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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2021
While Atiyah's and Summers’ concepts of form and substance in the context of constitutional law are often associated with constitutional interpretation, they can also be fruitfully applied to other areas of constitutional and administrative law. The intent of this paper is to apply the concepts of form and substance to Singapore constitutional and administrative law to illustrate that beyond constitutional interpretation, formalism is an apt description for several key areas of constitutional and administrative law doctrine and reasoning in Singapore, even to the extent of being formalistic. This article will argue that formalism in legal reasoning obtains in several important constitutional and administrative law doctrines in Singapore – specifically in the grounds of judicial review, ouster clause doctrine, and the rules on standing. This article will also evaluate the implications of these findings for the development of constitutional and administrative law in Singapore.
LL.M (Harvard), LL.B (SMU). Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University School of Law. The author is deeply grateful to Assistant Professor Swati Jhaveri of the National University of Singapore and the anonymous reviewers for their advice and comments. Any mistakes or omissions remain entirely the author's responsibility.
1. Atiyah, Patrick S & Summers, Robert S, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Oxford University Press 1991)Google Scholar.
2. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 5; Partlett, David F, ‘The Common Law As Cricket’ (1990) 43 Vanderbilt Law Review 1401Google Scholar, 1410.
3. Summers, Robert S, ‘The Formal Character of Law’ (1992) 51 Cambridge Law Journal 242Google Scholar, 258.
4. Robert S Summers, ‘On Analyzing and Characterizing the General Style of a Legal System as Formal or as Substantive’ (1992) 23 Rechtstheorie 27, 28; viewed through this lens, form and substance bear close links with legal positivism and non-positivism respectively as theories of legal validity. See Brendan O'Leary, ‘What Should Public Lawyers Do’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 404, 408.
5. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 9; Summers (n 4) 30; see also Summers (n 3) 253; see also Stephen J Hammer, ‘Retroactivity and Restraint: An Anglo-American Comparison’ (2018) 41 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 409, 435.
6. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 1; Luke R Nottage, ‘Form and Substance in US, English, New Zealand and Japanese Law: A Framework for Better Comparisons of Developments in the Law of Unfair Contracts’ (1996) 26 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 247, 251.
7. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 6; JC Froneman, ‘Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture: Our Vision of Law’ (2005) 16 Stellenbosch Law Review 3, 6.
8. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 6.
9. ibid 2; Nottage (n 6) 251; Neil Duxbury, ‘Struggling with Legal Theory’ (1993) 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 889, 897.
10. Froneman (n 7) 6.
11. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 7, 12, 42; Partlett (n 2) 1410–1411.
12. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 13–14.
13. Partlett (n 2) 1411.
14. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 14–15; Summers (n 4) 29–30; Summers (n 3) 253–254.
15. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 14–15; Partlett (n 2) 1411; Summers (n 4) 30; Summers (n 3) 254.
16. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 16–17; Partlett (n 2) 1412.
17. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 8.
18. Partlett (n 2) 1412–1413.
19. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 28.
20. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 28.
21. Froneman (n 7) 5, 10.
22. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 30.
23. ibid 2.
24. Froneman (n 7) 7; Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 24–26.
25. Atiyah & Summers (n 1) 6.
26. Christopher Forsyth, ‘Showing the Fly the Way out of the Flybottle: The Value of Formalism and Conceptual Reasoning in Administrative Law’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 325, 329–331.
27. Summers (n 3) 246–247.
28. Partlett (n 2) 1416.
29. Jason NE Varuhas, ‘Taxonomy and Public Law’, in Mark Elliott, Jason NE Varuhas & Shona Wilson Stark (eds), The Unity of Public Law? Doctrinal, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2018) ch 3.
30. Even robust exhortations of more substantive reasoning admit that there cannot be total exclusion of formal reasoning. See eg Geo Quinot, ‘Substantive Reasoning in Administrative-Law Adjudication’ (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 111, 116.
31. Swati Jhaveri, ‘Reflecting on Constitutional Change in Singapore: The Role of the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary’, in Jaclyn L Neo & Swati Jhaveri (eds), Constitutional Change in Singapore: Reforming the Elected Presidency (Routledge 2019) ch 9, 236; Yap Po Jen, ‘Uncovering Originalism and Textualism in Singapore’, in Jaclyn L Neo (ed), Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore: Theory and Practice (Routledge 2017) 119–120; Yap Po Jen, ‘Constitutionalising Capital Crimes: Judicial Virtue or Originalism Sin’ [2011] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 281, 284; Yvonne Tew, ‘Originalism at Home and Abroad’ (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 780, 820–821; Yvonne Tew, ‘Comparative Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation in Asia’ (2017) 29 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 719, 730; Jaclyn Neo & Yvonne CL Lee, ‘Constitutional supremacy: Still A Little Dicey?’, in Thio Li-ann & Kevin Tan (eds), Evolution of a Revolution: Forty Years of the Singapore Constitution (Routledge 2014) 179–180.
32. Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 (HL).
33. See Swati Jhaveri, ‘Revisiting Taxonomies and Truisms in Administrative Law in Singapore’ [2019] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 351 for an insightful discussion of how the legality-merits distinction is an inadequate heuristic device for determining the proper scope of judicial review.
34. SGB Starkstrom Pte Ltd v Commissioner for Labour [2016] 3 SLR 598 (CA).
35. ibid para 56.
36. Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 (HC).
37. ibid paras 53–55.
38. ibid paras 58–60.
39. See eg Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189 (CA); Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 (CA). Wong Keng Leong Rayney v Law Society of Singapore [2006] 4 SLR(R) 934 (HC) provides another example.
40. [2016] 3 SLR 598 (CA).
41. ibid paras 41–54.
42. ibid para 56.
43. ibid para 58.
44. ibid paras 59–62.
45. See eg the acceptance of the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations in R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213 and Ng Siu Tung v Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561 (Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong SAR).
46. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294 (CA).
47. ibid paras 38, 44.
48. Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 (HC).
49. ibid para 87.
50. See eg R v Home Secretary ex p Daly [2001] 2 AC 532 (Lord Steyn); R (Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] AC 1355, 1408–1411 (Lord Kerr).
51. Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
52. Especially as clarified by the House of Lords in O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, 279 (Lord Diplock); R v Hull University Visitor ex p Page [1993] AC 682, 701–702 (Lord Browne Wilkinson).
53. Cheng Vincent v Minister of Home Affairs and others [1990] 1 SLR(R) 38 (HC).
54. ibid para 26.
55. ibid.
56. Stansfield Business International v Minister for Manpower [1999] 2 SLR(R) 866 (HC).
57. R (on the application of Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal and others [2019] UKSC 22.
58. ibid paras 128–129.
59. See Kenny Chng, ‘The Theoretical Foundations of Judicial Review in Singapore’ [2019] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 294, 297–303.
60. See David Dyzenhaus, ‘Formalism's Hollow Victory’ [2002] New Zealand Law Review 525; TRS Allan, ‘The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or Interpretative Inquiry’ (2002) 61 Cambridge Law Journal 87; David Dyzenhaus, ‘Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law’ (2002) 27 Queen's Law Journal 445.
61. Cheng Vincent v Minister of Home Affairs and others [1990] 1 SLR(R) 38 (HC) para 26.
62. Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General [2019] 2 SLR 216 (CA).
63. Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) s 33B(4).
64. Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) s 33B(1), 33B(2).
65. Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General [2018] SGHC 112 para 43.
66. ibid para 108.
67. The Court of Appeal's mode of analysis was remarkably similar to Lord Carnwath's approach to the same issue in R (on the application of Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal and others [2019] UKSC 22.
68. Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General [2019] 2 SLR 216 (CA) para 67.
69. ibid para 71.
70. ibid para 74.
71. For a more in-depth discussion of the implications of this decision, see Kenny Chng, ‘Reconsidering Ouster Clauses in Singapore Administrative Law’ (2020) 136 Law Quarterly Review 40.
72. Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA).
73. Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) s 377A.
74. The other requirements are that the applicant must have a real interest in bringing the action, and there must be a real controversy between the parties – see Tan Eng Hong [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) para 72.
75. ibid para 82.
76. ibid para 93 (emphasis in original).
77. ibid para 82.
78. ibid para 122.
79. As is the position in English law – see, for example, IRC v National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses Ltd (on appeal from R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses Ltd) [1982] AC 617 (HL).
80. Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 (CA).
81. ibid para 27.
82. ibid para 33.
83. ibid.
84. ibid.
85. ibid para 43.
86. IRC v National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses Ltd (on appeal from R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses Ltd) [1982] AC 617 (HL).
87. One can see some evidence of this in Tan Eng Hong itself. The Court of Appeal refrained from setting out a general rule that the existence of an unconstitutional law in itself would suffice to demonstrate a violation of an applicant's constitutional rights, for fear that lax standing rules would hamper the executive's governing efficiency. Accordingly, the Court preferred that each case be decided on its facts, rather than in accordance with such a rigid formal rule: see Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) para 109.
88. Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 (CA).
89. ibid para 48.
90. Chan Sek Keong, ‘Judicial Review – From Angst to Empathy’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 469.
91. ibid paras 49–50.
92. ibid para 56.
93. ibid para 59.
94. ibid.
95. ibid para 61.
96. ibid.
97. ibid para 64.
98. ibid.
99. ibid para 65.
100. Forsyth (n 26) 334.
101. ibid 336.
102. Froneman (n 7) 7.
103. See eg Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) para 109.
104. See the discussion of Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 (CA) in Part III.C above.
105. Froneman (n 7) 19–20.
106. R (on the application of Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal and others [2019] UKSC 22 paras 133, 144.
107. See Neo, Jaclyn L, ‘All Power Has Legal Limits: The Principle of Legality as a Constitutional Principle of Judicial Review’ (2017) 29 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 667, 684–685Google Scholar. It should be noted that Lord Carnwath's reasoning, especially his emphasis on the supremacy of the rule of law, is likely to be deeply controversial in the UK, given its longstanding adoption of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. Nevertheless, his reasoning is entirely apt for Singapore's constitutional context.