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On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Robert D. Sloane
Robert D. Sloane*
Affiliation:
Boston University School of Law
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Extract

Necessity, necessità, is Machiavelli’s guiding principle . . . that infringing the moral law is justified when it is necessary.

Thus is inaugurated the dualism of modern political culture, which simultaneously upholds absolute and relative standards of value. The modern state appeals to morality, to religion, and to natural law as the ideological foundation for its existence. At the same time it is prepared to infringe any or all of these in the interest of self-preservation.

—J. M. Coetzee

Recent jurisprudence in investment arbitration, almost all of which originated in disputes arising out of Argentina’s turn-of-the-century fiscal crisis, has raised difficult questions about the existence, nature, and advisability of necessity as a defense to state responsibility. The jurisprudence has contributed to a sophisticated literature focusing on necessity’s role in the special context of investment arbitration. But the growing prominence of necessity pleas in international law has not been so limited. Nor will its effects be. In the first place, investor-state arbitral jurisprudence contributes to the evolution of general international law. Investment tribunals invoke the latter, for example, to inform their interpretation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or to cure lacunae in the law. More significantly, beyond the realm of investment arbitration, the past few decades have seen a striking growth in necessity pleas in fields ranging widely across the landscape of international law.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 106 , Issue 3 , July 2012 , pp. 447 - 508
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2012

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References

1 Diary of a Bad Year 17 (2007).

2 The phrase general international law is not used consistently. I mean the full corpus of international law that does not depend on treaty regimes or other special legal norms.

3 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Art. 42(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 UST 1270Google Scholar [hereinafter ICSID Convention].

4 For analysis, see infra notes 350 – 66 and accompanying text. See generally Johnstone, Ian, The Plea of “Necessity” in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-terrorism, 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 337 (2005)Google Scholar; Spierman, Ole, Humanitarian Intervention as a Necessity and the Threat or Use of Jus Cogens, 71 Nordic J. Int’l L. 523 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Laursen, Andreas, The Use of Force and (the State of) Necessity, 37 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 485 (2004)Google Scholar.

5 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep. 136, para. 140 (July 9).

6 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226, para. 105Google Scholar (July 8) (emphasis added).

7 See Rainbow Warrior (N.Z./Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 254-63 (Arb. Trib. 1990).

8 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010).

9 See, e.g., The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 1999 ITLOS Rep. 10, paras. 132-36 (July 1), 38 ILM 1323(1999); see also Un Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 92(1), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397.

10 See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 17, 2002), at http:www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; see also Mark Osiel, The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War 40-41 (2009).

11 See generally Boed, Roman, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct, 3 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2000 Google Scholar).

12 See, e.g., Traynor, Ian & Hooper, John, France and Italy in Call to Close EU Borders in Wake of Arab Protests, Guardian (London), Apr. 26, 2011, at 1Google Scholar; Dempsey, Judy, Denmark Reintroduces Border Controls, N.Y. Times, May 12, 2011 Google Scholar, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/europe/13iht-borderl3.html.

13 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).

14 Necessity has also been analyzed, for example, as a potential defense to international criminal responsibility. See, e.g., Ohlin, Jens David, The Torture Lawyers, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 193 (2010)Google Scholar; Blum, Gabriella, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2010)Google Scholar; DeNicola, Christopher P., Comment, A Shield for the “Knights of Humanity”: The ICC Should Adopt a Humanitarian Necessity Defense to the Crime of Aggression, 30 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 641 (2008)Google Scholar.

15 See, e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/69 (Nov. 18, 2011); cf. Reisman, W. Michael, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AJIL 82, 86 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Wilmarth, Arthur E. Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 Brook. J. Int’l L. 707, 707 (2010)Google Scholar; Willis, Bob, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, Bloomberg News, Aug. 1, 2009 Google Scholar, at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI.

17 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/15 (July 20, 2011).

18 Grady, Denise & McNeil, Donald G. Jr., Debate Persists on Deadly Flu Made Airborne, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2011 Google Scholar, at A1.

19 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN DOC. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility], reprinted in Crawford, James, The International Law Commission’S Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries 61 (2002)Google Scholar [hereinafter ILC Commentary]. The Lauterpacht Centre for International Law of the University of Cambridge maintains what it characterizes as an “almost complete collection of all the relevant historical documents relating to the International Law Commission’s State Responsibility work from 1996 to 2001.” The collection is available online at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/projects/state_responsibility_document_collection.php#6. All of the ILC documents are also available online on the Commission’s website, http://www.un.org/law/ile/.

20 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25.

21 Id, Arts. 21-27.

22 Id, Art. 55.

23 James Crawford, Introduction, in ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 1, 15-16. For analysis, see infra notes 350-366 and accompanying text.

24 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 ICJ Rep. 7, paras. 51-52 (Sept. 25); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 5, para. 140.

25 See Kurtz, Jürgen, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis, 59 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 325, 334-35 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, para. 344 (Sept. 28, 2007); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, para. 315 (May 12, 2005).

26 See UN Charter Art. 13(1); GA Res. 174 (II), at 105 (Nov. 21, 1947); McRae, Donald, The Work of the Inter national Law Commission, 2007-2011: Progress and Prospects, 106 AJIL 322, 324-31 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 See Heathcote, Sarah, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility: Necessity, in The Law of International Responsibility 491, 492 (Crawford, James, Pellet, Alain & Olleson, Simon eds., 2010 Google Scholar); see also Ago, Roberto, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1 Google Scholar, at 13, paras. 71-76, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318/Adds.5-7 [hereinafter Eighth Report Addendum]; ILC yearbooks are available online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/yearbooks.htm.

28 Williams, Glanville, The Defence of Necessity, 6 Current Legal Probs. 216, 225 (1953)Google Scholar; see also Osiel, supra note 10, at 37.

29 For further explanation and analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 229-36.

30 See generally Caron, David D., The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority, 96 AJIL 857 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 On the vital role of control systems generally and in international law and dispute resolution in particular, see Reisman, W. Michael, Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration 1–10 (1992)Google Scholar.

32 Others may include, for example, the jus ad bellum obligation that all force be necessary, the jus in bello obligation limiting force to no more than necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, treaties of all sorts authorizing temporary derogation based on various exigent circumstances, and international human rights treaties that allow states to derogate from certain obligations “ [i] n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.

33 See Reisman, W. Michael, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AJIL 866, 872 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Caron, supra note 30, at 873.

35 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fiftieth Session, UN GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, para. 224, UN DOC. A/53/10 (1998) [hereinafter Fiftieth Session Report].

36 Crawford, supra note 23, at 59 (emphasis added). I respectfully disagree with the suggestion that post-2001 developments vindicate the ILC’s prescriptive hope in this regard. Rather than analyze Article 25 “rigorously, together with all of [its] associated context and history,” Bodansky, Daniel & Crook, John R., Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview, 96 AJIL 773, 775 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, most tribunals and scholars have adopted Article 25 without analysis or reflection. See Caron, supra note 30, at 858, 868-70.

37 Crawford, supra note 23, at 59; see abo GA Res. 56/83, pmbl. (Jan. 28, 2002).

38 GA Res. 56/83, supra note 37, para. 3.

39 Caron, supra note 30, at 868-70.

40 Bodansky & Crook, supra note 36, at 775; see also Caron, supra note 30, at 858.

41 See ako Kurtz, supra note 25, at 335.

42 See, e.g., James Crawford, Addendum to Second Report on State Responsibility, paras. 278, 282, UN Doc. A.CN.4/498/Add.2, (Apr. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Second Report Addendum]; Crawford, supra note 23, at 4 & n.20; Heathcote, supra note 27, at 491-92; Comments and Observations of Governments on Part I of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [1982] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 15, 17-20, UN Doc. A/CN.4/351 & Adds. 1-3; see also Caron, supra note 30, at 858.

43 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, para. 51.

44 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 181-82, cmt. 11.

45 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 5, para. 140.

46 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 3.

47 Id. at 183, cmt. 14; see also Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495 (suggesting that except for the phrase in Article 25(1)(b) privileging interests of “the international community as a whole,” which “is considered progressive devel opment,” Article 25 codifies custom).

48 See generally Roberts, Anthea Elizabeth, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AJIL 757 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 Cheng, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 69–77 (1953)Google Scholar; see Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, Art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993.

50 Reisman, W. Michael, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 ASIL Proc. 101, 103 (1981)Google Scholar.

51 The exception is Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award, para. 106 (Apr. 22, 2009) (rejecting the defense).

52 See ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 182-83, cmt. 13 & n.420; see also Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 71.

53 See, e.g., 2 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 434 (Tuck, Richard ed., 2005) (1625)Google Scholar; Emer De Vattel, the Law of Nations, bk. II, ch. ix, §120 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008) (1758).

54 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan 103 (Oakeshott, Michael ed., 1962) (165l)Google Scholar.

55 Vattel, supra note 53.

56 3 Grotius, supra note 53, at 1190; see ako 2 Grotius, supra note 53, at 434.

57 Vattel, supra note 53.

58 Id., §119.

59 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 8 (citation omitted).

60 2 McNair, Arnold, International Law Opinions 231 (1956)Google Scholar.

61 Id.

62 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 179, cmts. 4-5.

63 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 23.

64 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 4.

65 2 McNair, supra note 60, at 231-32 (footnote omitted).

66 Id.

67 See id. (citing Vattel, supra note 53, ch. xii, §170).

68 Id. at 232 (emphasis added).

69 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 5.

70 Dinstein, Yoram, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 248 (4th ed. 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See generally Noyes, John E., The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force, in International Law Stories 263 (Noyes, John E., Dickinson, Laura A. & Janis, Mark W. eds., 2007)Google Scholar; Jennings, R. Y., The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82, 82-89 (1938)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Fox, British Minister to Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in 2 McNair, supra note 60, at 222.

72 See, e.g., Schachter, Oscar, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1634-35 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Shaw, Malcolm, International Law 1131 & n.63 (6th ed. 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (collecting authorities).

73 See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 70, at 67; 1 the Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 114-15 (Bruno Simma et al. eds, 2d ed. 2002); McNair, Arnold D., Collective Security, 1936 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 150, 150-52Google Scholar.

74 Furthermore, “There was nothing anticipatory about the British action against the Caroline . . ., inasmuch as use of the Caroline for transporting men and materials across the Niagara River . . . had already been in progress.” Dinstein, supra note 70, at 184-85.

75 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 5.

76 Noyes, supra note 70, at 270.

77 See 2 McNair, supra note 60, at 222-23; Dinstein, supra note 70, at 185.

78 Britain’s diplomatic correspondence, which concluded the affair, characterized the competing legal interests as, on the one hand, “[r]espect for the inviolable character of [sovereign] territory,” and on the other, “a strong over powering necessity.” Noyes, supra note 70, at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).

79 See id. at 270.

80 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1); ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 184, cmt. 17; see abo Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 290 (suggesting that under draft Article 33 “the balance to be struck” in cases involving erga omnes obligations should differ from the usual “balance between the interests of the respondent State and the individual interests of the State or States complaining of the breach”).

81 See Hobbes, supra note 54, at 103.

82 Id.

83 Sadly, neither example is hypothetical. See United States v. Holmes, 26 F.Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383); Rv. Dudley, [1884] Q.B.D. 273.

84 Regina v. Dudley, [1884] Q.B.D. 273; cf. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. It-96-22-A, Judgment, Joint & Sep. Op. McDonald & Vohrah, JJ. (Oct. 7, 1997).

85 See, e.g., Model Penal Code §3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

86 Ordinarily illegal conduct might also be excused as understandable under the circumstances. But this conception of necessity depends on the nature of the legal subject as a human being (rather than a state). See infra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.

87 2 McNair, supra note 60, at 231.

88 See Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 8 (citation omitted).

89 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, para. 186 (June 27).

90 Affaire d’Indemnité Russe (Russ./Turk.), 11 R.I.A.A. 431 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912)Google Scholar, transktedin 7 AJIL 178 (1913) [hereinafter Russian Indemnity].

91 7 AJIL at 183.

92 Id. at 184.

93 Id. at 185.

94 Id. at 178.

95 Id. at 195.

96 The ILC Commentary cites Russian Indemnity as support for both force majeure and necessity. ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 172, cmt. 7; id. at 180, cmt. 7.

97 Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495; see also “Force Majeure” and “Fortuitous Event” as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Survey of State Practice, International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine—Study Prepared by the Secretariat, [1978] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 61, paras. 25, 30, UN Doc. A/CN.4/315 [hereinafter Secretariat Survey].

98 Russian Indemnity, 7 AJIL at 195.

99 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(b) (emphasis added).

100 Russian Indemnity, 7 AJIL at 195 (citation omitted).

101 Id.

102 Id. at 196.

103 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(a).

104 Dispute Between Greece and Bulgaria Concerning the Forests of Rhodope, 15 League of Nations Official Journal 1432 (1934)Google Scholar; see ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 180, cmt. 7, n.407.

105 International Arbitral Awards of Osten Undén Arbitration Under Article 191 of the Treaty of Neuilly, 3 R.I.A.A. 1405 (1933)Google Scholar, translated in 28 AJIL 760 (1934) [hereinafter Üsten Undén Arbitration].

106 See Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 23.

107 Dispute Between Greece and Bulgaria Concerning the Forests of Rhodope, 15 League of Nations Official Journal at 1432 Google Scholar.

108 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 23; see abo ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 180, crat. 7 & n.407 (adopting the same interpretation).

109 No evidence implies that Greece attached any significance to the latter. See Üsten Undén Arbitration, 28 AJIL at 807 Google Scholar (dispositif m the underlying arbitration).

110 Société Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), 1939 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 78 at 160 (June 15).

111 See id. at 166.

112 Id. at 178.

113 Id. at 164; see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, paras. 276, 281.

114 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 28 (quoting Greece’s pleadings); see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 277.

115 Rainbow Warrior, supra note 7, para. 78; see also Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 23(1).

116 Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 276; see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, paras. 25,30.

117 See Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, paras. 280-81.

118 Société Commerciale de Belgique, 1939 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 78 at 174.

119 Id. at 177.

120 Id. at 172, 174-76.

121 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 180-81, cmt. 8; Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 288.

122 Société Commerciale de Belgique, 1939 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 78 at 174.

123 Id. at 175.

124 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 181, cmt. 8 (emphasis added); Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 288.

125 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 30 (emphasis omitted); see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 284; ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 181, cmt. 8.

126 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1).

127 Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 281.

128 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, paras. 29-30.

129 Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 275.

130 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 181, cmt. 8; see abo Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 288.

131 Société Commerciale de Belgique, supra note 110, at 177-78 (emphasis added).

132 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 31 (emphasis added); see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 288.

133 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 30; see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 284.

134 See Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 281 (emphasis added).

135 Contra LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Liability, paras. 266-67 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 ILM 40 (2007).

136 See Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 284; see also id., para. 287.

137 See, e.g., id., para. 276; Société Commerciale de Belgique, supra note 110, at 176.

138 See Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, paras. 14, 30.

139 Ago, Roberto, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 3Google Scholar, para. 55, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318/Adds.l-4.

140 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25.

141 Société Commerciale de Belgique, 1939 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 78 at 177-78.

142 See League of Nations Covenant, pmbl., Art 13.

143 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 181, ont. 8, n.410. In Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Serb.), 1929 PCIJ (ser. A) Nos. 20/21, at 5 (July 12), the PCIJ dismissed Serbia’s economic “force majeure” plea and held that “the war itself, despite its grave economic consequences,” did not give rise to a necessity defense affecting Serbia’s legal obligations. Id. at 39-40. In Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), 1934 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 63 at 65, 112-14 (Dec. 12), only Judge Dionisio Anzilotti, in his separate opinion, reached necessity, but he noted that Belgium probably did not itself mean to raise the defense and that, at any rate, it would have been rejected on the facts. Id, para. 7. See ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 181, cmt. 8, n.410 (citing Chinn, supra). Finally, the commentary, id., cites French Co. of Venezuehn R.R. (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 285 (Fr.-Venez. Mixed Claims Comm’n 1902), without comment. That award, in short, considered and rejected the classical conception of necessity; it offers no support for Article 25.

144 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 180, cmt. 6.

145 Letter from Earl of Rosebery to R. Morier (Mar. 17, 1893), in 86 British and Foreign State Papers 1893-1894, at 226 (1899).

146 See The Zabraka’s Seizure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1892 (on file with author).

147 Id.

148 Letter from R. Morier to Earl of Rosebery, supra note 145, at 228.

149 Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 155.

150 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 180, cmt. 6.

151 ILC Commentary, supra note 97, at 115.

152 Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, para. 155.

153 See Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495.

154 Under Article 21 of the Articles on State Responsibility (self-defense), the “wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.” The UN Charter did not exist at the time, and even if it had, it would be implausible to characterize Great Britain’s seal hunting as an armed attack. Under Article 23 (force majeure), the wrongfulness of an act may be precluded if it is attributable to “the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.” Seizing the British vessels, which Russia ordered, did not, of course, lie beyond Russia’s control.

155 Letter from Earl of Rosebery to R. Morier, supra note 145, at 227.

156 Another arguable authority not cited in the ILC Commentary is the Faber case. Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, at 600 (Ralston, Jackson Harvey & Doyle, W. T. Sherman eds., 1904 Google Scholar). Yet neither Germany nor the arbitral umpire even framed the issue in terms of necessity. Only in dicta, after issuing his ruling, did the umpire mention necessity—and even then, only in passing and in the course of a more general digression into “the true source of natural law.” Id. at 626; see id. at 627-30.

157 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 35.

158 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 181, cmt. 9.

159 See id.

160 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 UST 765, 970 UNTS 211.

161 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 ICJ Rep. 432 (Dec. 4); see ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 182, cmt. 12;

162 Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1998 ICJ Rep., para. 15.

163 Id., para. 20; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 9, Art. 92.

164 Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1998 ICJ Rep., paras. 67-68.

165 Id., para. 20 (emphasis added).

166 Id., para. 15. (emphasis added).

167 See id., para. 20 (summarizing Spain’s position as set forth in “two Notes Verbales [sent] to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,” as well as the European Community’s view as set forth in its own “Note Verbale” to Canada). The Second Report Addendum says that Spain’s memorial subsequently “dealt with issues of justification at some length” but, tellingly, “[w]ithout expressly referring to draft article 33.” Because of the ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction, “the claim was . . . neither formally pleaded nor adjudicated on the merits.” Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 285.

168 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(b); see also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, para. 53. But see supra text accompanying notes 43-47.

169 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 47, Art. 38(1)(c).

170 See Fletcher, George P., Rethinking Criminal Law 774–75 (1978)Google Scholar.

171 See Cheng, supra note 49, at 69.

172 Id. at 74 (emphasis added).

173 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 8 (citation omitted).

174 E.g., Cheng, supra note 49, at 74.

175 See, e.g. Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 13–14 (1968)Google Scholar; Greenawalt, Kent, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

176 See Harel, Alon, The Torture Lawyers: A Response, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 12 (Mar. 30, 2010)Google Scholar, at http://www.harvardilj.org/articles/HarelTortureLawyers-Final%20PDF.pdf.

177 Cf. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, supra note 84.

178 Schachter, Oscar, International Law in Theory and Practice 50 (1991)Google Scholar (footnotes omitted).

179 Cheng’s citation of national law might suggest the first, Cheng, supra note 49, at 69 n.3, but the sheer variety of national conceptions belies this possibility. Nor can necessity be characterized as “intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal systems,” Schachter, supra note 178, at 50, for it is a comparatively recent development in national law. See Fletcher, supra note 170, at 774-75. Finally, the fourth and fifth conceptions in Schachter’s typology seem incongruous as applied to necessity in the context of a legal system (international law, in general, and the law of state responsibility, in particular) that chiefly governs states rather than human beings.

180 See Cheng, supra note 49, at 72--73. The remaining authorities further exemplify the classical view. See, e.g., The Neptune (1797), in 4 International Adjudications: Modern Series 372, 385-86 (Moore, John Bassett ed., 1931)Google Scholar.

181 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, paras. 49-58.

182 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, pt. 1, ch. V (emphasis added).

183 Supra note 24; see 2 McNair, supra note 60, at 232.

184 See, e.g., Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, paras. 7-11.

185 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)Google Scholar.

186 See, e.g., Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Co. v. Burundi, 96 ILR 279, 319 (1994)Google Scholar; Rainbow Warrior, supra note 7, at 254.

187 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law 466 (7th ed. 2008)Google Scholar; see also Kurtz, supra note 25, at 334-35; Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 75.

188 GA Res. 174 (II), at 105 (Nov. 17, 1947); UN Charter Art. 13(1).

189 See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 27, at 494. But see Boed, supra note 11, at 7.

190 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1); see Boed, supra note 11, at 10.

191 E.g., Model Penal Code, supra note 85, §3.02; see Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1).

192 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(2)(c).

193 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, para. 51.

194 Cardozo, Benjamin N., The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1921)Google Scholar. Of course, “progressive development” implies reform of the law, which may be laudable. The point here is not normative; it is only to stress the extent of the reform in light of the history.

195 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 72.

196 Id., para. 11 (footnotes omitted).

197 Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 223 (emphasis added).

198 Id, para. 224.

199 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 27(b).

200 Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 282.

201 See, e.g., Bull, Hedley, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics 35 (Butterfield, Herbert & Wight, Martin eds., 1966)Google Scholar; Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, at 95 (1951)Google Scholar. With reference to criminal law analogies in particular, see Prosecutor v. Erdemović, supra note 84, Sep. & Diss. Op. Cassese, J., para. 2; see also Mohamed, Saira, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1275 (2010)Google Scholar.

202 See, e.g., DeNicola, supra note 14, at 672-74.

203 See Fiftieth Session Report, supra note 35, paras. 247-50.

204 See Nollkaemper, André, Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts, 101 AJIL 760, 791-92 (2007)Google Scholar.

205 I adopt this shorthand from Ohlin, supra note 14, at 218.

206 See, e.g., Perka v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (Can.).

207 Regina v. Howe, [1987] 1 A.C. 417, 432 (H.L.) (emphasis added).

208 Dennis, Ian Howard, On Necessity as a Defence to Crime: Possibilities, Problems and the Limits of Justification and Excuse, 3 J. Crim. L. & Phil. 29, 35 (2008)Google Scholar; accord Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R., para. 33.

209 See, e.g., In re A (Conjoined Twins), [2000] 4 All E.R. 961, 1043-45; Moss v. Howdle, (1997) J.C. 123 (Scot.); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §34 (Ger.), in The German Criminal Code: A Modern English Translation 45 (Bohlander, Michael trans., 2008)Google Scholar; see also Ohlin, supra note 14, at 218 & n.1 52.

210 See, e.g., Model Penal Code, supra note 85, §2.01.

211 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).

212 Cf. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, supra note 84, Sep. Op. McDonald & Vohrah, JJ.

213 2 Stephen, James Fitzjames, A History of the Criminal Law of England 107 (1883)Google Scholar.

214 See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, supra note 84, para. 85.

215 Model Penal Code, supra note 85, §2.09(1) (emphasis added).

216 See infra notes 307–18 and accompanying text.

217 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 185, ont. 20.

218 Crawford, supra note 23, at 13.

219 See Model Penal Code, supra note 85, §3.02; see also Fletcher, supra note 170, at 774-98.

220 See Model Penal Code, supra note 85, §3.02; see, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28-1407 (2008); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §503 (1998).

221 See, e.g., Act Likely to Cause Harm, but Done Without Criminal Intent, and to Prevent Other Harm, Pen. Code ch. 4, §81 (India), at http://chddistrictcourts.gov.in/The Indian Penal Code.pdf; Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §34 (Ger.); Ugolovnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [UK RF] [Criminal Code] Arts. 39, 41 (Russ.), in Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Butler, William trans. & ed., 1997)Google Scholar; Código Penal [Cód Pen.] [Criminal Code] §34(3) (Arg.), in The Argentine Penal Code 11–12 (Varela, Verónica Beccar trans., 2004)Google Scholar; In re A (Conjoined Twins), supra note 209; Criminal Code of China, Art. 21, in The 1997 Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of China 39–40 (Luo, Wei trans., 1998)Google Scholar; Introduction to Swiss Law 254 (Dessemontet, F. & Ansay, T. eds., 3d ed. 2004)Google Scholar (discussing Swiss Penal Code Art. 34 PC (Art. 17 rev PC).

222 E.g., Model Penal Code, supra note 85, §3.02(1).

223 Cf. Caplan, Lee M., State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory , 97 AJIL 741, 765-76 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

224 D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fdic, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).

225 To adapt an example made famous by Ronald Dworkin, see Dworkin, Ronald, Law’s Empire 15–20 (1986)Google Scholar, Anglo-American law, like international law, adopts the general principle that no one should profit from his own wrong. Consequently, the New York Court of Appeals construed a statute of wills—which, interpreted literally, might have bequeathed an estate to the very man who had murdered the legator in order to ensure his inheritance—to conform to the general principle that a delictor may not benefit from his own delict and thereby avoided this absurd result. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). General principles play a comparable role in inter national law, and for this reason, among others, any formal or literal normative hierarchy in international law would likely be misguided. For a more detailed analysis and critique of the idea of a normative hierarchy in international law, see generally Caplan, supra note 223.

226 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: the General Part §239 (2d ed. 1961); see also Greenawalt, Kent, Conflicts of Law and Morality 292 (1987)Google Scholar; 1 Lafave, Wayne R. & Scott, Austin W. Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 629 (1986)Google Scholar.

227 See, e.g., 2 Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments) 12 (1985) [hereinafter Model Penal Code Commentary]; Greenawalt, supra note 226, at 292; Williams, supra note 226, at 746.

228 See Dennis, supra note 208, at 32-33; see also Fletcher, supra note 170, at 793-94.

229 Williams, supra note 28, at 233.

230 Fletcher, supra note 170, at 790; cf. Greenawalt, supra note 226, at 306.

231 2 Model Penal Code Commentary, supra note 227, at 12; see also State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 946 (N.J. 1986); accord! Lafave, Wayne R., Substantive Criminal Law 118–19 (4th ed. 2003)Google Scholar.

232 Simons, Kenneth W., Exploring the Intricacies of the Lesser Evils Defense, 24 L. & Phil. 645, 648 (2005)Google Scholar.

233 United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1992); see ab Greenawalt, supra note 226, at 289-90; Fletcher, supra note 170, at 790.

234 See Hoffheimer, Michael H., Codifying Necessity: LegisL•tive Resistance to Enacting Choice-of-EviL• Defenses to Criminal Liability, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 191, 227-28 (2007)Google Scholar; Arnolds, Edward B. & Garland, Norman F., The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 289, 296-98 (1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

235 See Fletcher, supra note 170, at 782-83.

236 E.g., Oliver Cromwell, Speech to the First Protectorate Parliament (Sept. 12, 1654), in 2 Thomas Carlyle, Oliver Cromwell’S Letters and Speeches: With Elucidations 301 (1845)Google Scholar.

237 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(a); see, e.g., Posner, Eric A., Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1901 (2003)Google Scholar.

238 See Henkin, Louis, How Nations Behave 23–24 (2d ed. 1979)Google Scholar.

239 United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1992).

240 Bederman, David J., International Law Frameworks 7 (3d ed. 2010)Google Scholar.

241 Nollkaemper, supra note 204, at 791; see ako Crawford, James, The ILC”s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AJIL 874, 878 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

242 Consider, for example, as Nollkaemper does, supra note 204, at 791 & n.167, the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).

243 See Nollkaemper, supra note 204, at 791-93.

244 Cf. Alvarez, José E. & Khamsi, Kathryn, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in 2008-09 Y.B. Int’l Investment L. & Pol’y 379, 395-96 (Sauvant, Karl P. ed., 2009)Google Scholar.

245 Perhaps the closest analogue to legislative preclusion in international law is Article 2(2) of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 20-100 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85, which brooks no exceptions (necessity included) to the categorical prohibition on torture. It is telling that the Convention conspicuously failed under circumstances of perceived crisis, receiving not even a citation in the notorious “torture memos. “ See Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable 41, 91-93 (Cole, David ed., 2009)Google Scholar.

246 See, e.g., ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 178, cmt. 2 & n.398; id. at 182-83, cmts. 13-14; see ab Heathcote, supra note 27, at 491-92.

247 U.S. Const, pmbl.

248 Not coincidentally, John Rawls excluded international law from his initial theory of justice. See Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice 7–8 (1971)Google Scholar. Even within a polity, Rawls later concluded, “The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines—the fact of reasonable pluralism—shows that, as used in [A Theory of Justice], the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is unrealistic.” Rawls, John, Political Liberalism, at xvii (1993)Google Scholar. Time and again, he stressed that “in modern democratic societies,” value pluralism “is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy.” Id. at 36. A fortiori, it is a permanent feature of the “different cultures and traditions of thought” found within the figurative international community. Rawls, John, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” 11 (2001)Google Scholar.

249 Kg, Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1976).

250 Simons, supra note 232, at 648.

251 Lowe, Vaughan, Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 405, 407 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

252 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(b).

253 See Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495; see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, paras. 25, 30.

254 Self-defense may involve an equal measure of subjectivity. But it is part of the jus ad bellum, which, whatever its faults and controversies, supplies a shared framework, which, not coincidentally, includes its own, conceptually distinct, necessity standard.

255 See Caplan, supra note 223, at 742-43.

256 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25.

257 See Dan-Cohen, Meir, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 627 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

258 Crawford, supra note 23, at 15 (emphasis added).

259 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 257, at 631.

260 Id.

261 It would be equally misguided to construe provisions of the Articles on State Responsibility other than Article 25 solely as decision rules. Countermeasures (part 3, chapter II of the Articles on State Responsibility), for example, establish, and presumably were intended to establish, principles that will influence state conduct—namely, the circumstances under which states may take countermeasures and the nature and scope of those measures. Chapter II does not deal only with the formal consequences of a violation in the event that an institution happens to be available to apply the Articles on State Responsibility as decision rules.

262 Articles on State Responsibility, pt. 1, ch. V; see also ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 160, cmt. 2.

263 Id. at 65-66, Arts. 20-25.

264 See Lowe, supra note 251, at 406.

265 See DeNicola, supra note 14. But see Mohamed, supra note 201.

266 Perhaps, as Vaughan Lowe argues, the concept of excuse would be preferable for all CPWs. Lowe, supra note 251, at 409-11. This essay’s argument is limited to Article 25.

267 Amador, F. V. García, Report on State Responsibility, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 173, para. 191Google Scholar, UN Doc. A/CN.4/96.

268 Eighth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 139, para. 49 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).

269 Id., para. 55; see also id., paras. 48-54; Lowe, supra note 251, at 406.

270 Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 214.

271 Id., paras. 216-29.

272 Id., para. 353. Some CPWs fit more comfortably within one or the other rubric. It is difficult to see, for example, how consent (Article 20) could be anything but a justification. In contrast, force majeure (Art. 23), absent a lex specialis, is generally an excuse. The travaux suggest that states regarded countermeasures, consent, and self-defense as justifications and force majeure, necessity, and distress as excuses. Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 353.

273 Id, para. 353.

274 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, [1999] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2, at 74 Google Scholar [hereinafter Fifty-First Session Report].

275 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 160, cmt. 2.

276 Id. at 161, cmt. 4.

277 Id. at 178, cmt. 2 (emphasis added); see also id. at 183, para. 14.

278 See id. at 179-82, cmts. 4-12.

279 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 27(a).

280 See Fifty-First Session Report, supra note 274, at 85.

281 See generally Greenswalt, supra note 175.

282 See Fletcher, supra note 170, at 818.

283 See, e.g., Harel, supra note 176, at 14-15 (citing Fletcher, supra note 170, at 759-62; Gur-Arye, Miriam, Should a Criminal Code Distinguish Between Justificarían and Excuse?, 5 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 215, 222-29 (1992))CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

284 Greenawalt, supra note 175, at 1900.

285 See Verbatim Record, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, ICJ Doc. Cr 1999/15, trans. available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf (Rusen Ergec, representing Belgium in oral pleadings) [hereinafter Ergec ICJ pleadings].

286 E.g., Indep. Int’l Comm’n on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 10 (2000), at http://reliefweb.int/node/21913; cf. Franck, Thomas M., Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AJIL 857 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

287 See generally Lowe, supra note 251.

288 See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 187, at 510.

289 UN Charter Art. 2(4); see 1 Oppenheim’S International Law 7–8 (Jennings, Robert & Watts, Arthur eds, 9th ed. 1992)Google Scholar.

290 See Hornbeck, J. F., Argentina’s Default Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the “Holdouts, “CRS Report for Congress 1 (Jan. 21, 2010)Google Scholar, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41029.pdf.

291 LG&Energy Corp., supra note 135, para. 267(d).

292 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 55; see also, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, Art. XI, S. Treaty Doc. 103-2 (1993), 31 ILM 124 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Arg. Bit].

293 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 27(b).

294 See ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 160, cmt. 2; Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, paras. 222, 226; accord Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, para. 101.

295 Heathcote, supra note 27, at 494 (citation omitted).

296 See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co., supra note 25, paras. 355, 388; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 ICJ Rep., para. 48.

297 Heathcote, supra note 27, at 494 (citation omitted).

298 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(b).

299 Id., Art. 25(1)(a) (emphasis added); see Heathcote, supra note 27, at 496.

300 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 183, ont. 15.

301 Heathcote, supra note 27, at 496 (citations omitted).

302 Id. at 497.

303 See id. at 492; Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, paras. 278, 281.

304 Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 291.

305 Vicuña, Francisco Orrego, Softening Necessity, in Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Hekman 741, 751 (Arsanjani, Mahnoush H., Cogan, Jacob Katz, Sloane, Robert D. & Wiessner, Siegfried eds., 2011)Google Scholar.

306 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(b). Presumably an interest of the international community as a whole is the converse of an obligation of the international community as a whole, such as obligations ergaomnes. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970ICJ Rep. 3, para. 33 (Feb. 5). For discussion of the effect on necessity of applicable erGA omnes interests or obligations, see Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 290.

307 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(b).

308 See Heathcote, supra note 27, at 494.

309 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(2)(b).

310 See, e.g., Model Penal Code, supra note 5, §3.02(2) (footnote omitted).

311 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 13 (emphasis added).

312 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 23(1).

313 Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495; see also Secretariat Survey, supra note 97, paras. 25, 30.

314 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Arts. 23(2)(a), 24(2)(a).

315 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 185, cmt. 20.

316 Id.; see, e.g., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, paras. 57-58.

317 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l, Award, supra note 25, para. 341.

318 See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987).

319 See, e.g., Falk, Richard A., Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AJIL 847, 850-51 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

320 Heathcote, supra note 27, at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted).

321 Henkin, supra note 238, at 97 (internal quotation marks omitted).

322 Id.

323 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, at 38-40.

324 VU University Amsterdam, Necessity Across International Law, Apr. 24-25, 2009. A symposium issue arising out of this conference appears in volume 41 of the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (Dekker, I. F. & Hey, E. eds., 2010 Google Scholar).

325 Crawford, supra note 23, at 15.

326 Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law 94 (1961)Google Scholar.

327 Crawford, supra note 241, at 877; see also id. at 879; Eric David, Primary Rules and’Secondary Rules, in The Law of International Responsibility, supra note 27, at 27-29; Crawford, supra note 23, at 1-2; Caron, supra note 30, at 870.

328 Vermeer-Künzli, Annemarieke, As If: The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection, 18 Eur. J. Int’l L. 37, 49-50 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

329 Bodansky & Crook, supra note 36, at 778.

330 Crawford, Introduction, in ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 16; see, e.g., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24.

331 Crawford, supra note 23, at 15; see also David, supra note 327, at 32.

332 One scholar suggested that the distinction served “as a means to justify and protect [the ILC’s state responsibility work] intellectually.” Bederman, David J., Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AJIL 817, 818-19 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (footnote omitted).

333 Bodansky & Crook, supra note 36, at 780-81; see also Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 328, at 50.

334 See Combacau, J. & Alland, D., “Primary” and “Secondary” Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: Categorizing International Obligations, 1985 Neth. Y.B. Int’l L. 81, 104Google Scholar.

335 See id.

336 David, supra note 327, at 30-31.

337 Id. at 29.

338 Id.

338 Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 328, at 50.

340 Id. (footnote omitted).

341 Crawford, James, First Report on State Responsibility, [1998] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 1 Google Scholar, paras. 15-16, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490 (1998).

342 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 55.

343 See, e.g., ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 290-91, cmt. 10.

344 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Arts. XX, XXI, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194, 262-67; see, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services of Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010); see also General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. XIV, in World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 325 (1999)Google Scholar, reprinted in 33 ILM 1167 (1994); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross- border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB (adopted Apr. 20, 2005).

345 See ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 308, cmt.5, & nn.868-69; see also Crawford, supra note 341, at 7.

346 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 308, cmt. 5 (internal quotation maries omitted).

347 See id. at 290-91, para. 10; Crawford, James, Third Report on State Responsibility, [2000] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 3, para. 416 Google Scholar, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.4.

348 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 307, cmt. 4.

349 Id., cmt. 3.

350 Id. at 185, cmt. 19 (emphasis added).

351 Id. at 186, cmt. 21.

352 See, e.g., Simma, Bruno, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Henkin, Louis, Kosovo and the law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AJIL 824 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But cf. Reisman, W. Michael, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 3 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

353 Ergec ICJ pleadings, supra note 285, at 7.

354 UN Charter Art. 2(4).

355 Ergec ICJ pleadings, supra note 285.

356 See ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 186, cmt. 21 (footnote omitted).

357 See id. at 18 5, para. 21 (footnote omitted). But cf. Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, paras. 286-87.

358 Brownlie, supra note 187, at 510-11; see also Oppenheim’S International Law, supra note 289, at 704; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §102, cmt. (k).

359 Brownlie, supra note 187, at 511.

360 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 26.

361 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, para. 105(2)(E).

362 See id., Diss. Op. Higgins, J., at 583, para. 29.

363 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 185-86, ont. 21.

364 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 5, para. 140.

365 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 185, cmt. 21. The jus ad bellum also incorporates its own, independent necessity standard. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ Rep. 161, para. 73 (Nov. 6).

366 See Venturini, Gabriella, Necessity in the Law of Armed Conflict and in International Criminal Law, 2010 Neth. Y.B. Int’l L. 45 Google Scholar, 74.

367 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 5, para. 140.

368 See id. at 240, paras. 1, 3, 5-7 (decl. Buergenthal, J.).

369 See, e.g., Société Commerciale de Belgique, supra note 110; Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, supra note 143; Chinn, supra note 143; Russian Indemnity, supra note 90; French Co. of Venezuelan R.R., supra note 143.

370 See, e.g., People v. Fontes, 89 P.3d 484, 486 (Colo. App. 2003); State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) (“Economic necessity has never been accepted as a defense to a criminal charge.”). See generally Williams, supra note 226, at 729; Lafave, supra note 231, at 527 & n.35.

371 For a comprehensive review, see Bjorklund, Andrea K., Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure, in The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 459 Google Scholar ( Muchlinski, Peter, Ortino, Federico & Schreuer, Christoph eds., 2008)Google Scholar; see also, e.g., Rudolf Dolzer, Emergency Clauses in Investment Treaties: Four Versions, in Looking To the Future, supra note 305, at 705.

372 U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 292, Art. XI.

373 See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5,2008); BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, Award (UNCITRAL Dec. 24, 2007), at http://ita.law.uvic.ca; Sempra Energy Int’l, Award, supra note 25; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); LG&Eenergy Corp., supra note 135; CMS Gas Transmission Co., supra note 25.

374 See generally Desierto, Diane A., Necessity and “Supplementary Means of Interpretation” for Non-precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 827 (2010)Google Scholar. Compare, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 135, and Continental Casualty Co., supra note 373, with Sempra Energy Int’l, Award, supra note 25, para. 388, and CMS Gas Transmission Co., supra note 25, paras. 355, 388.

375 See Kurtz, supra note 25, at 329. In the interest of brevity, I discuss only the first, and only as relevant here.

376 Id. at 343.

377 See generally id. at 341.

378 See id. at 343-44.

379 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l, Award, supra note 25, para. 344; CMS Gas Transmission Co., supra note 25, para. 315.

380 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 307, cmt. 4.

381 U.S.-Arg. Bit, supra note 292, pmbl.

382 See Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495.

383 U.S.-Arg. Bit, supra note 292, Art. XI.

384 See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 244, at 392.

385 Burke-White, William W. & von Staden, Andreas, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 Va. J. Int’l L. 307, 323 (2008)Google Scholar. Notably, three of the earliest awards to adopt a variation on the “confluence” approach—CMS, Enron, and Sempra—have been annulled, in part based on a critique of this methodology.

386 LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 135.

387 ICSID Convention, supra note 3.

388 Id., Art. 42(1).

389 Id.

390 U.S.-Arg. Bit, supra note 292, Art. XI.

391 LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 135, para. 226.

392 See id., paras. 249–61.

393 Id., paras. 229, 257 (emphasis added).

394 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.

395 U.S.-Arg. Bit, supra note 292, pmbl.

396 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 27(b).

397 Id., Art. 55.

398 Cf. Tudor, Toana, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment 226–27 (2008)Google Scholar.

399 Continental Casualty Co., supra note 373.

400 See, e.g., Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Annulment ( July 30,2010). Because Article 52 of the ICSID Convention sharply limits the grounds for annulment, substantive analysis of the necessity plea has often been smuggled in under the strained rubric of an alleged excess of jurisdiction or failure of the tribunal to state reasons for its decision. See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annulment (June 29, 2010) (characterizing a difference in interpretation of Article Xi of the U.S. Argentina Bit as manifest excess of powers).

401 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 14 (emphasis added).

402 Orrego Vicuña, supra note 305, at 750-51.

403 See, e.g., id. at 745-46.

404 Dershowitz, Alan M., Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge 161–62 (2003)Google Scholar.

404 See Caron, supra note 30, at 858; see also id. at 868-70.

406 Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 80.

407 The most recent was published nearly a century ago. Burleigh Cushing Rodick, The Doctrine of Necessity’ in International Law (1928).

408 Waldron, Jeremy, The Rule of International Law, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 15, 21 (2006)Google Scholar; see also Henkin, Louis, International Law: Politics and Values 10 (1995)Google Scholar; Luban, David, The Romance of the Nation-State, in International Ethics 238 (Beitz, Charles R., Cohen, Marshall, Scanlon, Thomas & Simmons, A. John eds., 1985)Google Scholar.

409 Waldron, supra note 408, at 24 (footnote omitted).

410 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 179, ont. 4.

411 2 McNair, supra note 60, at 232.

412 Id.

413 Arguably, the right to self-determination is a jus cogens norm under Article 26 of the Articles on State Responsibility.

414 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, Merits, at 47 (Sept. 13).

415 The equidistance–special circumstances rule may supply a (very rough) analogy. Cf. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 ICJ Rep. 13, para. 65 (June 3).

416 Cf. Bodansky & Crook, supra note 36, at 788-89.

417 ILC Commentary, supra note 19, at 183, cmt. 15.

418 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 27(b).

419 Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 67 (sep. op. Jessup, J.).

420 Boed, supra note 11, at 2.

421 Id. at 2. Comparable situations arose in Jordan and Macedonia. Id. at 2-3 & n.4.

422 Id. at 3.

423 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25.

424 E.g., Benvenisti, Eyal & Downs, George W., The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 595, 597 (2007)Google Scholar.

425 See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).

426 The state may be the greatest threat to human rights, but it is also the most effective and reliable guarantor of those rights. Michael Ignatieff, Whose Universal Values? the Crisis in Human Rights 19-20 (1999).

427 Cf. CMS Gas Transmission Co., supra note 25, para. 317 (“If strict and demanding conditions are not required or are loosely applied, any State could invoke necessity to elude its international obligations. This would certainly be contrary to the stability and predictability of the law.”).