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The Political Economy of Charles E. Lindblom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Charles W. Anderson
Charles W. Anderson*
Affiliation:
University Of Wisconsin, Madison
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Abstract

The consistent theme in Charles E. Lindblom's work is a vision of political economy as constitutional engineering. Lindblom sees the question of institutional design in terms of a mechanical metaphor in which political economic systems are contrived out of relatively simple components. Politics and Markets compares a broad range of capitalist and socialist systems as a means of evaluating market mechanisms and authority structures as instruments of social coordination and control. Lindblom's argument that the privileged power of the corporation poses a problem for liberal market-oriented societies is logically distinct from his case that the corporation fits “oddly” with democratic theory, and the latter may be the more significant theme for further inquiry in political economic theory.

Type
Review Essay
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 72 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 1012 - 1016
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1978

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References

Braybrooke, David, and Lindblom, Charles E. (1963). A Strategy of Decision. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Hurst, James Willard (1970). The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.Google Scholar
Lindblom, Charles E. (1949). Unions and Capitalism. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Lindblom, Charles E. (1965). The Intelligence of Democracy. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Lindblom, Charles E. (1976). Politics, Economics and Welfare. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lindblom, Charles E. (1977). Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
McConnell, Grant (1966). Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Knopf.Google Scholar
Okun, Arthur (1975). Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington: Brookings.Google Scholar
von der Muhll, George (1977). “Robert A. Dahl and the Study of Contemporary Democracy.” American Political Science Review 71:1076.Google Scholar
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