edition’s editor, Lauterpacht. See this edition, Vol. I, p. 504.)

For the beneficiary doctrine see, e.g., Hyde, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 36–40; Vol. II, p. 873, and cf. also the first edition of this work, Vol. I, pp. 464 ff., esp. p. 465; Kraus, loc. cit., pp. 373 ff., 379; Strupp, “Règles,” loc. cit., p. 263 ff.; E. Kaufmann, “Règles,” loc.,cit., p. 324; Walz, loc. cit., p. 381 ff.; Freeman, remarks, Proceedings, American Society of International Law, Vol. 35 (1941), p. 19 f. (who would, however, limit the scope of this doctrine); Briggs, The Progressive Development of International Law, p. 29; Schwarzenberger, International Law, pp. 75–77; cf. also Salvioli, “Les règles générales du droit de la paix,” 46 Hague Recueil (1933), p. 41, on this development.

For the potential subject modification see, e.g., Cavaglieri, “I soggetti del diritto internazionale,” 17 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1925), pp. 18–32, 169–187; Liszt-Fleischmann, Völkerrecht (12th ed., 1925), pp. 85 ff., 221 ff.; Heilborn, Die Stellung des Menschen im Völkerrecht (1927), passim; Knubben, op. cit., p. 425 ff.; Streit, “La conception du droit international privé,” 20 Hague Recueil (1927), p. 30 ff.; Spiro-poulos, L’individu en Droit International (1928), pp. 33 ff., 66; Anzilotti, op. cit., pp. 1 ff., 41 ff., 111 ff., 121 ff.; Romano, Corso di Diritto Internazionale (1929), p. 71 ff.; Strupp, op. cit., pp. 1 ff., 103; Siotto-Pintor, “Les sujets du droit international autres que les états,” 41 Hague Recueil (1932), pp. 251–361, esp. pp. 267 ff., 274 ff.; Strupp, “Règles,” loc cit., pp. 463 ff., 465; Basdevant, “Règles générales du droit de la paix,” 58 Hague Recueil (1936), pp. 475 ff., 528 f.; Schoen, loc. cit., pp. 411–448; Schwarzenberger, Manual, pp. 1 ff., 35.

14 See, e.g., Mérignhac, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 171 f.; Despagnet, op. cit., p. 544; Ralston, op. cit., pp. 14 f., 24; Gorotsev, loc. cit., p. 181; Akzin, “Les sujets du droit international,” 4 Revue de Droit International (1929), p. 488; Hambro, “Individuals before International Tribunals,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, Vol. 35 (1941), p. 23; Dunn, loc. cit., p. 14.

15 See, e.g., Diena, “L’individu devant l’autorité judiciaire et le Droit international,” 16 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1909), p. 57 ff.; Bilflnger, “Les bases fondamentales de la communauté des états,” 63 Hague Recueil (1938), p. 134.

16 See, e.g., Mérignhac, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 171; Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens (1896), Vol. I, p. 13; Gareis, op. cit., pp. 148–152; Liszt, Völkerrecht (4th ed., 1906), p. 112.

17 Adler, “Über die Verletzung völkerrechtlicher Pflichten durch Individuen,” 1 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht (1907), pp. 614–618.

18 Walz, loc. cit., pp. 381 ff., 443 ff.

19 Liszt, op. cit., pp. 41, note 2, 144 ff.

20 Untertanen als Subjekte völkerrechtlicher Pflichten,” 1 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht (1907), pp. 53–55.

21 Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen (1912), p. 141.

22 Grundbegriffe des Völkerrechts, p. 96 f.

23 Das System des Völkerrechts, pp. 143, 171.

24 Dumas, Les sanctions pénales de crimes allemands (1916), passim; Mérignhac, “De la sanction des infractions au droit des gens commises, au cours de la guerre européenne, par les empires du centre,” 24 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1917), p. 5 ff.; Mérignhac et Lemonon, Le Droit des Gens et la Guerre de 1914–1918 (2 vols., 1921), passim, esp. Vol. II, p. 563 ff.; Basdevant, loc. cit., p. 528 f.; Isay, “Die Zuständigkeit der Gemischten Schiedsgerichte,” 53 Juristische Wochenschrift (1924), Vol. I, p. 596 f.; same, “Die Stellung des Menschen im Völkerrecht,” 53 ibid., Vol. II, p. 1317 f.; remarks of Ebers and Isay in Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht (1926), pp. 38 ff., 98; Schoen, loc. cit., pp. 411 ff., 431 ff.; Cavaglieri, “I soggetti,” loc. cit, pp. 18 ff., 169 ff., 186 f. (contra Cavaglieri, “Règles,” loc. cit., p. 318 ff.); Bomano, op. cit., p. 71; Siotto-Pintor, loc. cit., p. 346 ff.; Pallieri, Diritto Internazionale Pubblico (1937), p. 277 ff.; Rocco, Sistema di Diritto Internationale (1938), p. 32 ff.; Musso, L’Individuo e le Minoranze come Soggetti del Diritto Internazionale (1937), pp. 17 ff., 40, 75 ff.; Rundstein, “L’arbitrage internationale en matière privée,” 23 Hague Recueil (1928), pp. 347 ff., 363 ff.; Berezowski, “Les sujets non-souverains du droit international,” 65 Hague Recueil (1938), pp. 5–82, esp. pp. 6–20; Korowicz, “La personnalité internationale de l’individu d’après la Convention relative à la Haute Silésie (1922–1937),” 6 Revue Internationale Française du Droit des Gens (1938), pp. 5 ff., 23; Lachs, War Crimes (1945), passim; Hostie, “Examen de quelques règles du droit international dans le domaine des communications et du transit,” 40 Hague Recueil (1932), p. 488 ff.; same, “Les affaires de communication devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale,” 22 Revue de Droit International (1938), pp. 105–156, esp. pp. 138–150; Bellot, “War Crimes and War Criminals,” 36 Canadian Law Times (1916), pp. 754 ff., 876 ff.; 37 ibid., (1917), p. 9 ff.; same, “War Crimes, Their Prevention and Punishment,” 2 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1916), p. 31; Bauer, Die Kriegsverbrecher vor Gericht (1945), passim; Hambro, loc. cit., p. 22 ff.; Akzin, Les Problèmes Fondamentaux du Droit International Public (1929), p. 121 ff.; same, “Les sujets,” loc. cit., pp. 451 ff., 483 ff.; Bartlett, “Liability for Official War Crimes,” 35 Law Quarterly Review (1919), p. 177 ff.; McNair, “Collective Security,” 17 British Yearbook of International Law (1936), p. 160 f.; Garner, “Punishment of Offenders against the Laws and Customs of War,” this Journal, Vol. 14 (1920), p. 70 ff.; Finch, “The Nuremberg Trial and International Law,” ibid., Vol. 41 (1947), p. 20 ff.; Borchard, “Responsibility of States,” loc. cit., p. 740 f.; N. Hall, “The Individual in International Organization,” 28 American Political Science Review (1934), pp. 276–287; Eagleton, op. cit., p. 40 f.; same, “The Individual in International Law,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, Vol. 40 (1946), pp. 22–29, and cf. also comments thereon, ibid., pp. 29–50, especially remarks of Finch and King at pp. 38–40; Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948), p. 9 ff.; Dunn, loc. cit., p. 14 ff.

25 “Les sujets du droit international,” loc. cit., pp. 488 f., 489, note 50; Problèmes Fondamentaux, p. 121 ff., 162 ff.

26 Dietze, “Europa als Einheit,” 20 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht (1936), pp. 290 ff., 319 ff.; Walz, “Minderheitenrecht oder Volksgruppenrecht,” 3 Völkerbund und Völkerrecht (1936–1937), p. 594 ff.

27 This seems to be admitted by Fenwick (op. cit., 3rd ed., pp. 133–135), but Fenwick is here no longer a subjective positivist. (Cf. ibid., pp. 30–32, 133–135.) This also seems to be the reason why the strict subjective positivist at one time avoided the use of these terms even though he admitted most of the facts upon which these terms are based. See, e.g., Triepel, op. cit., p. 20 ff.; Heilborn, System, pp. 64 ff., 417; Anzilotti, op. cit., p. 121 ff.; Oppenheim, op. cit. (3rd ed.), Vol. I, p. 457 ff.

28 See note 2 above, especially Heilborn, System, pp. 63, 78 f., 110, and cf., further, Carnazza-Amari, Traité de Droit International Public, Vol. I (1880), p. 371 f.; Holland, Jurisprudence (9th ed., 1900), p. 93 ff.; Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1928 ed.), p. 865; Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence (1911), p. 127 ff.; Sauer, Juristische Methodenlehre (1940), p. 441 ff.

29 See, e.g., Oppenheim, op. cit. (5th ed.), Vol. I, p. 504; Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. beneficiary; Black’s Law Dictionary, s.v. beneficiary; Salvioli, loc. cit.; Lauterpacht, “The Subjects of the Law of Nations,” 64 Law Quarterly Review (1948), p. 97; Cavaglieri, “Règles,” loc. cit., p. 319.

30 See note 2 above.

31 See notes 10 and 13 above.

32 An assumption which led Heilborn to argue that states proceed against pirates or stateless slave traders not under international law, but under the law of self-help, much as they would against noxious wild beasts. System, p. 84 f.

33 See, e.g., Oppenheim, op. cit. (3rd ed.), Vol. I, p. 456; Kraus, loc. tit., p. 374.

34 See, e.g., Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 460 ff.; Schwarzenberger, International Law, p. 162 f.

35 The regulation of piracy, of the slave trade, and of slavery, as well as the protection of minorities, of the inhabitants of mandated or trust territories, and, more recently, of the human rights of the nationals of certain former Axis countries, provide random examples of these principles.

36 The belief that the object theory requires integration into, rather than mediation by, the state seems to be shared also by the critic of this doctrine. See, e.g., Aufricht, loc. cit.

37 On this definition of a right and duty see, e.g., Jellinek, op. cit., p. 44; Paton, op cit., p. 206 ff.; Ross, op. cit., p. 96.

38 See note 2 above and cf. Paton, op. cit., p. 249 f.

39 See, e.g., Jellinek, op. cit., p. 324 ff.; Heilborn, System, p. 64 ff.; Triepel, op. cit., pp. 20, 289 ff.; Briggs, The Progressive Development of International Law, p. 29.

40 See, e.g., Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 457; Dickinson, “L’interpretation et l’application du droit international dans les pays Anglo-Américains,” 40 Hague Recueil (1932), p. 309 ff. Cf. further, Heilborn, Grundbegriffe, p. 89 f.

41 Kraus, loc. cit., p. 373 ff.

42 Hyde, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 33–36, 767 f.; Vol. II, pp. 891 f., 2159, 2213; and cf. first edition of this work, Vol. I, pp. 410, 478 f.; Vol. II, pp. 630, 680. See, further, Eagleton, op. cit., p. 40 f.

43 See, e.g., Liszt, op. cit., p. 190; Garner, op. cit., p. 29. The same impression is conveyed when Schwarzenberger refers to war criminals as “rather disreputable objects of international law” (op. cit., p. 79). For the object of a right or duty is neither reputable nor disreputable; it is just a thing.

44 See, e.g., Hershey, op. cit., p. 157.

45 See. e.g., Pfankuchen, A Documentary Textbook of International Law (1940), p. 47. Cf. also Meier (op. cit., p. 19 ff.), Aufricht (loc. cit.), and Akzin (loc. cit., p. 489), who seem to contend that the object standing constitutes itself an international status.

46 Kaufmann, loc. cit., p. 324.

47 Cf., e.g., de Louter, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 160, 163; Heilborn, System, p. 64 f.; Kaufmann, loc. cit.

48 See, e.g., Bustamante, op cit., Vol. I, p. 136; Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 18. Indeed, this consequence of such attribution is confirmed by the very doctrines upon which these jurists would have to rely for its rebuttal, i.e., by their doctrine of the incorporation and transformation of international into municipal law and by the inverses of this doctrine because reversing its formal results, their theory of the international responsibility of states for internationally injurious acts of individuals and their tenets of the international protection by states of internationally guaranteed private interests and rights. for the theoretical and actual necessity for these doerines does not lie, as alleged, in the fact that the law of nations is a law between, and not also within, states. It lies, rather, in the fact, not formally but nevertheless actually conceded in this school, that this law in effect deals with individuals as persons and not as things.

49 System, pp. 63, 64 ff. On p. 63 Heilborn also concedes that the individual could, at least theoretically, be both subject and object of this law. See, further, note 53 below.

50 Triepel, op. cit., p. 20 ff., and cf., e.g., Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 460 ff.; Borchard, op. cit., p. 16 ff.; Fenwick, op. cit. (2d ed.), pp. 86 f., 177 ff,; Schwarzenberger, op. cit., pp. 71 ff., 161 ff.

51 See notes 2, 49, 50 above. What is asserted at times is that international law has a rule regarding its subjects (cf., e.g., Anzilotti, op. cit., p. 133 f.; de Louter, “L’avenir du droit international public,” 19 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1912), pp. 282, 294; Redslob, op. cit., p. 11); that the general rules of this law neither define nor determine the subjects of it (Siotto-Pintor, loc. cit., p. 253), or that the practice of states stamps the individual an object, and not a subject, of this law (Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 35).

52 It is probably because of the time-honored character of this tradition that its validity is nowhere specifically analyzed or discussed, and that it is usually just acted upon. Cf., e.g., Ledlie, Sohm’s Institutes of Roman Law (1907), p. 158 f.; Heilborn, System, p. 63; Triepel, op. cit., p. 20 f.; Holland, op. cit., pp. 76 ff., 85 ff.; Pollock, op. cit., Part I, Chs. IV-VIII.

53 Op. cit., p. 3 (here as elsewhere, unless otherwise indicated, translations are those of the writer).

54 See, e.g., Partsch, Griechisches Bürgschaftsrecht (1909), p. 136 ff.; Sohm’s Institutes of Roman Law, p. 165 f.; Holland, op. cit., p. 86 f.; Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1825, Philadelphia ed.), Vol. I, p. 472 ff.; Code of Virginia (Richmond, 1849), pp. 253, 257, 458, 460, 461, 526, 543, 753 f., 787 f. (which is contrary to Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), 19 How. 393), on this point.

55 See, e.g., Salvioli, loc. cit., p. 40, for a specific claim that the problem of the individual in international law must be solved in these terms.

56 Pradier-Fodéré, Traité de Droit International Public Européen et Américain, Vol. I (1885), p. 120; cf. ibid., pp. 119 f., 153, and Vol. III (1887), p. 466; Wilson and Tucker, International Law (7th ed., 1917), pp. 60, 62 ff.

57 See, e.g., Zouche, Juris et judicii fecialis, sive juris inter gentes, et quaestionum de eodem explicatio (1650) [Carnegie Reproduction and Translation], passim; Rachel, De jure naturae et gentium dissertationes (1676) [Carnegie Reprod. and Transl.], passim; Textor, Synopsis jure gentium (1680) [Carnegie Reprod. and Transl.], passim; Bynkershoek, Quaestiones juris publici libri duo (1737) [Carnegie Reprod. and Transl.], passim; same, De dominio maris (1744) [Carnegie Reprod. and Transl.], passim.

58 See, e.g., G. F. de Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens Moderne de l’Europe (2 vols., 1864 Vergé ed.), Vol. I, pp. 48–50, 79–81, 154 f.; Halleck, Elements of International Law and Laws of War (1866), pp. 30, 31, 42; Calvo, Le Droit International Théorique et Pratique (6 vols., 1896 ed.), Vol. I, pp. 139, 154, 168; Gallander, A Manual of International Law (1879), pp. 50 ff., 62 ff.; Seijas, El Derecho International Hispanico-Americano (6 vols., 1884–1885), Vol. I, p. 1 ff.; Davis, Outlines of International Law (1887), pp. 2, 18, 26.

59 See, e.g., Bulmeriheq, Systematik des Völkerrechts (1858), p. 237 f. (an opinion which he recanted in his Praxis, Theorie und Codification des Völkerrechts (1874), p. 8, n. 7, and in his Völkerrecht (1884), p. 179, but not in favor of the object conception); Resch, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (1885), p. 25 ff.; Holtzendorff, Introduction au Droit des Gens (1889), p. 81 f., and implicitly so already in Martens, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 81, 228 ff., in 1789.

60 Stoerk, “Staatsunterthanen und Fremde,” in Holtzendorff’s Handbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. 2 (1887), p. 583 ff., esp. p. 588; Gareis, Institutionen des Völkerrechts (1888), p. 133 f.; Rivier, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (1889), p. 4. Some of these early modern subjective positivists also attributed a direct or immediate international personality to sovereign rulers in their personal, rather than organ, capacity. See, e.g., Martens, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 5; Vol. II, pp. 1–17; Bulmerincq, Systematik, p. 210; Calvo, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 171; Vol. III, p. 284 ff., 354 f., and cf., further, Holtzendorff, op. cit., p. 81 f.

61 See the writers cited in notes 20–26 above, especially Rehm, Cavaglieri, Romano, Siotto-Pintor, Pallieri, Rundstein, Berezowski, Akzin, Hostie, and Rocco; cf. also Knubben, op. cit., p. 496 f.

62 See, e.g., Lasson, Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts (1871), passim.

63 See, e.g., Holland, op. cit. [1st ed. 1880], pp. 369–384; Hall, A Treatise of International Law (8th ed., 1924 [1st ed. 1880]), pp. 1, 2, 17–49, 56–64, 90, 103 ff., 275 ff., 337 ff., 351 ff.

64 See, e.g., Jellinek, op. cit., pp. 310–329 (first published in 1892); Despagnet, op. cit., pp. 40, 46, 50, 64, 79 f., 81 f., 268 f., 361–433; Heilborn, System, pp. 58–211, 372; Triepel, op. cit., pp. 7 ff., 20, 21, n. 1, 21 ff. For especially emphatic later rejections of these early notions see especially Zorn, op. cit., pp. 3 ff., 64 ff., and Jelf, “International Law in its Strictest Meaning,” Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. XI, (1925), pp. 53–62, both of whom refer to these earlier ideas as “phantasies” and “Utopias.”

65 See, e.g., Zouche, op. cit., Vol. II, Table of Contents; Martens, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 3–6; cf. Bulmerineq, Praxis, pp. 145–150, and Völkerrecht, p. 179 f., for other writers of the period following the same pattern. See also Knubben, op. cit., p. 59, and Gorotsev, loe. cit., p. 173 ff.

66 See, e.g., Bulmerineq, Völkerrecht, p. 179 f.; same, Praxis, pp. 145–150, and Gareis, Völkerrecht, p. 2.

67 See, e.g., Martens, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 4 f.; Bulmerincq, Systematik, p. 237 f.; same, Praxis, pp. 148, 151–158; same, Völkerrecht, pp. 192, 193, 201, 202 ff., 207 ff., 298 f.j Gareis, op. cit., pp. 2, 47 f., 70, 148, 157, 176.

68 Cf. System, p. 372.

69 Jellinek, op. cit., p. 324, n. 1.

70 See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Everyman’s ed.), Vol. I, pp. 19–22.