Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
During the last thirty years, there have been numerous attempts to revise or reconstitute the “classical” theory of democracy: the familiar doctrine of popular rule, patterned after the New England town meeting, which asserts that public policy should result from extensive, informed discussion and debate. By extending general participation in decision-making the classical theorists hoped to increase the citizen's awareness of his moral and social responsibilities, reduce the danger of tyranny, and improve the quality of government. Public officials, acting as agents of the public at large, would then carry out the broad policies decided upon by majority vote in popular assemblies.
Although it is seldom made clear just which of the classical democratic theorists is being referred to, contemporary criticism has focused primarily on the descriptive elements of the theory, on its basic conceptions of citizenship, representation and decision-making. The concept of an active, informed, democratic citizenry, the most distinctive feature of the traditional theory, is the principal object of attack. On empirical grounds it is argued that very few such people can be found in Western societies. Public policy is not the expression of the common good as conceived of by the citizenry after widespread discussion and compromise. This description of policy making is held to be dangerously naive because it overlooks the role of demagogic leadership, mass psychology, group coercion, and the influence of those who control concentrated economic power. In short, classical democratic theory is held to be unrealistic; first because it employs conceptions of the nature of man and the operation of society which are Utopian, and second because it does not provide adequate, operational definitions of its key concepts.
1 For discussions of the meaning of the classical theory of democracy see: Sabine, George, “The Two Democratic Traditions,” The Philosophical Review, 61 (1952), 451–474CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and his A History of Political Theory (New York, 1958), especially chs. 31 and 32Google Scholar. Also see Pennock, J. Roland, Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects (New York, 1950)Google Scholar; and Wolin, Sheldon, Politics and Vision (Boston, 1960), especially chs. 9 and 10Google Scholar.
2 Criticism of the descriptive accuracy of the classical theory has been widespread in recent years. The best statement of the basic objections usually made is Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, 1942), Part IVGoogle Scholar. See also Berelson, Bernardet al., Voting (Chicago, 1954), chapter 14Google Scholar; articles by Hartz, Louis and Beer, Samuel in Chambers, W. N. and Salisbury, R. H. (eds.), Democracy in the Mid-20th Century (St. Louis, 1960)Google Scholar; Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956)Google Scholar, and Who Governs? (New Haven, 1961), especially pp. 223–325Google Scholar; Key, V. O., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1961), especially Part VIGoogle Scholar; Milbrath, Lester W., Political Participation (Chicago, 1965), especially Chapter VIGoogle Scholar; and for a general summary of the position: Mayo, Henry, An Introduction to Democratic Theory. (New York, 1960)Google Scholar.
3 Introduction by Lipset to the Collier Books paperback edition of Michel's, Robert, Political Parties (New York, 1962), p. 33Google Scholar.
4 The phrase is Dahl's, in Who Governs?, p. 227Google Scholar.
5 Ibid., p. 225.
6 Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269.
7 Dahl, , Who Governs?, p. 164Google Scholar.
8 Lipset, Introduction to Michels, op. cit., p. 34.
9 Dahl, Robert and Lindblom, Charles, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York, 1953), p. 309Google Scholar.
10 Truman, David, “The American System in Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly, (12, 1959), pp. 481–497Google Scholar. See also a perceptive critique of Truman's change of attitude in Bachrach, Peter, “Elite Consensus and Democracy,” The Journal of Politics, 24 (1962), 439–452CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 Key, op. cit., p. 558. See also Key's, “Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy,” The Virginia Quarterly Review, 37 (1961), 481–494Google Scholar.
12 Dahl's position on this issue seems to have undergone a transformation somewhat similar to Truman's. Compare Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit., Chapter 11 with Dahl, Who Governs?, Books IV, V, VI.
13 Dahl, , Who Governs?, pp. 311–325Google Scholar. It is important to note that these conclusions about the crucial function of an elite consensus in democracy were based on little empirical evidence. Truman, Key and Dahl seem to rely most heavily on Stouffer, Samuel, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York, 1955)Google Scholar, a study based on national opinion surveys which was concerned with only one issue (McCarthyism) and did not investigate the relationship between the expressed opinions of its subjects and their behavior under stress; and Prothro, James and Grigg, Charles, “Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement,” Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276–294CrossRefGoogle Scholar, a study of attitudes in two small cities. More recently, however, McClosky, Herbert has produced more convincing data in his “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” this Review, 58 (1964), 361–382Google Scholar. On page 377 McClosky concludes that widespread agreement on procedural norms is not a prerequisite to the success of a democratic system: “Consensus may strengthen democratic viability, but its absence in an otherwise stable society need not be fatal, or even particularly damaging.” McClosky's conclusions are called into question by data presented by Eldersveld, Samuel, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago, 1964), pp. 183–219Google Scholar; and Constantini, Edmond, “Intraparty Attitude Conflict: Democratic Party Leadership in California,” Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 956–972Google Scholar.
14 See Bernard Berelson, et al., op. cit., Chapter 14; Lipset, op. cit., pp. 14–16; Morris-Jones, W. H., “In Defense of Apathy,” Political Studies, II (1954), 25–37Google Scholar.
15 Milbrath, op. cit., p. 152.
16 Louis Hartz, “Democracy: Image and Reality,” in Chambers and Salisbury (eds.), op. cit., p. 26.
17 Several articles have recently appeared which attack the elitist theory on normative grounds. The best and most insightful is Davis, Lane, “The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy,” Western Political Quarterly, 17 (1964), 37–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see: Duncan, Graeme and Lukes, Steven, “The New Democracy,” Political Studies, 11 (1963), 156–177CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rousseas, Steven W. and Farganis, James, “American Politics and the End of Ideology,” British Journal of Sociology, 14 (1963) 347–360CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bay, Christian, “Politics and Pseudopolitics,” this Review, 59 (1965), 39–51Google Scholar. The subject is also treated in: Kariel, Henry, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford, 1961), Chapters 9 and 11Google Scholar; Bottomore, T. B., Elites and Society (London, 1964), 108–110Google Scholar; Presthus, Robert, Men at the Top (New York, 1964), 3–47Google Scholar; and Agger, Robert, Goldrich, Daniel and Swanson, Bert, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York) (1964), 93–99, 524–532Google Scholar. For an insightful critique of the work of Dahl and Mills, conceived of as opposing ideological positions see: Connolly, William E., Responsible Political Ideology: Implications of the Sociology of Knowledge for Political Inquiry, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1965), pp. 18–39Google Scholar. This section of this article depends heavily on Lane Davis' analysis.
18 Mill, John Stuart, Considerations on Representative Government (New York, 1862), pp. 39–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
19 Samuel Beer, “New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America,” in Chambers and Salisbury (eds.), op. cit., p. 46.
20 Davis, Op. Cit., p. 45.
21 Lane, Robert, Political Ideology (New York, 1962), p. 475Google Scholar. See also Stokes', Donald comments on the same topic in “Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment,” in Cleveland, Harlan and Lasswell, Harold (eds.), Ethics and Bigness (Published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their relation to the Democratic Way of Life, 1962), p. 72Google Scholar.
22 Dahl, , Who Governs?, pp. 225Google Scholar.
23 Polsby, Nelson, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven, 1963), p. 117Google Scholar.
24 Blumer, Herbert, “Recent research [on race relations in the] United States of America,” International Social Science Bulletin (UNESCO), 10 (1958), p. 432Google Scholar. Similar arguments concerning the relationship of beliefs and action can be found in Lohman, J. D. and Reitzes, D. C., “Deliberately Organized Groups and Racial Behavior,” American Sociological Review, 19 (1954), 342–344CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and in Raab, Earl (ed.), American Race Relations Today (Garden City, 1962)Google Scholar.
25 Burnham, Walter Dean, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,” this Review, 59 (1965), 7–28Google Scholar.
26 Agger, Robert, Goldstein, Marshall and Pearl, Stanley, “Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning,” The Journal of Politics 23 (1961), 477–506CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Litt, Edgar, “Political Cynicism and Political Futility,” The Journal of Politics, 25 (1963) 312–323CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 For a brief survey of findings on this subject, see Milbrath, op. cit.; and for a clear, brief summary, see: Rosenburg, Morris, “Some Determinants of Political Apathy,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (1954–1955), 349–366CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Apter, David (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York, 1964), especially chapters by Converse and Wolfinger, et al.Google Scholar
28 A major study of the influence of secondary schools on political attitudes is underway at the University of Michigan under the direction of M. Kent Jennings.
29 An extensive investigation of the role of the police and the courts in city politics is being conducted at Harvard University by James Q. Wilson.
30 It is very difficult to compare crime rates or other indications of social disorganization in the United States with those in other countries. For a discussion of some of the difficulties see: UNESCO 1963 Report on the World Social Situation (New York, 1963)Google Scholar.
31 Solomon, Fredric, Walker, Walter L., O'Connor, Garrett and Fishman, Jacob, “Civil Rights Activity and Reduction of Crime Among Negroes,” Archives of General Psychiatry, 12 (03, 1965), 227–236CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.
32 For an excellent study of the Black Muslims which portrays the movement as a non-political outlet for the frustration and bitterness felt by many American Negroes see the study by an African scholar: Essien-Udom, E. V., Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America (Chicago, 1962)Google Scholar.
33 Herbert Agar makes a similar analysis and argues for the retention of the system in The Price of Union, (Boston, 1950)Google Scholar. On page 689 he states:
The lesson which Americans learned [from the Civil War] was useful: in a large federal nation, when a problem is passionately felt, and iB discussed in terms of morals, each party may divide within itself, against itself. And if the parties divide, the nation may divide; for the parties, with their enjoyable pursuit of power, are a unifying influence. Wise men, therefore, may seek to dodge such problems as long as possible. And the easiest way to dodge them is for both parties to take both sides.
34 For a study of several important factors affecting the degree of participation in American politics see: Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960), especially chs. 5 and 6Google Scholar.
35 Dahl, , Who Governs?, p. 224Google Scholar.
36 Lipset, op. cit., p. 121.
37 Gerth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, 1946), p. 115Google Scholar.
38 Banfield, Edward, Political Influence (New York, 1961), p. 290Google Scholar.
39 Friedrich, Carl, Constitutional Government and Politics (New York, 1939), pp. 17–18Google Scholar.
40 This point is made persuasively by Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton, “The Two Faces of Power,” this Review, 56 (1962), 947–952Google Scholar. Also see their “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,” this Review, 57 (1963), 632–642Google Scholar; and Anton, Thomas J., “Power, Pluralism and Local Politics,” Administrative Quarterly, 7 (1963), 425–457CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
41 Lipset, op. cit., p. 178.
42 Ruth Searles and J. Allen Williams, in a study of Negro students who took part in the sit-in demonstrations, found no evidence that they were authoritarian or posed threats to democracy. “Far from being alienated, the students appear to be committed to the society and its middle class leaders”: “Negro College Students' Participation in Sit-ins,” Social Forces, 40 (1962), p. 219Google Scholar. For other studies of this particular social movement see: Coles, Robert, “Social Struggle and Weariness,” Psychiatry, 27 (1964), 305–315CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and three articles by Solomon, Fredric and Fishman, Jacob; “Perspectives on Student Sit-in Movement,” American Journal of Ortho-psychiatry, 33 (1963), 872–882Google Scholar; “Action and Identity Formation in First Student Sit-in Demonstration.” Journal of Social Issues, 20 (1964), 36–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “Psycho-social Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities,” Psychiatry, 27 (1964) 91–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see the October, 1964 issue of The Journal of Social Issues, entitled “Youth and Social Action,” edited by Fredric Solomon and Jacob Fishman; and Walker, Jack L., “Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leaders in Atlanta, Georgia,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 7 (1963), 99–124CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
43 Sociologists usually study social movements under the rubric of collective behavior. For general treatments see: Blumer, Herbert, “Collective Behavior” in Gittler, J. B. (ed.), Review of Sociology (New York, 1957)Google Scholar; Heberle, Rudolph, Social Movements, (New York, 1951)Google Scholar; Killian, Lewis, “Social Movements” in Faris, Robert (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago, 1964)Google Scholar; King, Charles, Social Movements in the United States (New York, 1956)Google Scholar; Lang, Karl and Lang, Gladys, Collective Dynamics (New York, 1961)Google Scholar; Smelser, Neil, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Turner, Ralph and Killian, Lewis, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957)Google Scholar. For a brief historical sketch of some American social movements see: Greer, Thomas, American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1946)Google Scholar.
44 For a book which investigates social movements which have served this function among Italian peasants see: Hobsbawn, E. J., Primitive Rebels (Manchester, 1959)Google Scholar. See also: Lanternari, Vittorio, The Religions of the Oppressed (New York, 1963)Google Scholar for a study of the relationship of Messianic Cults and revolutionary movements on five continents; and Rude, George, The Crowd in History (New York, 1964)Google Scholar for a study of popular uprisings in England and France from 1730–1848.
45 Hobsbawn, op. cit., p. 2.
46 Heberle, op. cit., pp. 417–418.
47 American political scientists have not been sufficiently concerned with the role of violence in the governmental process. Among all the articles published in The American Political Science Review between 1906 and 1963, there was only one whose title contained the word “violence,” only one with the word “coercive” (it concerned India), and none with the word “force.” During the same period there were forty-nine articles on governmental reorganization and twenty-four on civil service reform. See Janda, Kenneth (ed.), Cumulative Index to The American Political Science Review (Evanston, 1964)Google Scholar, Efforts to retrieve this situation have begun in: Eckstein, Harry (ed.), Internal War (New York, 1964)Google Scholar.
48 Lewis Coser has discussed the role of conflict in provoking social change in his The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe: 1956)Google Scholar; and in his “Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change” British Journal of Sociology, 9 (1957) 197–207Google Scholar. See also Horowitz, Irving Louis, “Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory,” Social Forces, 41 (1962), 177–188CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
49 For an insightful and stimulating example, see Gusfield, Joseph, Symbolic Crusade (Urbana, 1963)Google Scholar, which makes an excellent analysis of the causes of the Temperance movement and changes in its leadership but makes only brief mention of the movement's impact on the government and the responses of political leaders to its efforts.
50 John Higham is somewhat of an exception of this generalization. See his Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1880–1925 (New York, 1963)Google Scholar. Also aee his: “Another Look at Nativism,” Catholic Historical Review, 44 (1958), 147–158Google Scholar; and his “The Cult of the ‘American Consensus’: Homogenizing Our History,” Commentary (02, 1959), p. 159Google Scholar.
51 Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, 1959), p. 159Google Scholar.
52 Sabine, “The Two Democratic Traditions,” op. cit., p. 459.
Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.