We are all of us today, even we international lawyers, disciples of Heraclitus. The international world shows itself so clearly in a “state of flux,” that a doubt on the central doctrine of that philosopher is no longer permissible. We theorists have therefore to take heed to build our doctrines on tendencies rather than on “facts” ; otherwise when we have finished constructing our systems, it may happen that the facts are no longer what they were when we began building, and the system is out of date before it is established.

The First Conference for the Codification of International Law met at The Hague on March 13, 1930, and closed its sessions after a month of hard work on April 13, 1930. The results achieved are somewhat meager, so far as they are embodied in signed instruments, but on the whole they need not be discouraging to those who see a need for the clarification an systematization of the customary international law through a process of codification. It is perhaps too early to attempt a thorough appraisal of the progress made by the Conference, but it is possible to review what it accomplished, to set out some of the Hmitations within which it functioned, and to sketch the prospect which has been opened for a continuation of its work at future conferences.

The pages that follow embody the fruits of an examination of the work of the Permanent Court of International Justice as an interpreter of treaties. For sake of clearness and simplicity the pertinent cases are dealt with in a few familiar groups.

On December 30, 1929, a manifesto was issued by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs stating that “The Chinese Government is compelled to declare that the year 1930 is the decisive time, and that the actual process of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty by the abolition of extraterritoriality begins on January 1. With that in view it will undertake measures designed to release the sovereign rights of China from the trammels of extraterritoriality, and has accordingly ordered the Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan to instruct the ministries concerned to prepare a plan for this purpose.” While this indicates a determination to hasten the abolition of extraterritoriality, it also indicates a desire to do so by a legal process. It has been recognized that the conclusion of new treaties is the appropriate process and this method has actually been illustrated by treaties conditionally eliminating extraterritoriality with Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Portugal and Spain. These treaties were made under normal conditions and probably indicate the kind of treaty China would like to conclude with the remaining Powers enjoying extraterritoriality.

The Conference for the Codification of International Law which met at The Hague from March 13 to April 12, 1930, was the first international conference specifically called for that purpose.

In 1924 the League of Nations set up a Committee of Experts for the progressive codification of international law. The task of that committee was to select and propose for the first conference on codification a certain number of subjects within the field of international law. Three subjects, namely, Nationality, Territorial Waters and The Responsibility of States for Damage Caused in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, were finally agreed on as the subjects to be considered by the first conference.

There is one point which has been stressed by nearly every one who has discussed the inclusion of nationality in the codification of international law, including the rapporteurs of the League of Nations Committee of Experts and of the Nationality Committee at the First Codification Conference, that is, that this subject is especially difficult because of the fact that it is to a great extent “ political.” Most, if not all, branches of international law are in a sense pohtical, but, when it is said that nationality is peculiarly a political subject, it is meant, no doubt, that the law of nationality is primarily a domestic matter as regards each state, to be determined by each state for itself, according to its needs, social, political, military, economic, etc. Thus no state is willing to surrender its sovereign prerogative in the matter of determining the way in which its nationality may be acquired. But this does not mean that international law has nothing to do with nationality.

The first thirty years of the nineteenth century saw the beginnings of a great revolution in transportation and communication. Improvements were introduced which in time greatly changed the daily lives of people throughout the world, and made it possible for their efforts to reach out as never before in human history. The change was nowhere more significant than in its effect on international society. A century ago, the railroad, the steamship and the telegraph so extended the range of human action that national organization ceased to correspond with the activities of many peoples, and the state system upon which the nineteenth century dawned was greatly modified by the progress made in international organization before the century had passed. Certainly no period up to that time had produced such changes as those which began in the decades between 1800 and 1830.

During the year 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice held two sessions, and handed down three judgments and three formal orders. The sixteenth (extraordinary) session of the court began on May 13, 1929, and ended on July 12, 1929; and the seventeenth (ordinary) session began on July 8, 1929, and ended on September 10, 1929. At the sixteenth session, the court gave an order in the “ Case Concerning the Denunciation by China of the Treaty of November 2, 1865, between China and Belgium” ; an order in the “ Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Indemnities)” ; a judgment (No. 14) in the “ Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France” ; and a judgment (No. 15) in the “ Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of the Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France.” At the seventeenth session, it gave an order in the “ Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex,” and a judgment (No. 16) in the “ Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder.” In addition to these activities, extensions of its jurisdiction and changes in the court's structure, which have been previsaged, make the year notable in the history of the court.

There is being developed a special technique of codification. The Sixth Pan American Conference at Havana adopted in the form of seven conventions a codification of that number of topics in public international law; namely, on the status of aliens, treaties, diplomatic privileges and immunities, asylum, civil strife, and maritime neutrality. The preparatory work had been done by (a) the American Institute of International Law working through its executive committee, and (b) the Rio Commission of Jurists reestablished by the Fifth Pan American Conference. The proposed world conference upon codification has now been called to meet at The Hague in the spring of this year. There have been no official indications as yet of its postponement because of other international conferences. The machinery created by the League of Nations to perform the work preparatory to this conference has been functioning since 1925. The working of this machinery has already been described in this Jo u rn al down to the creation of the present Preparatory Committee for the Codification Conference. It will be remembered that the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, composed of sixteen members, prepared a provisional list of topics suitable for codification by international agreement, made reports upon various topics, submitted questionnaires upon seven of them to the various governments, and selected therefrom three topics as the agenda of the first world conference on codification. This cpmmittee also made one general and two special reports upon the further work of codification, with some indications as to procedure.

In modern times of war belligerents usually have need of exceptional facilities for transportation. The taking over of private means of transportation belonging to the citizens of the belligerents has been common. The seizure of means of land transportation, whoever may be the owner, has long been common and was often called the exercise of the right of angary. With the development of maritime transportation, vessels were appropriated for war use. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was little question as to the right of angary. With the opening of the nineteenth century the right was questioned, as treaties had begun to prescribe that the right would not be exercised. Some treaties made specific mention of the use of vessels, etc., for military purposes, as the treaty between Prussia and Salvador, 1870, Article VI: