Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-mkpzs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T04:22:32.006Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Loss of Citizenship and Civil Rights for Conviction of Crime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

James A. Gathings
James A. Gathings
Affiliation:
Bucknell University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

An erroneous impression appears to exist among certain people in the United States that if a person is convicted of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction, he immediately and automatically loses his citizenship. It is apparently believed that when a citizen is convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude in either a state or national court, the person is no longer a citizen, and can never enjoy any of the rights or privileges of American citizenship for the rest of his natural life. A search of standard textbooks on American government will disclose that if the matter of the loss of citizenship or of civil rights for the conviction of crime is discussed at all, the author or authors will dismiss the topic by making the statement that citizens of the United States do not lose their citizenship for the conviction of crime; and the authors usually add that this fact is contrary to popular impression.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution defines citizenship by stating that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. The procedure required for a person to become a citizen by naturalization is one for Congress to determine by law, and Congress has passed legislation governing it. On the other hand, the Constitution does not contain a statement providing for the loss of citizenship or expatriation in any form, whether by voluntary or involuntary act on the part of the citizen.

Type
American Government and Politics
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 43 , Issue 6 , December 1949 , pp. 1228 - 1234
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1949

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The writer is not certain how widespread this idea is, but he has heard it expressed in his classes by many students for a number of years.

2 See the excellent article by Holtzoff, Alexander, “Loss of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime,” Federal Probation, Vol. 6, p. 18 (Apr.-June, 1942)Google Scholar.

3 “Although a state by virtue of its sovereignty may, within its own limits, confer citizenship, yet persons so admitted to citizenship do not thereby become citizens of the United States, where according to United States law they are disqualified, as formerly was the case of members of the African race, from receiving it.” Mitchell v. Wells. 37 Miss. 235; Minneapolis v. Remn, 56 Fed. 576.

4 “A state cannot make an alien a citizen of the United States. This can be done only in the manner prescribed by the naturalization laws of Congress. Hence the state of Minnesota did not confer United States citizenship on an alien who had declared his intention to become a citizen by permitting him to vote at state elections and to hold office.” Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. (U. S.) 425; 14 Fed. Cases No. 8,080; 14 Alb. L. J. 363. See also In re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443, 84 Amer., 700.

5 United States Code (1940 ed), title 8, sec. 801 (g). This is in general conformity with the law passed after the Civil War; and it reads: “All persons who deserted the military or naval services of the United States and did not return thereto or report themselves to a provost marshal within the sixty days after the issuance of the proclamation by the President, dated March 11, 1865, are deemed to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship, as well as their right to become citizens; and such deserters shall be forever incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under the United States or of exercising any rights of citizens thereof. No soldier or sailor, however, who faithfully served according to his enlistment until April 19, 1865, and who, without proper authority or leave first obtained, quit his command or refused to serve after that date, shall be held to be a deserter from the Army or Navy; and this section shall be construed solely as a removal of any disability such soldier or sailor may have incurred by the loss of citizenship, and of the right to hold office in consequence of his desertion.” United States Code (1934 ed.), title 8, sec. 12.

The law was changed in 1912 to read as follows: “Every person who deserts the military or naval service of the United States, or who, being duly enrolled, departs the jurisdiction of the district in which he is enrolled, or goes beyond the limits of the United States, with intent to avoid any draft into the military or naval service lawfully ordered, shall be liable to all the penalties and forfeitures of section 12 of this title. The provisions of this section and said section 12 shall not apply to any person deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of peace. The loss of rights of citizenship prior to August 12, 1912, imposed by law upon deserters from the military or naval service may be mitigated or remitted by the President where the offense was committed in times of peace and where the exercise of such clemency will not be prejudicial to the public interest. U. S. Code (1934 ed.), title 8, sec. 11.

6 The act of Congress approved March 3, 1865, providing additional penalties for the crime of desertion from military and naval service, including loss of citizenship, is not unconstitutional. It is not ex post facto, nor a bill of attainder. But before inspectors of elections can refuse to receive a vote on this ground it must be shown that the prospective voter has been duly convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction. Gotchens v. Matheson, 58 Barb. (N. Y.); Severance v. Healy, 50 N. H. 448.

7 53 Pa. St. Rep. 112 (1866).

8 Ibid., p. 116.

9 U. S. Code (1940 ed.), title 8, sec. 801 (h). This law adds loss of citizenship to an earlier law which provided: “Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.

“Whoever is convicted of treason shall suffer death; or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined not less than $10,000, to be levied on and collected out of any or all of his property, real and personal, of which he was the owner at the time of committing such treason, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding; and every person so convicted of treason shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States.” U. S. Code (1940 ed.), title 18, sees. 1, 2.

10 Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1 (1945). For a discussion of this case, see Cushman, R. E., “Constitutional Law in 1944–45,” in this Review, Vol. 40, p. 236 ff (Apr., 1946)Google Scholar.

11 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942). For a note on this case, see Cushman in ibid., Vol. 36, p. 1082 (Apr., 1942).

12 In this case, Douglas Chandler was convicted as a traitor to the United States for broadcasting Nazi propaganda from Berlin during the war. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and given a fine of $10,000 by Federal District Judge Francis J. W. Ford. For a report of the case, see New York Times, July 1, 1947, p. 1Google Scholar. United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230; reported in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, p. 223 (Jan., 1948)Google Scholar. See also the case of Robert H. Best, an American newspaper man who remained in Germany to broadcast Nazi propaganda during the war. He was convicted of treason in the same court as Chandler. For a report of this case, see New York Times, Apr. 17, 1948, p. 7Google Scholar.

13 Under terms of the special act of the legislature, the interim mayor, John L. Hynes, was to serve until Mr. Curley resumed office. The act provided that Mr. Curley retain the title of mayor and the salary of $20,000, and that Mr. Hynes, assuming the duties and powers, should be paid at the same rate. New York Times, Nov. 27, 1947, p. 35Google Scholar.

14 See the list enumerated in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).

15 The list of these crimes, as found in the U. S. Code, is as follows: Sec. 9: Subversive activity; undermining loyalty, discipline, or morale of the armed forces; Sec. 10: Advocating the overthrow of government by force; Sec. 11: Attempting or conspiring to commit prohibited acts; Sec. 12: Searches and seizures.

16 The list of these crimes is as follows: Sec. 19: Conspiracy to injure persons in the exercise of their civil rights; Sec. 55: Unlawful presence of troops at polls; Sec. 56: Intimidation of voters by officers or other persons of the Army or Navy; Sec. 57: Army or Navy officers prescribing qualifications of voters; Sec. 58: Interfering with election officers by officers or other persons of the Army or Navy; Sec. 192: Trading in public property by collecting or disbursing officer; Sec. 199: Accepting bribe by member of Congress; Sec. 202: Member of Congress taking consideration for procuring contract; Sec. 203: Receiving pay by member of Congress in matters affecting the United States; Sec. 207: Official accepting bribe; Sec. 235: Destroying records by officer in charge; Sec. 237: Bribery of judicial officer; Sec. 352: Illegally approving bond.

17 See the excellent article by Brown, Everett S., “The Restoration of Civil and Political Rights by Presidential Pardon,” in this Review, Vol. 34, pp. 295–300 (Apr., 1940)Google Scholar.

18 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1867). This decision was in conformity with the attitude of Attorney-General J. S. Black, who gave an opinion to Secretary of State Cass on September 22, 1860, saying: “In reply to your note accompanying the letter of W. Dunbar, Esquire, commissioner of the United States for the northern district of Ohio, I have to say that a person convicted of an offense against the laws of the United States, which disfranchises him as a citizen, can be restored to all the rights which he had before conviction by a full and free pardon from the President of the United States. Such pardon may be given after he has suffered the other penalties incident to his conviction, as well as before.” 9 Opinions of the Attorney-General, 478.

19 United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531 (1869). On the other hand, a court may restore citizenship to those persons who renounced it while in a segregation center. On April 19, 1948, Federal Judge Louis E. Goodman, of San Francisco, ordered United States citizenship restored to about 2,700 West Coast wartime evacuees of Japanese descent who had signed statements of renunciation while they were detained at Tule Lake, California. In his opinion, Judge Goodman criticized the United States for accepting the renunciations of citizenship, holding that “even expediency” could not remove “the taint of unfairness with which the renunciations, subsequently executed, were clothed” and that the government “under the stress of necessity of national defense” had “committed error” in accepting the renunciations. New York Times, Apr. 30, 1948, p. 16Google Scholar.

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.