Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Since there exists philosophy, there exists the attempt to bring it in relation with politics; and this attempt has succeeded in so far as it is today recognized to the degree of a truism that political theory and that part of philosophy we call ethics are closely connected with each other. But it seems strange to assume—and this essay tries to verify this assumption—that there exists an external parallelism, and perhaps also an inner relationship, between politics and other parts of philosophy such as epistemology, that is, theory of knowledge, and theory of values. It is just within these two theories that the antagonism between philosophical absolutism and relativism has its seat; and this antagonism seems to be in many respects analogous to the fundamental opposition between autocracy and democracy as the representatives of political absolutism on the one hand and political relativism on the other.
I
Philosophical absolutism is the metaphysical view that there is an absolute reality, i.e., a reality that exists independently of human knowledge. Hence its existence is objective and unlimited in, or beyond, space and time, to which human knowledge is restricted. Philosophical relativism, on the other hand, advocates the empirical doctrine that reality exists only within human knowledge, and that, as the object of knowledge, reality is relative to the knowing subject. The absolute, the thing in itself, is beyond human experience; it is inaccessible to human knowledge and therefore unknowable.
To the assumption of absolute existence corresponds the possibility of absolute truth and absolute values, denied by philosophical relativism, which recognizes only relative truth and relative values.
1 Cf. Kelsen, Hans, Staatsform und Wellanschauung (Tübingen, 1933).Google Scholar
2 Cf. Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, 1946), pp. 419 ff.Google Scholar
3 Cf. Russell, Bertrand, Philosophy and Politics (1947)Google Scholar, passim.
4 Cf. Kelsen, Hans, “Platonic Justice,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 48 (1937), pp. 367 ff.Google Scholar
5 Kelsen, Hans, “The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” Ethics, Vol. 48 (1937), pp. 1 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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