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Military Advancement: The Visibility Theory of Promotion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

David W. Moore  and
B. Thomas Trout
David W. Moore
Affiliation:
University of New Hampshire
B. Thomas Trout
Affiliation:
University of New Hampshire
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Abstract

This article examines the dynamics of military promotion and explores its consequences both for individual officers and for military organization. The central argument is that performance, while a necessary standard for acceptability into a rather large pool of officers from which the elite will emerge, is nonetheless a minor influence on promotion and becomes even less discriminating as an officer's career progresses, whereas visibility–the extent to which an individual has developed contacts with peers and superiors who can influence his movement in the organization–begins moderately and eventually becomes the dominant influence. To present this argument, the article first examines the prevailing concepts of performance and seniority and outlines an expanded model of the promotion process. The component variables of that model are applied to three separate military career levels–junior, middle-grade and senior officers–and are traced longitudinally through the entire officer career pattern. Finally, the impact of contextual factors on the model, particularly the differences between wartime and peacetime, is discussed and illustrated with data from general officer promotion in the army. The implications of this theory are significant for civil control of the military. Through the control of access to the elite nucleus represented by the promotion system, especially with the emphasis on visibility, the military is able to sustain a high degree of autonomy. By the time Congress or other civilian actors are able to exercise selection of the military elite, the promotion system has already preselected those individuals who most highly represent military values held by preceding leaders.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 72 , Issue 2 , June 1978 , pp. 452 - 468
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1978

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References

1 Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957)Google Scholar.

2 Larson, Arthur D., “Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2 (Spring 1974), 57–72Google Scholar.

3 Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

4 Larson.

5 Janowitz, p. 353.

6 Much of the analysis in this paper is based on evidence from both authors' participation in the armed forces. Moore graduated from West Point and served in the army on active duty for ten years, while Trout was designated Outstanding NROTC Midshipman at UCLA and served in the navy on active duty for three years. Both have since maintained active reserve commissions. In addition to using evidence gathered in their roles as participant-observers, both authors have conducted interviews with officers in all three major services who have been extensively involved in personnel and promotion matters. While the observations made in this paper are thus based on broad evidence, through both participant-observation and informal interviews, the assertions are not meant as definitive conclusions but rather hypothetical relationships subject to systematic and empirical verification.

7 Haberstroh, Chadwick J., “Organization Design and Systems Analysis,” in Handbook of Organizations, ed. March, James G. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 1182Google Scholar.

8 Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 29–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; 92.

9 Dornbusch, Sanford M. and Scott, W. Richard, Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), p. 147Google Scholar.

10 The most recent and most radical change has occurred in the air force. After dissatisfaction with the inflationary tendencies in the Air Force OER, a new form went into effect in 1975 which imposes quotas on each rater requiring distribution of the rated officers across the entire range of the rating scale (e.g., no more than 22 percent of officers rated can be placed in the top block). Air force officers familiar with the details of this new system, however, have already expressed doubt about its effectiveness in eliminating inflation. (See, for example, Major Jacobcik, John D., “The New OER System and Behavior,” Research Study Submitted to the Faculty, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, May 1976)Google Scholar.

11 Janowitz, p. 125.

12 Warren, Donald I., “The Effects of Power Bases and Peer Groups on Conformity in Formal Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (December 1969), p. 544CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Dornbusch and Scott, pp. 149–55.

13 Janowitz, p. xxxi, emphasis added.

14 Janowitz, p. 145, emphasis added.

15 Janowitz, p. xxxi.

16 Data for each year were obtained from the appropriate year's Army Register and from downgraded copies of the “General Officer's Alfa Roster.”

17 The figures include only those generals who had never retired. Thus, LTG Hershey, Director of the Draft, is not included because he was a retired officer called back to active duty.

18 For a sharply contrasting viewpoint, which argues that the academy officers dominate the higher ranks because of their greater potential and competitiveness, see Cochran, Charles L., “Midshipman and Cadet Profiles and National Norms: A Comparison,” Naval War College Review, 24 (May 1972), 37–47Google Scholar.

19 While young men in the academies and ROTC programs are somewhat more conservative than their nonmilitary peers, a broad ideological spectrum still exists. See Cochran; and Lucas, William A., “Military Images in the Army ROTC,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 1 (Spring 1973), 71–90Google Scholar.

20 Huntington; see also Abrahamsson, Bengt, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage), 1972)Google Scholar.

21 Stouffer, Samuel A.et al., The American Soldier, Vol. I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949)Google Scholar.

22 Abrahamsson, p. 74.

23 Abrahamsson, p. 120.

24 For a review, see Seigle, John W., “Military Advice in Decision-Making: Past and Prologue,” in Issues of National Security in the 1970's, ed. Jordon, Amos A. (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 248–71Google Scholar.

25 The experience with the Air Force OER system supports this expectation. The doubt expressed by Air Force officers concerning this new system centers on the arbitrariness of its quotas, which could work successfully only if all billets were of equal importance. But, as this article points out, certain billets are clearly more important than others and thus attract the better officers. Ordinarily, therefore, an officer who is second or third among those in the Chief of Staffs office or a major headquarters would be perceived as a better performer than an officer rated second or even first in a subordinate command. With the quota system, however, these differences in the importance of billets can no longer be formally recorded. Thus, the system will no doubt be circumvented. And that process of circumvention will stress even more the importance of an officer's visibility.

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