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“With colleagues like that, who needs enemies?”: Doctors and Repression under Military and Post-Authoritarian Brazil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2019

Eyal Weinberg
Eyal Weinberg*
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texaseyalw@utexas.edu
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Extract

As young medical students at Guanabara State University, Luiz Roberto Tenório and Ricardo Agnese Fayad received some of the best medical education offered in 1960s Brazil. For six years, the peers in the same entering class had studied the principles of the healing arts and practiced their application at the university's teaching hospital. They had also witnessed the Brazilian military oust a democratically elected president and install a dictatorship that ruled the country for 21 years (1964–85). After graduating, however, Tenório and Fayad embarked on very distinct paths. The former became a political dissident in opposition to the military regime and provided medical assistance to members of the armed left. The latter joined the armed forces and, as a military physician, participated in the brutal torture and cruel treatment of political prisoners. At the end of military rule, Brazil's medical board would find him guilty of violating the Brazilian code of medical ethics and revoke his license.

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The Americas , Volume 76 , Issue 3 , July 2019 , pp. 467 - 505
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Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 2019 

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Footnotes

I thank Ann Zulawski who provided feedback on an earlier version of this article at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. I am deeply grateful to Seth Garfield, James Green, and Philippa Levine for their comments on various drafts of the manuscript. Lastly, I thank the two anonymous reviewers for The Americas whose insightful feedback helped refining the analysis in this paper. Research for this article has benefitted from the generous support of the History Department and the Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin.

References

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16. See CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 197/88; and Testemunho de Luiz Roberto Tenório à Comissão Nacional da Verdade, September 22, 2014, Comissão Nacional da Verdade [hereafter CNV], Arquivo 00092.002439/2014-07. In 1975, Guanabara State University was renamed Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), as it is known today.

17. Goulart took office after a compromise between the military and congress changed the form of government to a parliamentary system, reducing the powers of the president and creating the role of prime minister. A 1963 referendum allowed Goulart to restore full presidential powers.

18. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 9–14.

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22. In addition to circulating alarming memoranda, the United States restricted aid to Brazil and channeled funding to states with conservative governors. See Smith, Joseph, Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 153–159Google Scholar; and Fico, Carlos, O grande irmão da operação brother sam aos anos de chumbo: o governo dos estados unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2008), 67–113Google Scholar.

23. The Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática, IBAD) and the Social Studies and Research Institute (Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais, IPES) brought together national security ideologues, generals, journalists, and conservative intellectuals in devising a national security doctrine and mobilizing public opinion against Goulart. Funding came from business leaders as well as the US government. See Dreifuss, René Armand, 1964, A conquista do estado: ação política, poder e golpe de classe (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981), 101–104Google Scholar, 162–199.

24. Skidmore, Thomas E., Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 229–234CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 276–293; Langland, Speaking of Flowers, 79–81, 85–87.

25. In a massive rally in Rio de Janeiro, Goulart called for immediate constitutional reforms. See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964, 284–293. On the other side of the political spectrum, conservative marches under the name of the “Family with God for Liberty” took place in major cities, including São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. See de Deus Simões, Solange, Deus, pátria e família: as mulheres no golpe de 1964 (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985)Google Scholar; and Mendes, Ricardo Antonio Souza, “Marchando com a família, com deus e pela liberdade: o ‘13 de março’ das direitas,” Varia Historia 21:33 (2005): 234–249CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the politicization of Latin Americans in the context of the Cold War, see Grandin, Greg, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. The first medical school was established in Salvador (later moved to Rio de Janeiro) in 1808 after the arrival of the royal family. Not until 1898 was a second school established, in Porto Alegre. The next schools were founded a decade or more later, in Curitiba and Rio de Janeiro (1912), São Paulo (1913), Belo Horizonte (1918), Belém (1919), and Recife (1920). See Ernesto Lima-Gonçalves, Médicos e ensino da medicina no Brasil (São Paulo: EdUSP, 2002), 115–116; and Lycurgo de Castro Santos Filho, História geral da medicina brasileira, vol. 2 (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1991). The first professional medical society, the Sociedade de Medicina do Rio de Janeiro (SMRJ), was established in 1829. Renamed the Academia Imperial de Medicina in 1835, it is known today as the Academia Nacional de Medicina. The Sociedade de Medicina e Cirurgia do Rio de Janeiro (SMCRJ) was established in 1886, in a period that also saw the appearance of the first medical periodicals, among them the Gazeta Médica da Bahia (1866) and Brazil Médico (1887). See Ferreira, Luiz Otávio, Maio, Marcos Chor, and Azevedo, Nara, “A Sociedade de Medicina e Cirurgia do Rio de Janeiro: a gênese de uma rede institucional alternativa,” História, Ciências, Saúde-Manguinhos 4:3 (1997): 475–491CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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28. Código de Ético da Associação Médica Brasileira (1953), see: http://portal.cfm.org.br/images/stories/documentos/EticaMedica/codigoeticaamb1953.pdf, accessed April 13, 2019. Ethics codes existed earlier in Brazil but varied between locales and relied on translations of foreign texts. In 1867, for example, the Gazeta Médica da Bahia published a translation of the ethics code of the American Medical Association. In 1929, the Brazilian doctors' union translated the ethics code approved by the VI Congreso Medico Latino-Americano (Havana, 1922). See Aristoteles Guilliod de Miranda, “A história dos códigos de ética médica,” Medicina: Jornal de Conselho Federal de Medicina, June 2009, 22–23.

29. Hélio Barroso dos Reis, ed., AMB 60 anos: 1951–2011 (São Paulo: Associação Médica Brasileira, 2011), 47; Guilliod de Miranda, “A história dos códigos de ética médica,” 23. The World Medical Association's Geneva Declaration was adopted by the WMA's second general assembly, held in Geneva, Switzerland, September 1948, https://www.wma.net/policy/current-policies, accessed April 1, 2019.

30. President Vargas made an initial attempt to institute medical boards (see Decreto-Lei no. 7.955, September 13, 1945), but it was President Kubitschek who in 1957 granted those bodies full autonomy to regulate the profession. See Lei no. 3.268, September 30, 1957. The federal medical council, the nation's highest authority on ethics and professional conduct, was located in the capital (Rio de Janeiro, moved to Brasília in the 1980s), and regional medical councils were instituted in every state. Until the institution of the councils, regulation of doctors was in the national government's hands, under the Serviço Nacional de Fiscalização de Medicina, installed by Decreto-Lei no. 3.171 on April 2, 1941.

31. A doctor by training, Kubitschek frequently used medical metaphors in his campaigns, linking health and national development. His Plano de Metas—epitomized by the motto “Fifty Years in Five”—focused on the development of five key areas: energy, food, industry, education, and transport. He also promised to improve access to health, including a 70 percent increase in hospital beds. See Hochman, Gilberto, “‘O brasil não é só doença’: o programa de saúde pública de Juscelino Kubitschek,” História, Ciências, Saúde - Manguinhos 16:1 (2009): 313–331CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lafer, Celso, JK e o programa de metas (1956–61): processo de planejamento e sistema político no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2002)Google Scholar; and Araújo, Fernando, Juscelino Kubitschek, o médico (Belo Horizonte: RC Editora e Gráfica, 2002)Google Scholar.

32. Figures refer to the years 1958 to 1962. Estimates are taken from the UN Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation and the UN Population and Vital Statistics Report, as well as from the records of the 3a Conferência Nacional de Saúde (1963), republished by the Secretaria Municipal de Saúde, Niterói, 1992. See also Naiara Prato Cardoso de Souza, “A 3a conferência nacional de saúde (1963): antecedentes para um sistema nacional de saúde público e descentralizado” (Master's thesis: Fiocruz, 2014), 99–102.

33. Hochman, Gilberto, “From Autonomy to Partial Alignment: National Malaria Programs in the Time of Global Eradication, Brazil, 1941–1961,” Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 25:1 (2008): 161–192CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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36. Reis, José Roberto Franco, “Viver é influenciar: Mário Magalhães, sanitarismo desenvolvimentista e o campo intelectual da saúde pública (1940–1960),” Tempo Social 27:2 (2015): 279–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Paim, Jairnilson Silva, “Medicina preventiva e social no Brasil: modelos, crises, perspectivas,” Saúde em Debate 11 (1981): 57–59Google Scholar; Lima, “Public Health and Social Ideas in Modern Brazil,” 1174–1175. See also Eric D. Carter, “Social Medicine and International Expert Networks in Latin America, 1930–1945” Global Public Health [Macalester College], 2018, 1–12; and “Tema B, C, D,” in 3a Conferência Nacional de Saúde: Anais, 1963 (republished by the Secretaria Municipal de Saúde, Niterói, 1992).

37. See the debate within l'Ordre National des Médecins, the body responsible for regulating the medical profession in France. Weisz, George, “The Origins of Medical Ethics in France: The International Congress of Morale Médicale of 1955,” in Social Science Perspectives on Medical Ethics, Weisz, George, ed. (Dordrecht: Springer, 1990), 145–161CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38. Medical doctor Ernesto Che Guevara delivered his influential “On Revolutionary Medicine” speech on August 19, 1960. See Obra Revolucionaria 24 (1960). Also see Feinsilver, Julie Margot, Healing the Masses: Cuban Health Politics at Home and Abroad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001)Google Scholar.

39. Most notable were the Pan American Health Organization's [hereafter PAHO] 1954 Viña del Mar (Chile) and 1955 Tehuacán (Mexico) meetings, which underscored the importance of social and preventive health, as well as the promotion of modern health as defined by the World Health Organization: “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being.” See the preamble to the constitution of the World Health Organization, adopted June/July 1946. See also PAHO, Health in the Americas: Regional Outlook and Country Profiles (PAHO, 2012), 5; and Cueto, Marcos, The Value of Health: A History of the Pan American Health Organization (Washington, DC: PAHO, 2007), 98–109Google Scholar. For the early roots of social medicine in Latin America, see Cueto and Palmer, Medicine and Public Health in Latin America, 168–175. Of course, integrating social aspects into health policies has a long history in Latin America, rooted in neo-Lamarckian conceptions. See Nancy Stepan's seminal work on Latin America's eugenic campaigns, The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Stepan, Nancy, “Eugenics in Brazil, 1917–1940,” in The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia, Adams, Mark B., ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 110–145Google Scholar.

40. The Cuban government's Medicina General Integral system promoted social medicine and preventive health care in both urban and rural settings. This was also the beginning of Cuba's international “medical diplomacy.” See Díaz-Briquets, Sergio, The Health Revolution in Cuba (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983)Google Scholar; and Feinsilver, Julie M., “Fifty Years of Cuba's Medical Diplomacy: From Idealism to Pragmatism,” Cuban Studies 41 (2010): 85–104Google ScholarPubMed.

41. In Brazil, the medical school of the University of São Paulo at Ribeirão Preto pioneered the integration of preventive and social medicine into medical training. See Passos, Afonso Dinis Costa, ed., Medicina social na Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeirão Preto da Universidade de São Paulo–1954 a 2014 (Ribeirão Preto, SP: Holos Editora, 2014), 45–66Google Scholar; and Nunes, Everardo Duarte, “Saúde coletiva: revisitando a sua história e os cursos de pós-graduação,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 1 (1996): 59–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar. An experimental medical curriculum was implemented for a brief period at the University of São Paulo, between 1968 and 1974. See Mota, André, “Entre o curso tradicional e o curso experimental da Faculdade de Medicina-USP: a experiência da pedagoga Maria Cecília Ferro Donnangelo, 1968–1976,” Educar em Revista 54 (2014): 159–172CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42. Students also studied sociocultural and ecologic factors of disease and health, community health protection, medical economics, and the social roles of the physician. Shepard, William P. and Roney, James G., “The Teaching of Preventive Medicine in the United States,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 42:4 (1964): 88, 111–113CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

43. Ibañez, Nelson, “Medicina social e saúde coletiva: entrevista com Hésio Cordeiro,” Cadernos de História da Ciência 8:2 (2012): 309–310Google Scholar. Cordeiro, a former student of Piquet Carneiro, later became a prominent advocate of social medicine and head of Brazil's health care agency, the Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social (INAMPS).

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45. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017. On the intensification of student activism in 1963 and the National Union of Students under military rule, see Langland, Speaking of Flowers, 72–75; and Filho, João Roberto Martins, Movimento estudantil e ditadura militar, 1964–1968 (Campinas, SP: Papirus Editora, 1987)Google Scholar.

46. CAOC also demanded the opening of a chair in preventive medicine. See “Parecer dos alunos e residentes da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de São Paulo aos membros da Comissão de Orientação Escolar,” O Bisturi 101 (December 1961): 1–2, found in the Museu Histórico da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de São Paulo [hereafter FMUSP]. Medical students’ advocacy for social medicine was not unique to Brazil. In 1960, for example, the British medical students' association recommended a full course in social medicine that would include epidemiology, medical sociology, and the organization of the National Health Service. See British Medical Students' Association, Report on the Teaching of Social Medicine in British Medical Schools, MacSween, R. N. M., ed. (1960). A summary appears in “Teaching Of Social Medicine,” The British Medical Journal 1:5180 (1960): 1193Google Scholar.

47. The congress was held in Recife, December 9-15, 1962. Its organizer, President of the Sociedade Brasileira de Higiene Mário Magalhães, was an ardent advocate of developmental health and social medicine. See Escorel, Sarah, “Mário Magalhães: desenvolvimento é saúde,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 20:8 (2015): 2453–2460CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Campos, Carlos Eduardo Aguilera, Cohn, Amélia, and Brandão, Ana Laura, “Trajetória histórica da organização sanitária da cidade do Rio de Janeiro: 1916–2015, cem anos de inovações e conquistas,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 21:5 (2016): 1351–1364CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “Novo plano de saúde para a população brasileira,” Correio da Manhã, February 23, 1962, 8.

48. The Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social was cut short by the 1964 coup. See Furtado, Rosa Freire d'Aguiar, “A história de um plano,” in O plano trienal e o ministério do planejamento, d'Aguiar Furtado, Rosa Freire, ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2011), 7–28Google Scholar.

49. The 1963 Conferência Nacional de Saúde reflected a departure from previous conferences held in 1941 under Vargas and 1950 under Dutra, inviting a wider range of health experts to participate in a conversation about health, living conditions, and development in Brazil. Ninety-five delegates participated in the conference. See Naiara Prato Cardoso de Souza, “A 3a conferência nacional de saúde (1963): antecedentes para um sistema nacional de saúde público e descentralizado” (Master's thesis: Fiocruz, 2014), 29–31; and Giovanella, Lígia, Escorel, Sarah, and Costa Lobato, Lenaura de Vasconcelos, eds., Políticas e sistema de saúde no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 2008), 317–318Google Scholar.

50. “Discurso do Presidente da República na Sessão Inaugural da 3a Conferência Nacional de Saúde,” in 3a Conferência Nacional de Saúde: Anais, 1963 (Niterói: Secretaria Municipal de Saúde, 1992), 25.

51. “Discurso do Ministro da Saúde, Deputado Wilson Fadul,” in 3a Conferência Nacional de Saúde: Anais, 1963 (Niterói: Secretaria Municipal de Saúde, 1992), 28–29.

52. See Relatório Final da 3a Conferência Nacional de Saúde, http://www.conselho.saude.gov.br/biblioteca/Relatorios/relatorio_3.pdf, accessed April 1, 2019; and Souza, A 3a Conferência Nacional de Saúde, 92–125.

53. Ibañez, , “Medicina social e saúde coletiva: entrevista com Hésio Cordeiro,” Cadernos de História da Ciência 8:2 (2012): 311Google Scholar; and Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017.

54. Ibañez, , “Medicina social e saúde coletiva: entrevista com Hésio Cordeiro,” Cadernos de História da Ciência 8:2 (2012): 309–310Google Scholar; Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017. At the University of São Paulo, the right-wing leaning Associação Atlética Acadêmica Oswaldo Cruz (AAAOC) served as CAOC's opponent. The politicization of medical students was not limited to Brazil, yet the phenomenon is mostly overlooked in scholarship. See Hoffman, Lily M., The Politics of Knowledge: Activist Movements in Medicine and Planning (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)Google Scholar, esp. chapt.1. For a broader sociological analysis of politicization in the academia under military regimes, see Diez, María Agustina “Career-Building in a Highly Politicized Period: Argentine Social Scientists in the 1960s,” in The Politics of Academic Autonomy in Latin America, Beigel, Fernanda, ed. (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 187–203Google Scholar.

55. Fico, O golpe de 1964; Joffily, “Aniversários do golpe de 1964.”

56. Tad Szulc, “Washington Sends ‘Warmest’ Wishes to Brazil's Leader,” New York Times, April 3, 1964, 1. On the role of the United States in the 1964 coup, see Pereira, “The US Role in the 1964 Coup in Brazil”; Green, We Cannot Remain Silent; Fico, O grande irmão; and Smith, Brazil and the United States, chapts. 6 and 7.

57. Goulart would stay in Uruguay (and temporarily in Argentina) until his death, in 1976. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964, 300–302; Napolitano, 1964, chapt. 2.

58. Motta's analysis of opinion polls administered shortly after the coup demonstrates that many Brazilians viewed Goulart's removal as “beneficial,” and felt optimistic about the future. Interestingly enough, the study also shows that polls conducted a few days prior to the takeover indicated high approval rates for Goulart and his reform plan. See Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, “O golpe de 1964 e a ditadura nas pesquisas de opinião,” Tempo 20 (2014): 1–21.

59. Ten days after the coup, the military instituted the first of 17 ‘institutional acts.’ This first act solidified executive control and allowed for the arrest and persecution of tens of thousands of civilians. See Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 32–38; Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 23–24; and Carlos Fico, Como eles agiam: os subterrâneos da ditadura militar: espionagem e polícia política (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2001), 36–39. By the beginning of 1965, support for the regime had decreased significantly, according to polls. See Motta, “O golpe de 1964 e a ditadura nas pesquisas de opinião,” 17–18.

60. Atas da Congregação da FMUSP, April 3, 1964, FMUSP. Of all the board members, only three objected to the announcement: Alberto Carvalho da Silva, Isaias Raw, and Reinaldo Chiaverini. All three were purged after the regime intensified repression in 1968. Other universities’ administrations made similar statements. See Motta, As universidades e o regime militar, 35–36.

61. The board suspended those representatives (leaders of the Oswaldo Cruz Academic Center, CAOC) for using the microbiology department's amphitheater for the protest without authorization. See Atas da Congregação da FMUSP, April 8, 1964, FMUSP.

62. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017. On the post-coup clashes at Guanabara State University's medical school, see Fabio Daflon, Título provisório: o movimento estudantil nas ciências médicas (São Paulo: Editora Quilombo, 1980), 23–24; Mancebo, Deise, Da gênese aos compromissos: uma história da UERJ (Rio de Janeiro: EdUERJ, 2016), 239Google Scholar.

63. In Rio de Janeiro, coup supporters set the UNE building on fire. See Langland, Speaking of Flowers, 88–89. Also see Motta's chapter on universities’ responses to the coup in As universidades e o regime militar, 24–60. The UNE was permanently abolished in 1967 under a decree-law that reorganized the system of student representation in Brazil (Decreto-Lei no. 228, February 28, 1967).

64. Lei no. 4.464 (November 9, 1964), also called Lei Suplicy, sought to advance a large-scale reform in higher education, requiring universities to adopt North American models of higher education and limiting students’ political representation. Many faculty members and students rejected the law. See Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 44–45; Langland, Speaking of Flowers, 93–94; and Motta, As universidades e o regime militar, 61–64.

65. Daflon, Título provisório, 20; Mancebo, Da gênese aos compromissos, 237–239. The Suplicy law did not make the UNE illegal but rather set up new state and federal student bodies, which it called “diretórios acadêmicos.”

66. Ramadon, Luis Fernando, UERJ: uma história apaixonante. (Rio de Janeiro: self-published, 2005)Google Scholar, 309, 596.

67. “Instituto O. Cruz tem novo diretor,” Correio da Manhã, June 24, 1964, 5. See also “Destituição do interventor do IAPB,” Correio da Manhã, April 28, 1964, 2.

68. The inquérito policial militar investigations were instituted under article 8 of the first Institutional Act (April 9, 1964), and Decreto no. 53.897 (April 27, 1964). See Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 33–35.

69. See Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, As universidades e o regime militar, 36; and Luigi Biondi, “‘Não éramos mais universidade’: a política na Escola Paulista de Medicina, da universidade federal à ditadura,” in A universidade federal de São Paulo aos 75 anos: ensaios sobre memória e história, Jaime Rodrigues, ed. (São Paulo: Editora Fap-Unifesp, 2008), 158–161.

70. As Brazil's minister of justice between 1967 and 1969, he served as one of the chief architects of Institutional Act No. 5 (1968).

71. Gama e Silva's secret committee was first revealed by the Correio da Manhã. See “O terror,” Correio da Manhã, October 9, 1964, 14. See also O livro negro da USP: o controle ideológico na universidade, Associação dos Docentes da Universidade de São Paulo [hereafter ADUSP], 1979, 16–18. Approved by São Paulo's governor, the expulsions included Luiz Hildebrando Pereira da Silva, Erney Plessmann Camargo, Luiz Rey, Pedro Henrique Saldanha, Reynaldo Chiaverini, Julio Puddles, and Thomas Maack. See Motta, As universidades e o regime militar, 53–54.

72. The University of São Paulo's rector, Antônio Barros de Ulhôa Cintra, promoted experimental research and science education initiatives of junior medical researchers such as Isaias Raw, Michel Rabinovitch, and Victor and Ruth Nussenzweig. See Medeiros-Neto, Geraldo, “Ulhôa Cintra, um pioneiro da moderna endocrinologia,” Arquivos Brasileiros de Endocrinologia & Metabologia 43:2 (1999): 146–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Izique, Claudia and Marcolin, Neldson, “Isaias Raw: cientista bom de briga,” Revista Pesquisa Fapesp 113 (2005): 12–17Google Scholar. See also O livro negro da USP: o controle ideológico na universidade, ADUSP, 1979, 9–10. On the professional and political conflicts at the Escola Paulista de Medicina, see Biondi, “‘Não éramos mais universidade,’” 144.

73. Lima, Nísia Trindade, “Public Health and Social Ideas in Modern Brazil,” American Journal of Public Health 97:7 (July 2007): 1168–1177CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. See also Scheffer, Mário, ed., Demografia médica no Brasil 2018 (São Paulo: FMUSP, CFM, CREMESP, 2018)Google Scholar.

74. Isaias Raw, for example, directed the Brazilian Foundation for the Development of Science Teaching (FUNBEC), which promoted science education in various populations and age ranges. See Izique, and Marcolin, , “Isaias Raw”; Thomas Maack, “Casa de Arnaldo, circa 1964,” Revista USP 10 (1991): 121–134Google Scholar; Pivetta, Marcos and Marcolin, Neldson, “Thomas Maack: memórias de um ano que não terminou,” Revista Pesquisa Fapesp 225 (2014): 26–31Google Scholar. Purges of progressive medical researchers occurred outside of universities as well. In June 1964, for example, President Castelo Branco dismissed the director of the Oswaldo Cruz Institute (later, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation), Joaquim Travassos da Rosa, a renowned bacteriologist and virologist. See “Instituto O. Cruz tem novo diretor,” Correio da Manhã, June 24, 1964, 5.

75. The episode is known as the Massacre da Praia Vermelha. See de Siqueira, Marcelo Nogueira, “A era dos estudantes: Rio de Janeiro, 1964–1968,” Revista do Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 8 (2014): 383–384Google Scholar; and Bordallo, Eduardo Augusto, 60 anos de luta médica (Rio de Janeiro: Foco Noticias, 2012), 23–26Google Scholar.

76. This was the first set of major strikes since the 1964 coup. See Humphrey, John, Capitalist Control and Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 24–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Seidman, Gay, Manufacturing Militance: Workers’ Movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970–1985 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 60–63Google Scholar. On the social unrest and students’ mobilization in 1968, see Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 82–91; and Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 74–78. For an analysis of cultural opposition in 1968, see Napolitano, 1964, 106–118; and Dunn, Christopher, Brutality Garden: Tropicália and the Emergence of a Brazilian Counterculture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017. The protest included around 600 medical students, ten of whom suffered bullet wounds. Luiz Paulo da Cruz Nunes, a second-year medical student, was shot in the head. See “polícia mata estudante a tiros e ataca hospital das clinicas,” Correio da Manhã, October 23, 1968, 1; and Daflon, Título provisório, 39–43. Earlier, in March 1968, police forces had killed high school student Edson Luis de Lima Souto in a protest in downtown Rio de Janeiro, mobilizing students around the country. See Langland, Speaking of Flowers, 111–147.

78. Mancebo, Da gênese aos compromissos, 244–245. Langland, in Speaking of Flowers (127–131), examines the impact of the 1968 events on the Brazilian student movement. For the Latin American context of 1968 youth radicalization, see Markarian, Vania, Uruguay, 1968: Student Activism from Global Counterculture to Molotov Cocktails. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zolov, Eric, Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture (Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1999)Google Scholar; and Pensado, Jaime M., Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture during the Long Sixties (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an international perspective on social protest and the Cold War, see Suri, Jeremi, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003)Google Scholar, esp. chapts. 3 and 5.

79. Alves's speech took place on September 2, 1968. See Marcelo Ridenti, “As oposições à ditadura: resistência e integração,” in A ditadura que mudou o Brasil, Reis, Ridenti, and Motta, eds., 30–47; Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85, 79–81; and Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 93–95.

80. Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 95–100; Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 81–83. Less than a year after the proclamation of AI-5, President Costa e Silva died after suffering a stroke. An interim junta held power until General Emílio Garrastazu Médici took office as the new president. During his term, repression was taken to its most brutal levels.

81. On the intricate network of domestic surveillance, see Fico, Como eles agiam, esp. 111–143. On the origins and operation of the repressive apparatus, see João Roberto Martins Filho, “Tortura e ideologia: os militares brasileiros e a doutrina da guerre révolutionnaire (1959–1974),” in Desarquivando a ditadura: memória e justiça no Brasil, vol. 1, Cecília MacDowell Santos, Edson Teles, and Janaína de Almeida Teles, eds. (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 2009), 179–202; and Mariana Joffily, “O aparato repressivo: da arquitetura ao desmantelamento,” in A ditadura que mudou o Brasil, Reis, Ridenti, and Motta, eds.,158–171.

82. Decree-Law 359 (December 17, 1968), for example, established a range of investigative commissions to scrutinize and punish “corrupt” politicians and public servants. See Motta, As universidades e o regime militar, 153–154; Fico, Como eles agiam; and Diego Knack, “O combate à corrupção durante a ditadura militar por meio da comissão geral de investigações (1968–1978)” (Master's thesis: UFRJ, 2014). In addition, the definition of national security crimes was expanded, resulting in more political trials. See Pereira, Anthony W., Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 72–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On censorship after AI-5, see Kushnir, Câes de guarda jornalistas e censores, do AI-5 à Constituiçâo de 1988, 255–286.

83. On Decreto-Lei no. 477 (enacted February 26, 1969), see Motta, As universidades e o regime militar, 153–156.

84. In what came to be called the Massacre de Manguinhos (1970), ten esteemed scholars were purged from the biomedical research institute, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation. The regime suspended their political rights for ten years. See Ana Maria Fernandes, A construção da ciência no brasil e a SBPC (Brasília: Editora UNB, 1990), 124–129; and Lent, Herman, O Massacre de Manguinhos (Rio de Janeiro: Avenir, 1978)Google Scholar. On the purges at the University of São Paulo, see O livro negro da USP; and Maack, Thomas, “Casa de Arnaldo, circa 1964,” Revista USP 10 (1991)Google Scholar. For a detailed analysis of purges in various academic institutions, see Motta, As universidades e o regime militar, 164–184.

85. Various physicians and medical students were affected by post-1968 repression. Some were expelled for “subversive activity”; others were investigated under a military police inquiry (IPM). See Ibañez, “Medicina social e saúde coletiva: entrevista com Hésio Cordeiro,” 310-311. In mid-1969, the military opened an inquiry into “subversive activity” at Guanabara State University's medical school, investigating the relationship between the social medicine program and “communist cells.” See the inquérito policial militar opened on May 28, 1969, found in Brasil: Nunca Mais (hereafter BNM), case no. 400, 4.

86. The revocation of Tenório's political rights (“cassação”) went into effect on April 29, 1969. The authorities also suspended his right to serve on union or association boards. See “Mais de cem foram cassados pelo CSN,” O Estado de São Paulo, April 30, 1969, 1; and Tenório's police records in Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo [hereafter APESP], Acervo DEOPS, Delegacia de Ordem Social, Ficha no. 563.

87. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 197/88.

88. DOI-CODI was a successor to OBAN (Operação Bandeirante), an earlier extralegal counterinsurgency unit that operated in São Paulo in 1969. The original operation received financial and logistical support from São Paulo's business elites. See Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 127–129; and Joffily, No centro da engrenagem; Godoy, A casa da vovó. Emílio Médici assumed the presidency on October 30, 1969, after the death of President Costa e Silva and an interim junta rule. Médici promoted a hard-line interpretation of the national security doctrine, dividing Brazil into six “zones of internal defense” to combat the “internal enemy.” See his Diretriz Presidencial de Segurança Interna, signed October 1970. The first DOIs were established in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Recife, and Brasília. See Fico, Como eles agiam, 115–135; and Elio Gaspari, A ditadura escancarada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), 175–184.

89. Testimonies describe an exceptionally cold confinement room known as the geladeira (refrigerator), and a cell where loud music was played on repeat. See for example Cid Benjamin, Gracias a la vida: memórias de um militante (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 2013), 75–77; and Hanrrikson de Andrade, “DOI-CODI no Rio tinha salas de tortura ‘caixinha de música’ e ‘boate,’ UOL, September 23, 2013, https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2013/09/23/doi-codi-no-rio-tinha-salas-de-tortura-caixinha-de-musica-e-boate.htm, accessed April 14, 2019. See also the testimonies given before Rio's and the national truth commission: Testemunho de Dulce Chaves Pandolfi à Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Rio de Janeiro, May 28, 2013, CNV, Arquivo 00092.001463/2013-30, 5–11; and Audiência Pública da CNV e da CEV-Rio sobre o Caso Mário Alves, August 14, 2013, CNV, Arquivo 00092.001874/2013-25.

90. See “Sete ex-presos reconhecem celas e salas de tortura no DOI-CODI do Rio,” Comissão Nacional da Verdade–Assessoria de Comunicação, September 24, 2014, http://www.cnv.gov.br, accessed March 24, 2019; and Marco Antônio Martins, “CNV diz que 48 presos morreram ou desapareceram no DOI-CODI do Rio,” Folha de S. Paulo, September 23, 2014, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/09/1521185-cnv-diz-que-48-presos-morreram-ou-desapareceram-no-doi-codi-do-rio.shtml, accessed March 24, 2019.

91. See Relatório Final da Comissão Nacional da Verdade (Brasília: 2014), vol. 1, tomo 2, capítulo 16, 922.

92. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017; Testemunho de Luiz Roberto Tenório à Comissão Nacional da Verdade, September 22, 2014, CNV, Arquivo 00092.002439/2014-07. For more on Rio de Janeiro's “resistance doctors,” see Olimpio, Miguel, “Médicos e resistência,” in 68, a geração que queria mudar o mundo: relatos, Ferrer, Eliete, ed., (Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, Comissão de Anistia, 2011), 369–375Google Scholar.

93. The narrative in the current and following paragraphs relies on Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by the author, August 1, 2017, and the following testimonies: Testemunho de Luiz Roberto Tenório à Comissão Nacional da Verdade, September 22, 2014, CNV, Arquivo 00092.002439/2014-07; and CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 197/88.

94. See Testemunho de Luiz Roberto Tenório à Comissão Nacional da Verdade, September 22, 2014, CNV, Arquivo 00092.002439/2014-07.

95. See CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 197/88; and Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017.

96. Found in Campanha contra o Brasil no exterior, October 11, 1972, Arquivo Nacional [hereafter AN], Fundo DSI/MJ, BR.AN.RIO.TT.0.MCP.AVU.397.

97. Amnesty International had published its Report on Allegations of Torture in Brazil in 1971. That year saw the release of additional international reports, among them Terror in Brazil: A Dossier, published by the American Committee for Information of Brazil, and Police Repression and Tortures Inflicted upon Political Opponents and Prisoners in Brazil, published by the International Commission of Jurists. See also Green, We Cannot Remain Silent, 204–208.

98. Over the course of the twentieth century, prominent physicians partnered with the state in carrying out disease eradication campaigns that displaced rural populations, sanitary operations that suppressed traditional health practices, and family planning programs that forced the sterilization of poor black and indigenous women. See for example Nancy Stepan, Leys, “Eugenics in Brazil, 1917–1940,” in The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia, Adams, Mark B., ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 110–152Google Scholar; Hochman, Gilberto, A era do saneamento: as bases da política de saúde pública no Brasil (São Paulo: Hucitec Editora, 1998)Google Scholar; Benchimol, Jaime, “Reforma urbana e revolta da vacina na cidade do Rio de Janeiro,” in O Brasil republicano. da proclamação da república à revolução de 1930, vol. 1, Jorge Luiz Ferreira and Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds. (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2006), 231–286Google Scholar; Hochman, Gilberto, Lima, Nísia Trindade, and Maio, Marcos Chor, “The Path of Eugenics in Brazil: Dilemmas of Miscegenation,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics, Bashford, Alison and Levine, Philippa, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 493–510Google Scholar; and Otovo, Okezi T., Progressive Mothers, Better Babies: Race, Public Health, and the State in Brazil, 1850–1945 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016)Google Scholar. Nísia Trindade Lima writes about the contribution of medical doctors to developing Brazilian social thought. See Lima, , “Public Health and Social Ideas in Modern Brazil,” American Journal of Public Health 97:7 (July 2007): 1168–1177CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and Hochman, Gilberto and Lima, Nísia Trindade, eds., Médicos intérpretes do Brasil (São Paulo: Hucitec Editora, 2015)Google Scholar.

99. The National Institute of Social Welfare (INPS) had been in planning since 1964, when an interministerial committee led by Minister of Labor and Social Security Arnaldo Süssekind was established to devise a new social security framework. A later pilot plan (Plano Miranda) seeking privatization of all healthcare institutions owned by the state was eventually rejected. See Almeida, Celia, “Comentário: política e planejamento: o plano de saúde Leonel Miranda,” Revista de Saúde Pública 40:3 (2006): 381–385CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Prior to the dictatorship, limited social protection initiatives included the Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensões (IAPs) under Getúlio Vargas, which granted medical care and pensions to workers of specific labor sectors. See Lima, Nísia Trindade et al. , eds., Saúde e democracia: história e perspectivas do SUS (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 2005), 61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Malloy, James, The Politics of Social Security in Brazil (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 125Google Scholar.

100. See Alves, Maria Helena Moreira, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Couto e Silva's influential texts: Golbery do Couto e Silva, Aspectos geopolíticos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1957); and Silva, Golbery do Couto e, Geopolítica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1967)Google Scholar.

101. In 1960, state health care covered a mere 7.4 percent of the population. See Falleti, Tulia G., “Infiltrating the State: The Evolution of Health Care Reforms in Brazil, 1964–1988,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, Mahoney, James and Thelen, Kathleen, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 43Google Scholar.

102. Weyland, Kurt Gerhard, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 90–91Google Scholar; Lima et al., Saúde e democracia, 61–62.

103. Malloy, The Politics of Social Security in Brazil, 122. For the regime's economic model, see Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 25–27.

104. Under President Geisel's 1974 national development plan (II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento), the government established a new ministry of social security and welfare (Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social, MPAS), whose budget became the second largest among government bureaus. In 1977, it installed a new agency, the Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social (INAMPS) that expanded care to various contributing populations. Still, millions of informal workers and the unemployed were excluded from care. See Lima et al., Saúde e democracia, 65–67; Weyland, Kurt Gerhard, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 91–100Google Scholar; and Giovanella, Lígia, Escorel, Sarah, and Lobato, Lenaura de Vasconcelos Costa, eds., Políticas e sistema de saúde no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 2008), 337Google Scholar.

105. Weyland, Democracy without Equity, 97; Escorel, Sarah, Reviravolta na saúde: origem e articulação do movimento sanitário (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 55. See also de Araújo Oliveira, Jaime A. and Fleury Teixeira, Sonia M., (Im)Previdência social: 60 anos de história da previdência no Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1986)Google Scholar.

106. Ludwig, Armin K., Brazil: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1985), 90Google Scholar; Weyland, Democracy without Equity, 97–98. Brazil reached 100,608,951 residents in 1973. Instituto de Pesquisa Económica Aplicada (IPEA), available at ipeadata.gov.br, accessed March 26, 2019.

107. The system granted contracted private institutions full discretion in reporting charges for medical treatments. See Lima et al., Saúde e democracia, 67; Escorel, Reviravolta na saúde, 54–57; and Jaime A. de Araújo Oliveira and Sonia M. Fleury Teixeira, (Im)Previdência social, 218–222. On the medical-industrial complex, see Cordeiro, Hésio, “A medicina de grupo e o complexo medico-industrial,” Revista de Administração Pública 17:3 (January 1, 1983): 22–37Google Scholar; and de Mello Vianna, Cid Manso, “Estruturas do sistema de saúde: do complexo médico-industrial ao médico-financeiro,” Physis: Revista de Saúde Coletiva 12:2 (December 2002): 375–390CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108. Ludwig, Brazil, 90; Weyland, Democracy without Equity, 97–98. Outbreaks of malaria, the return of yellow fever, and particularly a meningitis epidemic that terrorized São Paulo—and was censored by the government—demonstrated the inadequacy of healthcare services. See Guimarães, Reinaldo, Saúde e medicina no Brasil: contribuição para um debate (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Graal, 1978), 45–90Google Scholar; and Horn, James J., “Brazil: The Health Care Model of the Military Modernizers and Technocrats,” International Journal of Health Services 15:1 (January 1, 1985): 52CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. On São Paulo's meningitis epidemic, see Barradas Barata, Rita de Cássia, Meningite: uma doença sob censura? (São Paulo: Cortez, 1988)Google Scholar.

109. Depending on petroleum for most of its energy needs, Brazil's economy suffered significantly from the 1973 oil crisis. Some scholars see the Geisel presidency as the beginning of a long transition period to democracy. See Codato, Adriano Nervo, “Uma história política da transição brasileira: da ditadura militar à democracia,” Revista de Sociologia e Política 25 (2005): 83–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cruz, Sebastião Velasco e, “As peripécias do quatro na política brasileira,” Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política 64 (2005): 39–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reis Filho, Ditadura militar, esquerdas e sociedade, 65–71; and Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 178–180.

110. Scholars focus on the formation of the Sanitary Reform Movement (Movimento da Reforma Sanitária) in the mid to late 1970s as the first organized framework demanding public health reform. The sanitaristas gained traction through institutions such as the Centro Brasileiro de Estudos de Saúde (CEBES) and its popular journal Saúde em Debate. See Amarante, Paulo, Rizzotto, Maria Lucia Frizon, and Costa, Ana Maria, “Memória de um movimento: a revista Saúde em Debate e a reforma sanitária brasileira,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 20:7 (July 2015): 2023–2029CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Daniela Carvalho Sophia, “O CEBES e o movimento de reforma sanitária: história, política e saúde pública (Rio de Janeiro, 1970–1980)” (PhD diss.: Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, 2012).

111. A 1977 presidential decree-law (Decreto Presidencial 80.281, 1977) formalized medical residency programs in Brazil but lacked proper regulatory guidelines. Thus residents were still subjected to extended shifts, low pay, and deprivation of social benefits. See Célia Regina Pierantoni, Residência médica: meio século no Brasil, in the series Estudos em Saúde Coletiva 93 (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Medicina Social, UERJ, 1994), 7–12; and Escorel, Reviravolta na saúde, 92.

112. Protests began at the hospital of São Paulo's State University (UNESP) in Botucatu. See Médicos residentes em Botucatú–Operação Tartaruga, March 1977, APESP, Acervo DEOPS, OP 955. Within a year, protests erupted in more than 30 hospitals in São Paulo, including the Escola Paulista de Medicina, Hospital Servidor Público, and the University of São Paulo's Hospital das Clínicas. Various hospitals in Rio de Janeiro as well as other major cities joined soon thereafter. The series of strikes disrupted health services around the country. See “Médicos residentes da paulista marcam greve para amanha,” Folha de S. Paulo, June 7, 1978, 17; “Confirmada greve no hospital São Paulo,” Folha de S.Paulo, June 8, 1978, 17; “Residentes de 30 hospitais fazem concentração em SP,” and “No Rio, ato em frente a assembleia,” Folha de S. Paulo, June 23, 1978, 12; and “PM dispersa as manifestações no Rio de Janeiro,” Folha de S. Paulo, June 30, 1978, 14.

113. The murder under torture of journalist Vladimir Herzog (1975) and metalworker and union activist Manoel Fiel Filho (1976) raised questions about the progress of political opening in the country. In both cases, authorities argued that the victims committed suicide. See Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 158–159; Luppi, Carlos Alberto, Manoel Fiel Filho, quem vai pagar por este crime? (São Paulo: Escrita, 1980)Google Scholar; and Dantas, Audalio, As duas guerras de Vlado Herzog (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2014)Google Scholar. There were also attacks on progressive Catholic clergymen as well as attempted attacks against the Brazilian Press Association (ABI) and the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB). See Costa, Celia Maria Leite, Pandolfi, Dulce Chaves, and Serbin, Ken, O bispo de volta redonda: memórias de Dom Waldyr Calheiros (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2001), 138–140Google Scholar; and “AAB assume a responsabilidade pela explosão,” Folha de S. Paulo, August 20, 1976, 4–5. In 1978-79, over 350,000 metalúrgicos (autoworkers) from the industrial belt of São Paulo went on strike. The protest movement reached a historical high in 1979 that counted around half a million Brazilians, ushering in a new form of unionism. See Humphrey, Capitalist Control; Seidman, Manufacturing Militance; and Antunes, Ricardo and Santana, Marco Aurélio, “The Dilemmas of the New Unionism in Brazil: Breaks and Continuities,” Hernández, Luis Alberto, trans., Latin American Perspectives 41:5 (2014): 10–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

114. Movimento Renovação Médica won 70 percent of the votes in the 1978 elections for São Paulo's medical council, for example. See de Sousa Campos, Gastão Wagner, Os médicos e a política de saúde: entre a estatização e o empresariamento: a defesa da prática liberal da medicina (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 1988), 99–101Google Scholar; and Escorel, Reviravolta na saúde, 99–101.

115. Although REME won São Paulo's medical council elections by a large margin, the federal medical council nullified the results on the grounds of “late registration.” An appeal to the federal court finally led to acknowledgment of REME's legitimate victory. See “O absurdo protesto da chapa derrotada,” Jornal do Médico 3, August 1978, 4, Sindicato dos Médicos de São Paulo [hereafter SIMESP]; and “Classe agitada,” Veja, October 4, 1978, 83. Similar attempts to annul results were made in the 1977 elections for São Paulo's doctors’ union. See Campos, Os médicos e a política de saúde, 104. In some instances, the court refrained from interfering, as in the case of the elections for Rio de Janeiro's regional medical council, which had been annulled by the federal medical council for “irregularities in the electoral process.” See “Resolução CFM No. 864/78,” published in Diário Oficial da União, October 3, 1978, and “Resolução CFM No. 880/78,” published in Diário Oficial da União, October 10, 1978. Also see Escorel, Reviravolta na saúde, 104–105.

116. See Atividades de integrantes do conselho regional de medicina do estado de São Paulo, January 4, 1979, AN, Serviço Nacional de Informações, ASP ACE 293/79; and Eleições de conselho, August 29, 1978, AN, Centro de Informações de Segurança da Aeronáutica (CISA), VAZ.82.72. REME members were also surveilled by local agencies. See APESP, Acervo DEOPS, OS1194, Pasta 254.

117. “DOPS intima SinMed-SP para depor,” Jornal do SinMed, May, 1979, 13, Biblioteca Nacional [hereafter BN]

118. Agrimeron Cavalcanti da Costa, interview by author, July 7, 2015; “Aceitamos o desafio,” Jornal do Médico 1, June 1978, SIMESP; Telegrama, June 23, 1981, APESP, Acervo DEOPS, OP 988; Ato público promovido pelo sindicato dos médicos de RJ, June 30, 1981, AN, Centro de Informações de Segurança da Aeronáutica (CISA), VAZ. 107.208.

119. See letters to the editor, “As favas com Hipócrates,” O Estado de S. Paulo, July 23, 1978, 2; and “A causa da greve é a medicina moderna?” Jornal da Tarde, July 25, 1978, 4.

120. See Carta aberta à população dos médicos do estado de São Paulo (9 orgãos), July 20, 1978, APESP, Acervo DEOPS, OP 988. Sociologist Sarah Escorel argues that doctors adopted a “labor consciousness” in the 1970s. Physicians, she contends, saw themselves for the first time as health “workers” rather than “liberal professionals.” Escorel, Reviravolta na saúde, 87–88.

121. Within a year after REME took office in 1978, the membership of São Paulo's doctors’ union jumped from 2,000 to 8,000 associates. By 1980, it reached 12,000 paying members. Cavalcanti da Costa, interview by author, July 7, 2015; and Campos, Os médicos e a política de saúde, 124.

122. REME won the ballots of several more regional medical councils, but the federal council succeeded in suspending their victories. Campos, Os médicos e a política de saúde, 58. REME also triumphed in union elections in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Bahia, Espírito Santo, and Brasília. See Eleição da nova diretoria do sindicato dos médicos de MG, March 20, 1980, AN, Serviço Nacional de Informações, AC ACE 6496 80; Eleições no sindicato dos médicos do estado da Bahia, July 16 1980, AN, Serviço Nacional de Informações, ASV ACE 772/80; and Carlos Gentile de Mello, A medicina e a realidade Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Achiamé, 1983), 58.

123. See “Renovação médica é vitoriosa na AMB,” Folha de S. Paulo, September 3, 1981, 12. Rio de Janeiro's medical council, which had operated under a provisional board since 1978, came under REME's control in 1983-84. See “Eleições para o corpo de conselheiros para o período 1983/1988,” Ética: Boletim do CREMERJ 13, August/Septemeber 1983, 11–12, CREMERJ.

124. See REME's platform for São Paulo's regional medical council in “Movimento renovação nas eleições do CRM,” Jornal do Médico 2, July 1978, 4, SIMESP. For REME's support of residents’ struggle, see Campos, Os médicos e a política de saúde, 128.

125. See “Reforma do código de ética deve ser discutida amplamente,” Jornal do CREMESP 5, April/May/June 1980, 3–7, Conselho Regional de Medicina do Estado de São Paulo [hereafter CREMESP]; and Gabriel Wolf Oselka, interview by author, June 23, 2015.

126. As the last conservative stronghold, the federal medical council refused to discuss the possibility of ethical revision with the regional councils. See “Conselho propõe um novo código de ética médica,” Jornal do CREMESP 6 July/August/September 1980, 1, CREMESP. The federal council came under REME's control in 1984 without major obstacles. See “Renovação total é meta do novo corpo de conselheiros do CFM,” Boletim do CREMERJ 2, November 1984, CREMERJ.

127. Constitutional Amendment No. 11 (October 1978) repealed the notorious AI-5, restored habeas corpus, suspended censorship of television and radio, and eliminated the death penalty. Geisel still left room to maneuver, as the amendment granted the executive branch the right to declare a “state of emergency” without congressional approval, and suspend rights of citizens and representatives. One should also remember that the “moderate” Geisel administration closed the congress in 1977 and suspended the political rights of 11 representatives. It also censored 47 films, 117 plays, and 840 songs. See Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 203.

128. Other medical councils followed suit and ratified the document, among them the councils of Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro. See “Alerta dos CRMs,” Jornal do Médico 6, December 1978, 8, SIMESP.

129. The Declaration of Tokyo was adopted in October 1975 during the 29th general assembly of the World Medical Association in Tokyo, Japan.

130. At the center of the investigation stood the case of Marco Antônio Tavares Coelho, a former congressman of the Brazilian Communist Party who was arrested and tortured in 1975. Shibata, who examined Coelho after torture, issued a fraudulent report that disregarded Coelho's marks of torture. See Marco Antônio Tavares Coelho, Herança de um sonho: as memórias de um comunista (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2000), 409–418; and Gabriel Wolf Oselka, interview by author, June 23, 2015.

131. Conselho Regional de Medicina de São Paulo (CREMESP), December 21, 1978, AN, Fundo DSI/MJ, TT.0.MCP.PRO.1591; Tomada de depoimento, nas dependências do CREMESP, do subversivo Marco Antônio Tavares Coelho, December 27, 1978, AN, Fundo DSI/MJ, TT.0.MCP.PRO.1591.

132. Dr Harry Shibata – Conselho Regional de Medicina de São Paulo (CREMESP), February 20, 1979, AN, Serviço Nacional de Informações, AC ACE 685/79.

133. Arguing that Shibata was a civil servant acting in the most professional manner, his lawyers requested the reassignment of the case to the federal medical council, a stronghold of the sector's conservative faction. See Dr. Harry Shibata, January 8, 1980, AN, Serviço Nacional de Informações, AC ACE 5705/80.

134. “Um laudo falso. E Shibata foi cassado,” Jornal da Tarde, October 23, 1980, 2; “CRM cassa Shibata por laudo falso,” Jornal do Brasil, October 23, 1980, 1, 15.

135. Regional revocations of medical licenses had to be authorized by the federal medical council. The conservative bloc running the council, led by its president Murillo Belchior, was favorable to Shibata's appeal, canceling his sentence on December 30, 1981, due to “flagrant contradictions” between the verdict and the evidence presented in the case. See Julgamento de Harry Shibata, pelo Conselho Regional de Medicina do estado de São Paulo, October 4, 1983, AN, Serviço Nacional de Informações, AC ACE 39839/84; and “Harry Shibata vai entrar com recurso contra CRM,” Folha de S. Paulo, January 9, 1982, 5.

136. The Lei de Anistia (6.683, August 28, 1979) reflected a compromise between the Brazilian Amnesty Committee (CBA), which called for a “wide-ranging, general, and unrestricted” amnesty, and opposition leaders and military hard-liners who viewed the proposed law as a threat to national security. Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 211. An additional law (Lei 6.681, August 16, 1979), intended to regulate the work of military health professionals, determined that military doctors were to be disciplined by their respective military units rather than medical councils, imposing considerable limits on future investigations.

137. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017.

138. Tenório was affiliated with REME-MAIS, an opposition group to REME from the left, which called for intensifying doctors’ mobilization. REME-MAIS lost the 1981 election for the union's board, but its campaign successfully swayed Rio's union to commit to a national remobilization in favor of doctors’ economic and political rights. Paulo Ernani Gadelha Vieira, interview by author, August 4, 2017; Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017.

139. See CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 197/88.

140. The year 1981 saw one of the biggest strikes the medical sector had ever seen, encompassing senior and resident physicians at public hospitals and private clinics throughout Brazil. See “Médicos param; governo ameaça punir,” O Estado de S. Paulo, April 28, 1981, 46; and “Médicos fizeram seu protesto,” Folha de S. Paulo, April 29, 1981, 11. See also “Carta à população,” found in Greve dos médicos, April 14, 1981, AN, Serviço Nacional de Informações, ARJ ACE 4554/81; and Eduardo Augusto Bordallo, 60 anos de luta médica (Rio de Janeiro: Foco Noticias, 2012), 64.

141. The largest Diretas Já rally took place in São Paulo's Vale do Anhangabaú, drawing over a million and a half people. See Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 240–244. On doctors’ involvement in the campaign, see “CREMESP defende eleições diretas para a presidência da república,” Jornal do CREMESP 16, December 1983, 3, CREMESP. See also Conselho Regional de Medicina do Estado de São Paulo, CREMESP, uma trajetória (São Paulo: CREMESP, 2004), 60; and Augusto Bordallo, 60 anos de luta médica, 94–95.

142. On the political alliance leading the campaign, see Maciel, David, “A aliança democrática e a transição política no Brasil,” in Ditadura: o que resta da transição, Pinheiro, Milton, ed. (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2014), 288–294Google Scholar.

143. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85, 240–244, 250–254. On the eve of inauguration, however, Neves collapsed due to escalating heart disease and died a month later. To the dismay of many Brazilians, Neves's running mate, vice-president-elect José Sarney was instead sworn in as Brazil's president.

144. Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 162. Although military rule had ended, various officials kept their government positions, senior military officers remained on duty, and judges retained their seats. President Sarney was himself a former supporter of the regime and a member of the ARENA party.

145. Cecília Coimbra, interview by author, February 3, 2015; de Castro Gomes, Ângela and Fontes, Virgínia, “Tortura: Nunca Mais, entrevista com Cecília Coimbra,” Tempo 1 (1996), 167Google Scholar.

146. Beginning in the late 1970s and particularly following the enactment of the amnesty law in 1979, Brazil witnessed a surge in testimonial literature. See Filho, “The War of Memory.”

147. See Paulo, Arquidiocese de São, Brasil: Nunca Mais (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985)Google Scholar, and its English-language version Torture in Brazil: A Shocking Report on the Pervasive Use of Torture by Brazilian Military Governments, 1964–1979, Wright, Jaime, trans. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998)Google Scholar. The book topped the best-seller list for over 90 weeks, and has since been reprinted in 37 editions. Lawrence Weschler captured the story behind Brasil: Tortura Nunca Mais in Weschler, Lawrence, A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990)Google Scholar.

148. Archdiocese of São Paulo, Torture in Brazil, 33.

149. Lobo's role in repression was revealed as early as 1973 in an anonymous report on the Communist Party's underground journal Voz Operária and the Argentine psychoanalytic journal Cuestionamos. His violations received public attention again in 1981 when former political prisoners confronted him in his Copacabana clinic. “Médico confirma que socorreu presa política em Petrópolis,” Jornal do Brasil, February 6, 1981, 1, 9. Yet it was only in 1986 that CREMERJ picked up on Lobo's misconduct and decided to investigate. See “Médico de DOI depõe, diz que corre risco e recusa proteção,” Jornal do Brasil, September 9, 1986, 8; and “A memória do porão,” Veja, September 3, 1986, 44–46.

150. Between September and October of 1986 alone, the Jornal do Brasil published over 30 articles referring to Amilcar Lobo. The following year, there were 40 articles between April and June. See for example Zuenir Ventura, “A psicanálise da tortura,” Jornal do Brasil, September 14, 1981, Caderno B, 6–8; and “Do fundo dos porões,” Istoé, April 1, 1987, 16–22. The probe into Lobo's ethics violations sparked an institutional crisis within local and international psychoanalytical associations, known as the Lobo-Cabernite affair. See Vianna, Helena Besserman, Não conte a ninguém: contribuição à história das sociedades psicanalíticas do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1994)Google Scholar; Vianna, Helena Besserman, Pujet, Janine, and Wallerstein, Robert, “Letters: The Lobo-Cabernite Affair,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 48:3 (2000): 1023–1038CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rubin, Aline, Mandelbaum, Belinda, and Frosh, Stephen, “‘No Memory, No Desire’: Psychoanalysis in Brazil During Repressive Times,” Psychoanalysis and History 18:1 (2016): 93–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

151. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 134/87. Lobo later appealed to the federal labor court in Brasilia against CREMREJ. See Processo 90.0008572-1, 4a Vara do Distrito Federal, October 25, 1990, found in: Arquivo Grupo Tortura Nunca Mais [hereafter GTNM]. Lobo's case would be litigated in federal courts in the following decade.

152. See Código de Ética Médica (1988), https://portal.cfm.org.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=10&Itemid=123, accessed March 27, 2019. The code was shaped by regional councils’ discussions and conferences, among them the Rio de Janeiro State Conference of Medical Ethics (October 1987) and the First National Conference of Medical Ethics, which approved the new code in November 1987. See “Conferência estadual debate código de ética,” Boletim do CREMERJ 15, November 1987, 3,8, CREMERJ.

153. It also forbade involvement in force-feeding and the execution of death penalties. See Código de Ética Médica (1988), capítulo 4 (Direitos Humanos).

154. de França, Genival Veloso, Comentários ao Código de Ética Médica (Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 1994), 49Google Scholar; de Siqueira, José Eduardo, “A bioética e a revisão dos códigos de conduta moral dos médicos no Brasil,” Revista Bioética 16:1 (2009): 91Google Scholar. For more on the code and its history, see Oselka, Gabriel, “O código de ética médica,” in Bioética, Segre, Marco and Cohen, Claudio, eds. (São Paulo: EdUSP, 2002), 63–68Google Scholar.

155. Brazil's 1988 constitution defined torture as a crime that cannot be “subject[ed] to bail, clemency, or amnesty,” applicable to those who are “giving the commands, those executing these commands, and those who, although able to avoid the crimes, fail to do so.” See Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil (1988), Art. 5, inc. XLIII.

156. Witnesses in the hearings against Lobo referred to Fayad multiple times. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 134/87. See also “Do fundo dos porões,” Istoé, April 1, 1987, 16–22; and “Médico da tortura vai ser julgado por seus colegas,” Jornal do Brasil, March 6, 1988, 14.

157. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 134/87.

158. “Lobo dá nomes de militares torturadores do DOI-Codi,” Jornal do Brasil, September 28, 1986, 18.

159. The council approved a preliminary inquiry on March, 9, 1988, and formed an investigative ethics commission in September of that year. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

160. See Article 5 of Lei No. 6.681, August 16, 1979. The “Shibata law,” which human rights activists and physicians claimed was effectively shielding military doctors complicit in torture, determined that military doctors were subjected to their units’ disciplinary mechanism. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional TRE 197/88; Cecília Coimbra, interview by author, February 3, 2015.

161. Parecer No. 77/89, in CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

162. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

163. Tenório served as president of Rio de Janeiro's doctors’ union (SINMED) for two consecutive terms, in 1992-95 and 1995-98. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017.

164. Testimonies given between February and March of 1994. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

165. Testimony given on March 2, 1994. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

166. Tenório testified before the commission on February 22, 1994. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

167. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

168. Testimonies given between February and March of 1994, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

169. Testimony given on February 23, 1994, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

170. They referred to Article 84, Código de Processo Ético-Profissional (1988). See CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

171. Lei no. 6.838, October 29, 1980.

172. The council initiated preliminary inquiry as early as 1989, but investigation was suspended for long periods. See CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

173. Cecília Coimbra, interview by author, February 3, 2015.

174. Fayad's promotion was approved in March 1994 by then Brazilian president Itamar Franco. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

175. Razões Finais, March 20, 1994, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

176. Razões Finais, March 20, 1994, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

177. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88; “CRM cassa registro de general-médico,” Jornal do Brasil, May 6, 1994, 12.

178. Brandão Carneiro served as the ethics commission's relator, a rapporteur who presents an analysis of the proceedings and recommends a judgment. In 1995 he assumed the presidency of CREMERJ. Providing a second opinion, the commission's revisor was Paulo Cesar Geraldes, who assumed CREMERJ's presidency in 2005. See Voto do relator, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

179. Voto do relator and voto do revisor, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

180. Voto do relator, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

181. Voto do relator, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

182. Fayad was found guilty of violating Article 2 (committing doctors to the health of the human being), Article 49 (proscribing participation in the practice of torture and other forms of degrading, inhuman, and cruel procedures), Article 50 (forbidding the provision of means, knowledge, and instruments that facilitate the practice of torture), Article 53 (obliging doctors to report violations to councils of medicine), and Article 55 (proscribing practicing medicine in favor of crimes and corrupt behavior). See Acordão, CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

183. “CRM cassa registro de general-médico,” Jornal do Brasil, May 6, 1994, 12.

184. The CFM heard Fayad's appeal between September 1994 and August 1995. See Processo Ético-Profissional CFM 20/94, located in CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

185. This was one of the most senior positions available to military health professionals. CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88; “Grupo se queixa de promoção a Itamar,” Jornal do Brasil, May 10, 1994, 14; “Cassação não agrada exército,” Jornal do Brasil, May 11, 1994, 16.

186. Tenório sent a letter to President Franco denouncing the nomination. See “Médico pede que general seja punido,” Folha de S. Paulo, May 7, 1994. In addition, Torture Never Again denounced the appointment in both the press and dossiers circulated among domestic and international human rights organizations. Cecília Coimbra, interview by author, February 3, 2015; Denúncia contra caso Fayad, n.d., pamphlet found in GTNM, Dossiês.

187. Razões Recorrente, Processo Ético-Profissional CFM 20/94, in CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

188. Regina Ribeiro Parizi Carvalho, interview by author, July 3, 2015. Carvalho served as president of São Paulo's Regional Medical Council (CREMESP) in 1993–95, prior to her role in the federal council.

189. Parecer e voto da relatora, Processo Ético-Profissional CFM 20/94, in CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

190. Parecer e voto da relatora, Processo Ético-Profissional CFM 20/94, in CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88.

191. The verdict was given on August 10, 1995. All 21 CFM councilors were present for the vote. Ata da Sessão, referente ao Julgamento do Processo Ético-Profissional CFM 20/94, in CREMERJ, Processo Ético-Profissional 197/88. See also “Conselho cassa registro de médico acusado de tortura,” Jornal do Brasil, August 11, 1995, 6.

192. In 1996, a federal judge accepted Fayad's appeal, ruling that medical councils lack authority to discipline military officers. The councils’ counter-appeal to Brazil's Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justiça) suspended the ruling, and in 2001 finally restored the council's authority to regulate military doctors in the civilian realm. Fayad succeeded again in a 2004 appeal but the ruling did not have a major impact, as the military doctor was retired by then. Recently (February 2018), the office of Brazil's attorney general in Rio de Janeiro opened a new investigation against Fayad, examining his role in the torture of former political prisoner Espedito de Freitas. See, respectively, “Caso Fayad: presidente do CFM ameaçado de prisão,” Jornal Medicina, November 1998; “CFM: uma vitoria contra a tortura,” Jornal Medicina, December 1998; “STJ confirma competência dos conselhos para cassar general Fayad,” Jornal Medicina, October/November 2000 [all in Conselho Federal de Medicina]; “Médico acusado de cooperar com tortura tem sua cassação anulada,” Folha de S. Paulo, April 19, 2004; and “MPF do Rio denuncia general reformado por tortura na ditadura,” Radioagência Nacional (EBC), February 15, 2018, http://radioagencianacional.ebc.com.br/direitos-humanos/audio/2018-02/mpf-do-rio-denuncia-general-reformado-por-tortura-durante-ditadura, accessed April 14, 2019.

193. “Volta de general acusado de tortura gera indignação,” Zero Hora, October 18, 1998, 29.

194. As part of its human rights agenda, the Cardoso administration established two commissions. The 1995 Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances (Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos) investigated forced disappearances and awarded compensation to relatives of the disappeared. The 2001 Amnesty Commission determined reparations to victims of torture and other kinds of repressive abuse. On Cardoso's foreign policy, see Vigevani, Tullo and de Oliveira, Marcelo Fernandes, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration,” Latin American Perspectives 34:5 (2007): 58–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Burges, Sean W., Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

195. The campaign involved not only Torture Never Again but also Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB), and other organizations. Cecília Coimbra, interview by author, February 3, 2015; Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017; “Volta de general acusado de tortura gera indignação,” Zero Hora, October 18, 1998, 29.

196. “General acusado de ajudar tortura pede afastamento,” Folha de S. Paulo, April 3, 1998, 11; “Acusado de apoiar tortura vai para reserva,” Folha de S. Paulo, March 19, 2001, 6A.

197. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017. Guanabara State University was renamed Rio de Janeiro State University in 1975.

198. Tenório served as municipal secretary of health for Niterói from 2006 to 2008. Luiz Roberto Tenório, interview by author, August 1, 2017.

199. Testemunho de Luiz Roberto Tenório, Audiência Pública Raul Amaro Nin Ferreira, September 22, 2014, CNV, Arquivo 00092.002439/2014-07.

200. Of the five officers compelled by law to appear before the commission, three presented medical notes exempting them from attending, and the fourth refused to collaborate “with the enemy.” The hearing was held in Brasília. See “Não colaboro com o inimigo, diz militar a grupo,” Folha de S.Paulo, September 9, 2014, A11.

201. “Não colaboro com o inimigo, diz militar a grupo.” Folha de S.Paulo, September 9, 2014, A11.

202. See Torelly, Marcelo, “Assessing a Late Truth Commission: Challenges and Achievements of the Brazilian National Truth Commission,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 12:2 (2018): 196–199CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For transitional justice in Brazil and Latin America, see de Brito, Alexandra Barahona, “Justice, Politics, Memory, and Democratization and the Southern Cone,” in The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, Enríquez, Carmen González et al. , eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 119–160Google Scholar; and Pereira, Anthony, Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 161–163CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also James L. Cavallaro and Fernano Delgado, “The Paradox of Accountability in Brazil,” in Popovski and Serrano, After Oppression, 86–115; and Soares and Kishi, Memória e Verdade. especially Part 2.

203. In November 1988, human rights practitioners, philosophers, legal scholars, and political scientists from Latin America, Africa, and Asia gathered at the Aspen Institute conference “State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon” to examine the various ways to pursue justice during periods of transition to democracy. Various participants would later play important roles in implementing transitional justice models around the world, among them Jaime Malamud-Goti, chief transitional justice adviser to Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín; attorney José Zalaquetta, a member of Chile's National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation; Aryeh Neier, co-founder of Human Rights Watch; Juan E. Méndez, political prisoner under Argentina's Dirty War and future president of the International Center for Transitional Justice; and journalist Lawrence Weschler. See Arthur, Paige, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31:2 (2009): 321–367CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a history of transitional justice, see Elster, Jon, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Teitel, Ruti G., “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 59–94Google Scholar.

204. Schneider, Nina, “Truth No More? The Struggle over the National Truth Commission in Brazil,” Iberoamericana 11:42 (2011): 164–170Google Scholar; Torelly, Marcelo, “Assessing a Late Truth Commission: Challenges and Achievements of the Brazilian National Truth Commission,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 12:2 (2018): 194–215CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

205. Atencio, Rebecca J., Memory's Turn: Reckoning with Dictatorship in Brazil (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 12–13Google Scholar, 28–58; Filho, João Roberto Martins, “The War of Memory: The Brazilian Military Dictatorship According to Militants and Military Men,” Thompson, Timothy, trans., Latin American Perspectives 36:5 (2009): 89–107CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

206. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 75–78; International Center for Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?” https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice, accessed March 27, 2019. I borrow the term “violence workers” from Martha Knisely Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip G Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

207. Hayner, Priscilla B., Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar, 16, 146. Also see Sikkink, Kathryn, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011)Google Scholar; and Crocker, David, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, Rotberg, Robert I. and Thompson, Dennis, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 99–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar.