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Loss Coverage: Why Insurance Works Better with Some Adverse Selection, Edited by R. Guy Thomas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 274pp, ISBN: 978-1-107-49590-6

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Loss Coverage: Why Insurance Works Better with Some Adverse Selection, Edited by R. Guy Thomas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 274pp, ISBN: 978-1-107-49590-6

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 August 2018

Michael Hoy
Michael Hoy*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada. E-mail: mhoy@uoguelph.ca
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Type
Book Review
Information
Annals of Actuarial Science , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , September 2019 , pp. 420 - 425
Copyright
© Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 2018 

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