This is an interim, summary and provisional judgment on the Brazilian experiment of the past nine years, that is, since the military took power on April 1, 1964. To try to give an impression of the results of the interaction among the values of political democracy, equality, and economic growth, and the present levels compared with those of 1964 as well as what appear to be the trends. I have chosen six “indicators”:

1. (1) the autonomy and integrity of the legal system;

2. (2) torture and police brutality;

3. (3) freedom of the mass media;

4. (4) income distribution patterns;

5. (5) education distribution patterns; and

6. (6) the quality of life of the people of the city of greater São Paulo.

The goals of economic development, political democracy, and equality, which are the three values suggested for discussion at this meeting, share a close relationship. Although the guidelines for discussion prepared by the organizers of the meeting reveal certain doubts about the compatibility of these values, at least as coexistent parts of a common process, my own point of view is that they are not only compatible but also inseparable. The crisis of a society emerges precisely when any one of these values is abandoned or subordinated to the attainment of the others, either in the case of a developing or of a developed country. The relationship of balance will, of course, depend on the particular circumstances of each country, its stage of political and cultural development, and the definitions adopted with regard to those values. This is why the developments taking place throughout the world cannot be judged by applying theoretical models or standards inspired by the realities of developed countries, which is the frequent mistake of many scholars and government officials.

Our four speakers have discussed the concept of human rights with various degrees of refinement. They range from the broad goals of political democracy and equality Üirough Professor Trubek’s classification of economic, social, and cultural rights alongside of the classical political and civil rights, to Jorge Domínguez’ 32-cell sociological matrix, which goes so far as to estimate the quantity of “rectitude” in Cuba before and after the revolution. I admire Professor Domínguez’ metìiodologi-cal erFort, but would prefer not trying to push it that far. I also felt that Professor Trubek took too seriously the use of the word “rights” in constitutional and other formal documents when what is really meant is goals or aspirations. Many of the so-called economic and social rights are inherently unenforceable through any kind of systematic legal procedure. Like Franklin Roosevelt’s “four freedoms,’” equating them with juridically enforceable rights should be recognized as a kind of poetic or political license rather than a feature of the legal scenery. I am all in favor of stating social goals and aspirations, but it would be well to avoid confusion in the terminology.

The topic, “Economic Development and Human Rights,” can best be understood in the context of the broad historical forces now gripping the world. On the one hand, we are living in the epoch of socialism which is the great social force propelling social development today. This has been so for the past 55 years, much the same as capitalism once dominated the world in the 18th and 19th centuries. Ordinary people in country after country have risked life and limb in their struggle for a better society under the banner of socialism, led by political movements of national liberation and socialist development. We find few historical examples of people spontaneously organizing themselves in sharp conflict with more powerful opponents whose political program embraces the construction of capitalism. For the most part capitalism must purchase its soldiers in much the same way as it transacts any business on a money market. We find few pieces of prose or political writing in capitalist less developed countries which grip our imagination. Who are the heros of capitalism to compare with people like Ché Guevara, Franz Fanon, Mao Tse-Tung, and Ho Chi Minh? And the list of countries embracing the socialist road to development grows every year, from the first socialist revolution in the Soviet Union to Chile’s efforts at the construction of socialism today.

I would like to begin this discussion by providing a framework for a general analysis of the concessions problem. If one were to take a look at the general literature relating to concessions in the late 1940’s, 1950’s, and early 1960’s, one would obtain a very special view of concessions in that literature. This view was shaped, to some extent, by the sociology of concessions knowledge. Most concessionaires and most concession-giving countries have traditionally held their concession agreements very close to their vests, and it has until recently been extremely difficult to obtain copies of actual agreements. Consequently, those academics and others who wrote about concessions in the 1940’s, ‘50’s, and ‘60’s found that they had very little to write about except the traditional lawyer’s concern for sanctity of contract, choice of law, and arbitration. With regard to the latter topic it might be observed that never has so much been written by so many for so few because, as we all know, concession agreements seldom come to arbitration. One reason is that the arbitration clause usually deals with the sort of disputes which are not at the heart of most country concessionaire conflicts.

It is impossible in a reasonable space of time to cover the changes that have occurred in relationships between host countries and oil companies since the first concession agreements in the early 1900’s. It is difficult to cover even the developments of the past three years. Oil producing countries have, of course, always wanted a greater share of the profits from producing operations within their borders and to exercise a greater control over such operations. With the use of hindsight it is possible to say that the degree to which these twin goals have been achieved over the past few years is not remarkable. I believe it is true, however, that five or even three years ago very few, if any, in the petroleum industry would have forecast the success which the producing countries have achieved.

I would like to address myself to some of the issues of nationalism which I think are implicit in the developments we have seen not only in the mineral field, but also in industrial and economic fields. We seem to be entering into what might be called a third generation of relationships between developed countries and the developing world. As has been pointed out, the day in which the major commercial interests of the metropolitan powers constituted very much a Taw unto themselves has given way to a transitional period marked by hostility and uncertainties in relations between the representatives of the industrialized and the developing nations. Such times are characterized by mutual suspicion and even now hardly a day passes that we do not read about some threatened or actual takeovers, whether it be foreign insurance companies in India or copper mines in Chile.

Our first question is one of terminology. We have used a great many of these terms very loosely. We still talk in terms of “concession agreements.” The meaning of that term has shifted. It now stands for a much broader concept than it did before. It is now an all-embracing term seemingly covering any agreement between a government and an operator for the exploration and production of mineral resources. I do not think it is an accurate enough term any longer. We lawyers have not been inventive; we have distinctions with differences within the broad term “concession.” We now have operating or production agreement, development agreement, profit-sharing agreement, contract of work, management agreement, and service agreement. These terms mean different things; they bring different results. They represent different relationships between the government and the operator.

Transnational law includes municipal law, public international law, and conflicts, including some attention to comparative law. For example, the international arbitration between the Arabian-American Oil Company and the Government of Saudi Arabia required George Sauser-Hall, the arbitrator, to weigh all of these variables. When you consider working in this field you should realize that you are concerned with politics, economics, and different bodies of law and also with great areas of uncertainty. I suppose that the current ITT case with $92 millions of investment insurance is a good example of the uncertainty when a political and legal situation gets mixed up.

May I also say that I feel somewhat of a fraud speaking about transnational practice. I describe myself as a small town practitioner since I am a member of the English Bar where we have only about 2,000 practitioners. I would like to present here two points of view which may prove useful. One is the problem of the English Bar at the present juncture and the other is the new important dimension of practice in the European Community.

I think I am the only current “international organization man” on this roundtable. Into my few minutes I will therefore attempt to squeeze a brief sketch of the lawyer in an international organization, more particularly the United Nations where all my practical experience has been.

I ought to point out first that my own practice is primarily corporate practice dealing with international business between Japan and the United States. Contract drafting is probably what I do most of, that and contract negotiations. In my field, many of the negotiations are not polite; they involve role playing on both sides and often extreme misunderstandings on both sides. I think, in addition to a good law background, the most important element in practice, especially in relations between Asia and the United States, is knowledge of an Asian language and a cultural familiarity with the countries where you specialize. To be able to communicate with your own client, and to be able to communicate for your client with the Japanese company across the table, knowledge of the language is absolutely essential. Also, I think my type of practice—that is practice with Asia—illustrates something that has happened in American law practice during the last ten years. The causes are primarily the revolution in transportation and something called the telex machine. Before 1960 it was impossible to get to Tokyo from New York in less than 26 hours. Now I go almost every month; it takes 16 hours. If you are representing Japanese clients in the United States it is necessary, I think, to meet the people in the Tokyo home office. Japanese abide greatly by this type of personal contact. It also helps to eliminate misunderstanding between a lawyer and his client. More and more lawyers, especially out of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington are traveling around the world with their practices following them. If you have support services in various cities, there is usually no problem. You can travel, especially if your secretary and the people you work with out of the office from which you originate can handle the minor problems that come up. The telex machine has become extremely important. This is partly because of the time lag. Japan is almost exactly twelve hours opposite from the United States. My clients’ legal departments can handle minor negotiations and telex questions to me or ask me to draft particular positions. By getting background by telex, I can do this on an overnight basis so that in effect their legal department works 24 hours a day. This has the added benefit that sometimes the Japanese clients are able to disguise from the opposing American side the fact that they are using a large New York law firm.