The self-governing colonies of the British Empire are not, it is true, states within the meaning of international law, for Great Britain has, among other things, the legal right to conclude with other nations treaties which affect her colonies. It is, moreover, too much to say that the self-governing colonies will become members of the family of nations. Still it is a fact that England has in recent years granted them more or less participation in the negotiation of treaties affecting their welfare; and in a recent treaty of general arbitration Great Britain expressly reserves “the right before concluding a special agreement in any matter affecting the interest of a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire, to obtain the concurrence therein of the Government of that Dominion.” Consequently these colonies possess a certain standing in international relations which can not be overlooked, and which justifies some comparative study of their fundamental laws. The object of this paper is, therefore, to give a general sketch of the constitution of South Africa, recently approved by the English Parliament, in the light of the earlier constitutions similarly granted to Canada and Australia.

It was in the natural course of things that the Second Conference of 1907, called to elaborate the work of 1899, should deal with the problem of extending arbitration along the lines indicated in the Russian proposal of 1899, and that the question should be reconsidered as to whether the nations could not and should not obligate themselves to refer disputes to arbitration.

The lawyers in every country have been kept busy during the last century in developing a special body of law, first for the railroad, then for the telegraph, and then for the telephone. They must soon address themselves to a new task of the same nature. The air-ship has at last been brought to a state of efficiency which, while far short of perfection, takes it out of the field of mere experiment and seems to assure its speedy employment in the transportation for hire of passengers and goods. Other uses of less worth to the community or of absolute detriment are equally certain. It will be seized as an aid in evil-doing by smugglers, spies, burglars; by criminals of all sorts flying from justice; and for illicit trade of every kind. It flies over the borders of one sovereignty into those of another as swiftly and irresponsibly as a bird. How far must it be the subject of public regulation? How fully can the precepts of private law which have been found applicable to other conditions and relations be applied to those resulting from the introduction of this new agency of power ? Can there be one world-law for the high air, as there is one world-law for the high sea ? Can such rules as those of general average and maritime lien be applied by analogy to aerial navigation ?“

During the year which has elapsed since the writer first devoted attention to some of the legal aspects of aerial navigation, very material progress has been made in the art itself. Longer and more regularly controlled nights have been recorded by both the dirigible balloon and the aeroplane type of aircraft, between stated localities on land, over territorial waters and even over lanes of commercial importance upon the high seas. A great number and variety of aircraft are being built for state as well as. private uses in large establishments erected in many countries for that particular purpose. The field of experiment and demonstration has constantly broadened. Great nations have established a special aeronautic service for use in conjunction with both the army and the navy. So great is the importance ascribed to the function of aircraft in the next great war that much attention is already directed toward the construction of special means for effectual defense. Indeed, an entirely new type of ordnance has resulted, having, as we shall see, a notable influence upon some questions of international law.

Of the two kinds of prescription, acquisitive (acquisition by usucaption) or extinctive, the latter has more frequently received the consideration of claims commissions and to it we desire first to particularly address ourselves.

When the entire course of a river passes through the territory of but a single state, it is generally agreed that a right of exclusive control is possessed by the territorial sovereign which may, therefore, bar the navigation of the stream by foreign nations. Any privileges of transit enjoyed by their vessels are always understood to be subject to the consent of the local state. Thus, with respect to such rivers as the Mississippi and the Hudson, foreign countries enjoy no right of navigation.