The outstanding accomplishment of the Lima Conference was without doubt the Declaration of the Principles of the Solidarity of America, known more briefly as the Declaration of Lima. Its formulation was not brought about by discussions in the committee to which problems relating to the “Organization of Peace” were entrusted, but was rather the outcome of informal and in part confidential conversations among the heads of the several delegations. Numerous drafts were submitted in the process of reconciling conflicting views. Compromises were made by delegates with more advanced views in order to secure the assent of those taking a more conservative position. The requisite of unanimity not only delayed the final adoption of an acceptable text, but of necessity introduced elements of confusion in the logical order of the Declaration and of inconsistency in the relations of its several parts. Nevertheless the final result was a document of far-reaching importance in the progress of international law within the western hemisphere; and the agreement which it embodies must for the time rank as the most significant statement of principles and pledge of concerted action in the history of Latin American conferences.

The Inter-American Committee of Experts for the Codification of International Law, created by resolution of the Seventh Conference of American States at Montevideo in 1933, met, for the second time, at Lima, Peru, from November 24 to December 21, 1938, after a preliminary exchange of views by mail. Of the seven members of the Committee, a quorum of four was present.

In the conduct of foreign policy and the participation of the United States in international affairs, the relation between the Navy and the Foreign Service is of vital importance, but often misunderstood. The relationship encompasses the very wide range of coördination and coöperation which should and must exist between the two interdependent government agencies in peace, during times of national emergency, and, finally, when the country is engaged in actual warfare. The relationship involves, as well, the larger problem of national defense, and this cannot be ignored if the United States is to maintain its proper position in world affairs.

At a time when the subject of arms embargoes and arms export control is arousing considerable interest both at home and abroad, it is not untimely to examine the system of control which has developed in one of the chief arms producing and exporting countries of the world—Great Britain. Much attention has been devoted to the alleged evils of the international traffic in arms, and to the desirability of an effective government control over all armaments exports. Little consideration, on the other hand, has been given by writers to the question of how such control should be administered by a government, and what measures are actually involved. Taking the experience of Great Britain as a case study, the writer proposes in the following pages to trace the development of arms export control in that country, to examine the ways in which it has been administered, and to point out some of the difficulties which have been encountered. The present article may be looked upon, therefore, as a case study in the broader subject of national controls over the export of war materials.

The forms of international organizations have been a result of practical considerations. They exist because the specific necessities or desiderata which have appeared in the national interests of states were best dealt with by some international machinery. Frequently the constructive idea has come from a particular government which was willing to sponsor whatever institution was required to give it reality. In consequence, most of the multilateral machinery which governments now use for their 60 or 70 cooperative activities are situated in national capitals and are dependent on particular governments for some of their functioning. Diplomatic courtesy has thus largely accounted for the present wide geographic distribution of international bureaus, commissions, and other organs; but since the constituent instruments have customarily provided for their limited financial support by all contracting states, and the functions of the host government have been formal or even honorary, dependence upon a single administration has seldom interfered with the functioning of official international organs.