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Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2010

CHRISTOPHER KAM ,
WILLIAM T. BIANCO ,
ITAI SENED  and
REGINA SMYTH
CHRISTOPHER KAM*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
WILLIAM T. BIANCO*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
ITAI SENED*
Affiliation:
Washington University in St. Louis
REGINA SMYTH*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
*
Christopher Kam is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, C-410 Buchanan Bldg., 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z1 (ckam@interchange.ubc.ca).
William T. Bianco is Professor, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, 210 Woodburn Hall, 1100 E. Seventh Street, Bloomington, IN 47405-7110 (wbianco@indiana.edu).
Itai Sened is Professor, Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1063, One Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO. 63130-4899 (sened@artsci.wustl.edu).
Regina Smyth is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, 210 Woodburn Hall, 1100 E. Seventh Street, Bloomington, IN 47405-7110 (rsmyth@indiana.edu).
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Abstract

This article promotes a characterization of intraparty politics that explains how rank- and-file party members control the delegation of power to their cabinet ministers and shadow cabinet ministers. Using the uncovered set as a solution concept and a measure of party members' collective preferences, we explore the hypothesis that backbenchers' preferences constrain the ministerial selection process in a manner that mitigates agency problems. Specifically, promotion is distributed preferentially to members whose own policy preferences are proximate to the uncovered set of all party members' preferences. Our analysis of ministerial appointments in the contemporary British Parliament supports this view. For both the Labour and Conservative parties, front bench appointments are more sensitive to the collective preferences of backbenchers in each party as measured by the party uncovered set than to the preferences of the parties' leaders.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 104 , Issue 2 , May 2010 , pp. 289 - 306
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2010

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References

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