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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
In recent discussions of the German problem there seems to be a growing superficiality and confusion that is greatly to be deplored. Sensational articles, and even books, on the subject are having a deep influence on American and British opinion. We badly need more informed discussions of basic parts of the German problem if we are to avoid serious mistakes in the postwar world. Although definitive answers cannot always be given in the political field, it is nevertheless incumbent upon everyone who has studied, both in the ivory tower and in the field, to offer as much light and leading within the spheres of his competence as time and strength will permit.
At this time, I think it is important to call attention to an aspect of the German problem which must not be overlooked after the war either by the occupying powers or by the German people. Since it is primarily a long-run problem, and not merely a problem of occupation, the German people will have to solve it in the final analysis. Furthermore, since I do not belong to the school of gloomy haters who envisage an indefinite oppression and control of the German people, I prefer to base a program of governmental and political regeneration for Germany on the assumption that the tragic and bitter experience of the Germans under Hitler will lead to a revival of those features of civilized, democratic society which are so essential to the proper functioning of both national and international government.
1 Brecht, Arnold, Prelude to Silence (New York, 1944).Google Scholar
2 See this Review, Vol. 38, p. 1007.
3 See Economic Journal, Vol. 52, pp. 176–185.
4 Hermens, F. A., Democracy or Anarchy? (Notre Dame, 1941).Google Scholar
5 It is interesting to note that German scholars and publicists did not seem to be much interested in the subject of public opinion during the Weimar period. Two German studies, however, are worthy of mention: Bauer, Wilhelm, Die öffentliche Meinung in der Weltgeschichte (Potsdam, 1930)Google Scholar, and Tönnies, Ferdinand, Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung (Berlin, 1922).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 See “The Tragedy of the German Revolution,” in Frankfurter Zeitung, Nov., 1920.
7 Mowrer, Edgar Ansel, Germany Puts the Clock Back (New York, 1933), p. 319.Google Scholar
8 See James T. Shotwell, What Germany Forgot.
9 Mowrer, , Germany Puts the Clock Back, pp. 319–320.Google Scholar
10 See Georg Kaisenberg, Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren; Thoma, Richard, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Vol. 10, pp. 55–73Google Scholar; Wells, Roger, National Municipal Review, Vol. 18, pp. 29–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrecht, Vol. 2, pp. 204–220.
11 Public Administration Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 205.
12 I have suggested a procedure for this in Current History, Vol. 6, pp. 304–310 (Apr., 1944).
13 American Sociological Review, Vol. 39, pp. 301–313.
14 Ibid., pp. 304–305.
15 Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., War and German Society (New Haven, 1937), p. 294.Google Scholar
16 See this Review, Vol. 38, pp. 970–975.
17 See my evaluation of “The German Party System,” in this Review, Vol. 23, pp. 859–891.
18 See the author's German Election Administration (Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 51–65, for a treatment of the German P. R. system.
19 It is not possible to deal in this article with the necessity of establishing civilian control over whatever army Germany is permitted to maintain. The Weimar Republic failed completely in this respect. Presumably a small citizen army based on short-term obligatory service, similar to Foch's recommendations which the Versailles Conference rejected, would prove less dangerous than the professional army which was created after the last war under the requirements of the Versailles Treaty.
20 Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Subcommittee on War Mobilization, Subcommittee Report No. 4, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 2.
21 Ibid., p. 5.
22 Ibid., p. 8.
23 Hauschild, C., Der Vorlaüfige Reichswirtschaftsrat (Berlin, 1926).Google Scholar
24 See my brochure What Shall Be Done With Germany (Carleton College, 1944), p. 43.
25 Sollmann, F. W., “How To Deal With Germany,” World Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 2, pp. 82–86.Google Scholar
26 See Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 4; Vol. 55, Nos. 1 and 2 (Dec. 1939–June, 1940).
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