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Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John M. Orbell  and
L. A. Wilson II
John M. Orbell
Affiliation:
University of Oregon
L. A. Wilson II
Affiliation:
Institute of Policy Analysis
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Abstract

The existence of N-prisoners' dilemmas (conflict between individual and collective rationality) is a standard justification for collectivizing decision making through the state, but there is little theory about how different institutions operate to “solve” such dilemmas. The efficiency of majoritarian democracy, “selfish dictatorship” and uncoordinated individualism is explored using a simple nine-person game. Majoritarian democracy is found to produce equilibrium outcomes at the maximum social product available when the opportunity costs of “cooperating” are less than half the magnitude of the externalities, but to produce no such equilibrium when the opportunity costs are greater than that. Our research draws implications for the role of information in constitutional design, and of altruism.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 72 , Issue 2 , June 1978 , pp. 411 - 421
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

*

Dallas Hardison and Anne Schneider participated in the original sessions out of which this paper was developed and have been constant sources of help since then. Brian Barry, Robert Campbell, Robyn Dawes, Geoff Fougere, R. Kenneth Godwin, David Messick, William Mitchell, Howard Rosenthal, Barry Siegel and Jeff Smith have all given valuable advice and encouragement. Versions of the paper have been delivered to the University of Oregon Psychology Department's seminar on collective dilemmas, the Political Science and Sociology Departments of the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and to political science classes at the University of Oregon; thanks are due to the participants in these meetings who invariably offered much-needed and constructive criticism.

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