Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T15:34:24.662Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Determining Hierarchy Between Conflicting Treaties: Are There Vertical Rules in the Horizontal System?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 February 2012

Ahmad Ali GHOURI
Ahmad Ali GHOURI*
Affiliation:
University of the Punjab (Gujranwala Campus), Pakistan
*
ghouri_ali@hotmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Treaties are contractual instruments that may provide special rules of priority in case they conflict with other treaties. When a treaty does not provide such rules, however, priority is determined by the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and/or general principles of law. This article argues that both the VCLT and general principles of law do not provide an adequate solution to treaty conflicts. It suggests that the solution to treaty conflicts rests in a value-oriented reading of international law and the norms incorporated in treaties. Norms represent values and values represent interests or benefits for which international society requires protection. Conflicts of treaty norms are, therefore, conflicts of values that courts and dispute settlement bodies resolve by ordering a hierarchy of competing interests and protecting the most important interests in a given context.

Type
Articles
Information
Asian Journal of International Law , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , July 2012 , pp. 235 - 266
Copyright
Copyright © Asian Journal of International Law 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Lecturer in Law, University of the Punjab (Gujranwala Campus), Pakistan; Doctoral Scholar, Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Finland. Many thanks are owed to Professor Jukka Mähönen and Professor Andrew Newcombe for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also grateful to Professor Jean d'Aspremont and Professor Jan Klabbers for their encouragement and advice. The responsibility for all views expressed herein remains mine alone.

References

1. Cf. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (ILC), finalized by Martti KOSKENNIEMI, UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), at 15, para. 17 [ILC's Report on Fragmentation].

2. See art. 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force on 27 January 1980) [VCLT].

3. Ibid., art. 26.

4. SADAT-AKHAVI, Seyed Ali, Methods of Resolving Conflicts Between Treaties (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) at 5Google Scholar.

5. BORGEN, Christopher J., “Resolving Treaty Conflicts” (2005) 37 George Washington International Law Review 573 at 579Google Scholar.

6. For what is and what is not within the scope of interpretation in treaty conflict, see KLABBERS, Jan, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 34Google Scholar–5.

7. See ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 34, para. 55.

8. Cf. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 100, including references thereto.

9. See ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 34, para. 55.

10. Soering v. United Kingdom, [1989] 161 ECHR (Ser. A) Rep. [Soering].

11. Matthews v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 18 February 1999, [1999] Eur. Ct. H.R. [Matthews].

12. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 [Schmidberger]. Formerly known as the EC Treaty, the Treaty of Rome or the Treaty establishing the European Community, the TFEU was given its name and amended by the Lisbon Treaty (signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007), and sets out organizational and functional details of the European Union. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF> [TFEU].

13. See generally Prosper WEIL, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law 413 at 413. Cf. Jean D'ASPREMONT, “The Foundations of the International Legal Order”, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265525>.

14. Martti Koskenniemi is a leading contemporary advocate of the hegemonic construction of international law, and the ILC's Report on Fragmentation (supra note 1) also presents the same notion of international law. The present article will discuss Koskenniemi's several scholarly writings in this regard, especially this article: KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, “International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration” (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197Google Scholar.

15. For instance d'Aspremont has advocated the rejection of values in the formation of international law (although not in the context of the resolution of normative conflicts) on the basis of a somewhat eccentric distinction between “common interests” and “global values”. See d'Aspremont, supra note 13.

16. See ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 103, para. 199.

17. On the concept and critique of “Asian Values”, see e.g. Michael C. DAVIS, “Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian Values” (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 109.

18. Supra note 2.

19. Cf. Borgen, supra note 5 at 580.

20. For a detailed discussion on the formation and functioning of the international civil society, see Georges ABI-SAAB, “Whither the International Community?” (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 248.

21. See e.g. BRÖLMANN, Catherine M., “Law-Making Treaties: Form and Function in International Law” (2009) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 383Google Scholar.

22. See generally Weil, supra note 13; TASIOULAS, John, “In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communication Values and the Nicaragua Case” (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 85Google Scholar; Jost DELBRÜCK, “Laws in the Public Interest—Some Observations on the Foundations and Identification of Erga Omnes Norms in International Law” in Volkmar GÖTZ et al., eds., Liber Amicorum Gunther Jaenicke (Berlin: Springer, 1998) at 17Google Scholar–18, 28. Cf. PAUWELYN, Joost, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 101CrossRefGoogle Scholar–6. However, unlike this article, which is focused entirely on the conflicting norms found in two different treaties, both Delbrück and Pauwelyn discuss the question of how treaty norms might become binding on third parties on the basis of their nature as a “public interest norm”. Cf. d'Aspremont, supra note 13.

23. Koskenniemi, supra note 14 at 198.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. SALCEDO, Juan Antonio CARRILLO, “Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law” (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 583 at 588CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27. Ibid.

28. FARER, Tom, “Toward an Effective International Legal Order: From Coexistence to Concert?” (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 228Google Scholar.

29. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 11.

30. Ibid., at 198.

31. Ibid., at 199.

32. Koskenniemi, supra note 14 at 200.

33. d'Aspremont, supra note 13 at 7.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., at 16.

37. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1.

38. d'Aspremont does not deny the existence of an international civil society. See d'Aspremont, supra note 13 at 12.

39. Art. 2(1) of the United Nations Charter proclaims that “[t]he organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members”. In the Declaration On Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (entered into force 24 October 1970), the sixth out of seven principles is the “Sovereign Equality of States”. States have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political, or other nature. See also Weil, supra note 13 at 419.

40. Weil, supra note 13 at 418.

41. Ibid., at 419.

42. Farer, supra note 28 at 230.

43. Ibid., at 222.

44. Cf. KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, “The Normative Force of Habit: International Custom and Social Theory” (1990) 1 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 77 at 149Google Scholar.

45. See Weil, supra note 13. Inspiration was derived from the work of Jürgen HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William REHG (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) at 67Google Scholar .

46. Koskenniemi, supra note 44 at 149 (where he is not referring to the internalization process but perhaps to such internalization as a novelty that presents itself as “fragmentation” of the old world). Cf. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 16–17, para. 20.

47. George SCHWARZENBERGER, International Law: vol. 1, International Law as Applied by Courts and Tribunals, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1957) at 422Google Scholar .

48. KLABBERS, Jan, “The Meaning of Rules” (2006) 20 International Relations 295; d'Aspremont, supra note 13 at 22Google Scholar.

49. This is perhaps due to what is conceived about Weber's indication of “value pluralism”. See SEIDMAN, Steven, “Modernity, Meaning, and Cultural Pessimism in Max Weber” (1983) 44 Sociological Analysis 267Google Scholar.

50. Carrillo Salcedo, supra note 26 at 592. Cf. Abi-Saab, supra note 20 at 262. For a detailed treatment of jus cogens, see ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 166–7, paras. 325–7 and 361.

51. Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 44 at 83 (referring to H.L.A Hart and stating that “laws are obeyed because citizens have internalized the legal structure, they have recognized that obeying laws is a matter of duty and not one of mere constraint”).

52. See the arguments of “hegemonic contestation” by Koskenniemi, supra note 14.

53. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 14.

54. Ibid., at 4, para. 15.

55. For what is and what is not within the scope of interpretation in treaty conflict, see Klabbers, supra note 6 at 34–5.

56. See e.g. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 53.

57. See Section IV of this article.

58. Weil, supra note 13 at 421.

59. Koskenniemi, supra note 14 at 198.

60. Ibid., at 200.

61. Cf. Abi-Saab, supra note 20, especially at 249–50 and 265. Weil put it in terms of “irreducible natural law”. Weil, supra note 13 at 423.

62. Koskenniemi, supra note 14 at 198–200.

63. Ibid., at 215.

64. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 15.

65. d'Aspremont, supra note 13 at 12.

66. See ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 106, para. 205.

67. Ibid., at 107, para. 208.

68. Ibid., at 108, para. 214.

69. Roda MUSHKAT, “Cultural and International Law: Universalism v. Relativism” (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 1028 at 1030.

70. See ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 103, para. 199.

71. See e.g. Davis, supra note 17; FREEMAN, Michael, “Human Rights and Real Cultures: Towards a Dialogue on ‘Asian Values’” (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25Google Scholar.

72. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 105, para. 204.

73. Ibid., at 102, para. 195.

74. Ibid., at 108, para. 211. See also DAVIS, Michael C., “The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian Economic Development” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 303Google Scholar.

75. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 102, para. 195.

76. Davis, supra note 74.

77. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 106, paras. 205–7.

78. Schwarzenberger, supra note 47 at 422; Borgen, supra note 5 at 573–4.

79. Borgen, supra note 5 at 573.

80. Ibid.

81. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 23, para. 34.

82. KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, “Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch” (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 566 at 566CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

83. The terms “mutual” and “universal” should not be confused with “bilateral” and “collective” in terms of private or public law or obligations erga omnes. Cf. Roscoe POUND, Jurisprudence, vol. III (Minnesota, MN: West Publishing Co., 1959) at 16 and 327–8Google Scholar.

84. Koskenniemi, supra note 82 at 569.

85. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 165.

86. Wilfred JENKS, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties” (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International Law 401 at 426.

87. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 34–5.

88. See GHOURI, Ahmad Ali, “Positing for Balancing: Investment Treaty Rights and the Rights of Citizens” (2011) 4 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 95Google Scholar.

89. For an assessment of the deontic logic, see e.g. VRANES, Erich, “The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal Theory” (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 395Google Scholar.

90. DWORKIN, Ronald M., “The Model of Rules” (1967) 35 University of Chicago Law Review 14 at 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On Dworkin's view of conflict of values, see DWORKIN, Ronald M., “Do Values Conflict: A Hedgehog's Approach” (2001) 43 Arizona Law Review 251Google Scholar. Also see the discussion on Dworkin by Habermas, supra note 45 at 211.

91. Habermas, supra note 45 at 212–13.

92. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 53. Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 22 at 278.

93. See Vranes, supra note 89.

94. Ibid.

95. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 20, para. 28.

96. Ibid., at 24, para. 35.

97. See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 4, Chapters II–III at 25–96.

98. See Pound, supra note 83 at 16.

99. Ibid., at 327–8.

100. Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 44 at 126.

101. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 24–5, para. 36.

102. Ibid.

103. Supra note 2.

104. For detailed description of several types of treaty conflicts, see Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 4, II–III at 25–96.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., at 5–24.

107. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 30. For a detailed discussion on these three tests, see Ahmad Ali GHOURI, “Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU Member States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options” (2010) 16 European Law Journal 806 at 808–10.

108. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 14, 87–9, and 92.

109. See the comments of Ian Sinclair at the 1969 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, Committee of the Whole, 85 Meeting, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, online: <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawoftreaties-1969/docs/english/2ndsess/a_conf_39_c1_sr85.pdf#page=5>, at 221–2, para. 39. Cf. Klabbers, ibid.

110. Cf. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 21, paras. 21–2. See also Ghouri, supra note 107 at 8–10.

111. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 18.

112. Cf. ibid.

113. Kaveh L. AFRASIABI, “The Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea: Beyond the Conflicting Treaties” Payvand Iran News (17 September 2003), online: Payvand Iran News <www.payvand.com/news/03/sep/1106.html>.

114. On details of treaties concluded by littoral Caspian states, see Mehrdad HAGHAYEGHI, “Russia's Regional Role: Conflict or Cooperation, The Coming of Conflict to the Caspian Sea” (2003) 50 Problems of Post-Communism 32.

115. Signed by five littoral Caspian states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan in Tehran (Iran) on 4 November 2003.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (entered into force 15 April 1994).

119. See Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force 1 January 1948) [GATT].

120. See e.g. United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, [1996] 35 I.L.M. 603 [Reformulated Gasoline]; United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, [1998] WT/DS58/AB/R [Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report]; United States—Import of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, [2001] WT/DS58/AB/RW [Shrimp-Turtle Recourse Action].

121. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, [1998] WT/DS58/R [Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report].

122. Ibid., para. 3.1.

123. Ibid., para. 7.45.

124. Cía. Territorial de Seguras (S.A.) v. The Clara Y, Judgment of 4 May 1953, [1953] 20 I.L.R. 429.

125. Ibid.

126. Reservations to the Genocide Convention, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15.

127. Ibid., at 21.

128. Matthews, supranote 11 and Prince Hans-adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, Application No. 42527/98, Judgment of 12 July 2001, [2001] Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 47.

129. See Prince Hans-adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, ibid. For discussions on Matthews, see infra notes 219 to 226 and accompanying text.

130. In re B, Judgment of 26 May 1952, [1952] 19 I.L.R. 318.

131. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 124–5, para. 241.

132. Pauwelyn, supra note 22 at 378.

133. Ibid.

134. Cf. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 97.

135. Pauwelyn, supra note 22 at 385. Cf. ibid., at 99.

136. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 34, para. 56.

137. Ibid., at 35, para. 58.

138. Pauwelyn, supra note 22 at 388. Cf. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 97.

139. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 56–122.

140. Ibid., at 30–5.

141. Cf. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 35–6.

142. For an analysis of the resolution of treaty conflicts within the WTO regime, see Sabrina SAFRIN, “Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organization Agreements” (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 606. See also Lorand BARTELS, “Treaty Conflicts in WTO Law—A Comment on William J. Davey's Article ‘The Quest for Consistency’” in Stefan GRILLER, ed., At the Crossroads: The World Trading System and the Doha Round, I (Vienna: Springer, 2008), at 130−45.

143. KLABBERS, supra note 6 at 36–9.

144. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 35, para. 57.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., at 37, para. 61.

148. Ibid., at 38, para. 62.

149. Ibid., at 38, para. 64. Cf. ibid., at 41, para. 71.

150. Ibid., at 61, para. 112.

151. Ibid., at 62, para. 115.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid., at 63, para. 116.

154. Ibid., at 25, para. 36.

155. Ibid., at 167, para. 325.

156. Ghouri, supra note 107 at 8–10.

157. VCLT supra note 2, art. 30(4).

158. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 88 and 91.

159. Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 4 at 72.

160. Such fundamental interests can be viewed in the context of an individual as well as the national and international societies at large, the observance of which is of fundamental importance to the international community as a whole. See Weil, supra note 13 at 424.

161. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 88; see also discussions in Section III(C) of this article.

162. See Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, “Third Report on Law of Treaties” (1958) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Draft Article 18, para. 5 at 27.

163. For a detailed discussion on the principle of political decision, see Klabbers, supra note 6 at 90–3.

164. Cf. Borgen, supra note 5 at 576.

165. Cf. ibid.

166. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 92. See also Jan B. MUS, “Conflicts Between Treaties in International Law” (1998) 45 Netherlands International Law Review 227.

167. Klabbers, ibid.

168. Cf. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 25–8.

169. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 93.

170. Ibid., at 12–13.

171. Ibid., at 13–14.

172. Ibid., at 14 and 35.

173. Ibid., at 34–5.

174. See discussions under Section II of this article.

175. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 34–5.

176. Ibid., at 100.

177. Charles D. Short v. The State of Netherlands, before Dutch High Court, decision of 30 March 1990, (1991) 22 The Netherlands Yearbook of International Law at 432 [Short]. See Klabbers, supra note 6 at 108–10.

178. Short, ibid., at 437.

179. Ibid.

180. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 110.

181. Ibid., where he observes that “states, and international society at large, have something of an interest in keeping even the most mundane treaties”. See also Klabbers, supra note 6 at 34–5 and Klabbers, supra note 48. For the distinction between interests and rights, see Section II of this article.

182. Pound, supra note 83 at 331.

183. On relativity of norms in international law, see Weil, supra note 13 and Tasioulas, supra note 22. Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 44 at 126.

184. Schmidberger, supra note 12.

185. Ibid. Cf. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 165.

186. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 53.

187. Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 44 at 126.

188. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 16, para. 19.

189. See e.g. Vranes, supra note 89 at 404.

190. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 25 (stating that “[t]reaty interpretation is diplomacy, and it is the business of diplomacy to avoid or mitigate conflicts”).

191. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 104.

192. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), Judgment of 4 August 2000, [2000] International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, online: <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/1-57.pdf>, at para. 52.

193. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, Central American Court of Justice (CACJ), Judgment of 30 September 1916, (1917) 11 American Journal of International Law 181 at 227–8. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Borgen, supra note 5 at 591–4 and El Salvador v. Nicaragua, (CACJ), Opinion and Decision of 9 March 1917, (1917) 11American Journal of International Law 674 at 729.

194. See Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belgium), [1934] P.C.I.J (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12). For a detailed analysis of the case, especially with regard to the dissenting opinions, see Borgen, supra note 5 at 596–9. For an analysis of these conflicts-avoiding techniques, especially within the WTO regime, see Marko MILANOVIC, “A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 459.

195. Cf. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 27.

196. Borgen, supra note 5 at 640.

197. Matthews, supra note 11.

198. Soering, supra note 10. For a detailed discussion on Soering, see Richard B. LILLICH, “The Soering Case” (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 128.

199. United Kingdom-United States Extradition Treaty, 8 June 1972, 28 U.S.T. 227, Supplementary Treaty, 25 June 1982 and an Exchange of Notes, 19–20 August 1986.

200. As compared to the Short case discussed at supra note 177, Soering could not claim that the death penalty itself constituted such treatment as ECHR Article 2 explicitly affirms the death penalty. It was only in January 1999 that the then Home Secretary Jack Straw signed the Sixth Protocol of the ECHR that provides for the formal abolition of the death penalty.

201. Soering, supra note 10 at para. 82.

202. Ibid., para. 83.

203. Ibid., para. 86.

204. Ibid.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid., para. 87.

207. Ibid., para. 88.

208. Ibid.

209. As it is in the case of, for example, art. 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, GA Res. 39/46, UN Doc. A/39/51 (entered into force 26 June 1987).

210. Soering, supra note 10 at para. 88.

211. See CHINKIN, Christine, Third Parties in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 80Google Scholar.

212. Milanovic, supra note 194 at 17.

213. Cf. the dissenting views in the otherwise concurring opinion of Judge de Meyer annexed to the Judgment in Soering, supra note 10.

214. Cf. Milanovic, supra note 194 at 17.

215. Soering, supra note 10 at para. 86.

216. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 53.

217. Ibid., art. 64.

218. The Court applied the same exception to a case where the conflict was between the ECHR and a public international law obligation rather than another treaty; see Case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, (2010) Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 61498/08. Cf. Chinkin, supra note 211 at 80–1, note 134.

219. Matthews, supra note 11 at para. 26.

220. Ibid., para. 63.

221. Ibid., para. 24.

222. Ibid., para. 66.

223. Ibid.

224. Ibid., para. 34.

225. Cf. Milanovic, supra note 194 at 16.

226. Schmidberger, supra note 12.

227. See GHEI, Nita, “Evaluating the WTO's Two Step Test for Environmental Measures under Article XX” (2007) 18 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 117Google Scholar.

228. PAUWELYN, Joost, “A Typology of Multilateral Treaty: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?” (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 907 at 945CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

229. See e.g. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), [1998] WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, at para. 177; European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, [2001] WT/DS135/AB/R, at para. 172 [EC-Asbestos].

230. Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, [2001] WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, at paras. 163 and 166 [Korea-Beef].

231. EC-Asbestos, supra note 229 at para. 172.

232. See supra notes 119–22.

233. Korea-Beef, supra note 230 at para. 162.

234. Ibid., at para. 182.

235. EC-Asbestos, supra note 229 at para. 172.

236. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 106.

237. Art. 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that issues arising under the WTO Agreements may only be submitted to the WTO's DSB. Cf. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 107.

238. Art. 3(2) of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.

239. NOORTMANN, M., Enforcing International Law: From Self-help to Self-contained Regimes (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005) at 141Google Scholar.

240. See e.g. LINDROOS, Anja and MEHLING, Michael, “Dispelling the Chimera of ‘Self-Contained Regimes’ International Law and the WTO” (2005) 16 The European Journal of International Law 857Google Scholar.

241. EC-Asbestos, supra note 229.

242. Korea-Beef, supra note 230.

243. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 121 at paras. 7.52, 7.57, and 7.58.

244. Cf. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 28.

245. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 575-I U.N.T.S., at 160–234 (entered into force on 14 October 1966) [ICSID Convention].

246. The consent needs to be provided in writing, but there is no indication that one way is preferred over another. The consent can be given in a treaty, a contract, or local law. In the Olguin Case (Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, Award of 8 August 2000, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5), the CSOB case (Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. The Slovak Republic, Award of 24 May 1999, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4), and the Tradex case (Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, Award of 29 April 1999, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2), the tribunals have referred to the possibility of consent being granted by the state in a BIT. That will not grant jurisdiction per se to ICSID, for the consent of the investor will be lacking. But once the investor files a claim with ICSID, the parties are considered to have consented to submit the dispute to ICSID arbitration.

247. According to art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, supra note 245, the tribunal is the judge of its own competence.

248. ICSID Convention, supra note 245, art. 42(1).

249. See ICSID Course on Dispute Settlement, 2.6 Applicable Law, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.5, at 7–8.

250. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 30, para. 45.

251. Schwarzenberger, supra note 47 at 475.

252. Ibid. The ILC is also convinced with this contention: “[b]ut when a party raises a point about conflict and about the precedence of one obligation over another, then a stand must be taken”. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 28, para. 43.

253. Cf. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 30–3.

254. Klabbers, supra note 6 at 109–10 (referring to a Dutch High Court case).

255. Schmidberger, supra note 12.

256. Cf. ILC's Report on Fragmentation, supra note 1 at 33, para. 53.