Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T22:50:26.107Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policy-making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2019

KEITH E. SCHNAKENBERG Open the ORCID record for KEITH E. SCHNAKENBERG [Opens in a new window]  and
IAN R. TURNER Open the ORCID record for IAN R. TURNER [Opens in a new window]
KEITH E. SCHNAKENBERG*
Affiliation:
Washington University
IAN R. TURNER*
Affiliation:
Yale University
*
*Keith E. Schnakenberg, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, keschnak@wustl.edu.
†Ian R. Turner, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University, ian.turner@yale.edu.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Lobbying is a potential source of corruption but is also a valuable source of information for policy-makers. We analyze a game-theoretic model that shows how the threat of corruption affects the incentives of noncorrupt politicians to enlist the help of lobbyists to make more informed decisions. Politicians face a dilemma because voters cannot always tell whether a politician allows access to lobbyists to solicit corruption or to seek information. Thus, a noncorrupt politician may deny access to lobbyists to signal that she is noncorrupt even though doing so impedes her ability to make good policy. This signaling may decrease the welfare of the voters depending on the value of the lost policy information relative to the value of screening out corrupt politicians.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 113 , Issue 3 , August 2019 , pp. 762 - 777
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

The authors would like to thank Stephane Wolton, Carlo Prato, Jon Woon, Richard Van Weelden, Chris Cotton, Thomas Groll, Arnaud Dellis, Philippe De Donder, Torun Dewan, Tasos Kalandrakis, Andrea Aldrich, Bill Clark, as well as seminar audiences at Texas A&M University, Université du Québec à Montréal, University of Pittsburgh, Washington University in St. Louis, and the London School of Economics and Political Science for very helpful discussions and feedback. Errors are ours alone.

References

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy, and Sonin, Konstantin. 2013. “A Political Theory of Populism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (2): 771–805.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ashworth, Scott, and Shotts, Kenneth W.. 2010. “Does Informative Media Commentary Reduce Politicians’ Incentive to Pander?” Journal of Public Economics 94: 838–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1995. “Campaign Contributions and Access.” American Political Science Review 89 (3): 566–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David, and Wright, John R.. 1992. “Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s Vote.” Social Choice and Welfare 9 (3): 229–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David, and Wright, John R.. 1994. “Counteractive Lobbying.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 25–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, David P. 1989. “Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1): 45–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R., Berry, Jeffrey M., Hojnacki, Marie, Leech, Beth L., and Kimball, David C.. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennedsen, Morten, and Feldmann, Sven E.. 2006. “Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions.” Journal of Public Economics 90 (4): 631–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berkman, Michael B. 2001. “Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26 (4): 661–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, Timothy. 2006. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Caillaud, Bernard, and Tirole, Jean. 2007. “Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group.” The American Economic Review 97 (5): 1877–900.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Herron, Michael C., and Shotts, Kenneth W.. 2001. “Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 532–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cho, In-Koo, and Kreps, David M.. 1987. “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (2): 179–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coate, Stephen, and Morris, Stephen. 1995. “On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests.” Journal of Political Economy 103 (6): 1210–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cotton, Christopher. 2012. “Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational Lobbying and Contribution Limits When Money Buys Access.” Journal of Public Economics 96 (3–4): 369–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dahm, Matthias, and Porteiro, Nicolás. 2008. “Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure.” Social Choice and Welfare 30 (4): 531–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Denzau, Arthur T., and Munger, Michael C.. 1986. “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented.” American Political Science Review 80 (1): 89–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duggan, John, and Martinelli, César. 2015. “Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy.” GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15–31. URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2606481.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellis, Christopher J., and Groll, Thomas. 2017. “Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy.” Unpublished Manuscript. Columbia University.Google Scholar
Faccio, Mara. 2006. “Politically Connected Firms.” The American Economic Review 96 (1): 369–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisman, Raymond. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” The American Economic Review 91 (4): 1095–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fowler, Anthony, Garro, Haritz, and Spenkuch, Jörg L.. Forthcoming. “Quid Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions.” The Journal of Politics.Google Scholar
Grossman, Gene M., and Helpman, Elhanan. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” The American Economic Review 84: 833–50.Google Scholar
Grossman, Gene M., and Helpman, Elhanan. 2001. Special Interest Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hall, Richard L., and Deardorff, Alan V.. 2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” American Political Science Review 100 (1): 69–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansen, John Mark. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 2012. “Behavioral and Experimental Economics as a Guidance to Anticorruption.” In New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption, eds. Serra, Danila and Wantchekon, Leonard. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 279–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leech, Beth L. 2013. Lobbyists at Work. New York, NY: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maskin, Eric, and Tirole, Jean. 2004. “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government.” The American Economic Review 94 (4): 1034–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCarty, Nolan, and Rothenberg, Lawrence S.. 1996. “Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract.” American Journal of Political Science 40 (3): 872–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meier, Kenneth J., and Holbrook, Thomas M.. 1992. “‘I Seen My Opportunities and I Took ’Em:’ Political Corruption in the American States.” The Journal of Politics 54 (1): 135–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morelli, Massimo, and Van Weelden, Richard. 2013. “Ideology and Information in Policymaking.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (3): 412–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morris, Stephen. 2001. “Political Correctness.” Journal of Political Economy 109 (2): 231–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Omarova, Saule T. 2010. “Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry.” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 35 (3): 665–706.Google Scholar
Potters, Jan, and Van Winden, Frans. 1990. “Modelling Political Pressure as Transmission of Information.” European Journal of Political Economy 6 (1): 61–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Potters, Jan, and Van Winden, Frans. 1992. “Lobbying and Asymmetric Information.” Public Choice 74 (3): 269–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prat, Andrea. 2005. “The Wrong Kind of Transparency.” The American Economic Review 95 (3): 862–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and Tierney, John T.. 1986. Organized Interests and American Democracy. New York, NY: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Schnakenberg, Keith E. 2017. “Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 61 (1): 129–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wolton, Stephane. 2016. “Lobbying, inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices.” Unpublished Manuscript. London School of Economics. URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190685.Google Scholar
Wright, John R. 1996. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Schnakenberg and Turner supplementary material

Schnakenberg and Turner supplementary material 1

Download Schnakenberg and Turner supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 229 KB
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.