Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2020
Rival causal and interpretive approaches to explaining social phenomena have important ethical differences. While human actions can be explained as a result of causal mechanisms, as a meaningful choice based on reasons, or as some combination of the two, it is morally important that social scientists respect others by recognizing them as persons. Interpretive explanations directly respect their subjects in this way, while purely causal explanations do not. Yet although causal explanations are not themselves expressions of respect, they can be used in respectful ways if they are incorporated into subjects’ self-directed projects. This can occur when subjects correctly understand and freely adopt researchers’ goals through a process of informed consent. It can also occur when researchers correctly understand and adopt their subject’s goals, using their research to empower those they study.
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the NUI Galway Law and Philosophy Colloquium, the University College Dublin Philosophy Colloquium, the University of East Anglia Philosophy Seminar, the Open University Values and Reasons Philosophy Seminar, the Association for Political Theory (APT) Annual Meeting, and the Philosophy, Politics, Anthropology and Allied Disciplines (PPA+) Annual Conference. I would like to thank all the organizers and attendees as well as Coral Celeste Frazer and Jennifer Page for their invaluable assistance and the University of East Anglia for its generous research leave. I would also like to thank Leigh Jenco, Sarah Goff, and three incredibly thorough anonymous reviewers for helping to improve this article so significantly for the better as it made its way through multiple rounds of revision at the APSR.
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