Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 February 2018
The Philippines v. China arbitration award has been praised as a landmark victory setting forth illuminating jurisprudence interpreting the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], but it has also been repeatedly excoriated as an “unenforceable” decision—a Pyrrhic victory—due to China’s repeated refusal to date to acknowledge the binding effect of the award. China’s withdrawal from Scarborough Shoal—hailed by the new Duterte government as a hallmark of its diplomatic efforts—is one instance of state practice that still remains equivocal on the opinio juris of China’s acceptance (or rejection) of the arbitration award.
Michael J. Marks Distinguished Professor of Law and Co-Director, ASEAN Law & Integration Center [ALIC], the University of Hawaii William S. Richardson School of Law; 2016–2017 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences [CASBS], Stanford University; Adjunct Fellow, WSD Handa Center for Human Rights and International Justice, Stanford Global Studies. I can be reached at desierto@hawaii.edu, dianedesierto@aya.yale.edu, and diane.desierto@dapdlaw.com.
This paper is based on remarks given at the International Law Association’s Panel on Disputes in the South and East China Seas, during the Fall 2016 International Law Weekend, Fordham Law School, and a follow-up lecture in February 2017 at Stanford Law School’s Center for International Conflict Negotiation. My thanks go to panel moderator and chair Professor Ved Nanda, and fellow panelists Professors Jerome Cohen and Suisheng Zhao, and likewise to Stanford Law School Professor Allen Weiner for robust exchanges on this topic.
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19. I note that other scholars have characterized subsequent developments as proof of China’s imperfect compliance and/or outright non-compliance with Philippines v. China. See Julian KU and Chris MIRASOLA, “Tracking Compliance with the South China Sea Arbitral Award: China’s 2017 Summer Fishing Moratorium May Rekindle Conflict with the Philippines” Lawfare (7 March 2017), online: Lawfare <https://www.lawfareblog.com/tracking-compliance-south-china-sea-arbitral-award-chinas-2017-summer-fishing-moratorium-may>.
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24. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, U.N.T.S 1833 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS], at art. 296 (Finality and Binding Force of Decisions), and Annex VII, art. 11 (Finality of Award).
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26. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ibid., at para. 413.
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28. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(3).
29. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(6).
30. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(7).
31. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(4) and (5).
32. Ibid., supra note 15 at para. 1203(B)(9).
33. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(11).
34. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(12).
35. Ibid., at paras. 1203(B)(13) and (14).
36. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(15).
37. Ibid., at para. 1203(B)(16).
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52. The Philippines’ pronouncements under the Duterte administration have not always been consistent with the Philippines’ legal positions taken in Philippines v. China. Philippine Foreign Minister Perfecto Yasay told the international press that “my position, which is the official position, is that the disputed part of the South China Sea has never belonged to anyone”. See Raissa ROBLES, “Duterte Plays A Dangerous Game in the South China Sea” South China Morning Post (27 February 2017), online: South China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2073858/duterte-plays-dangerous-game-south-china-sea>. See also Nehginpao KIPGEN, “The Philippines’ South China Sea Flip-Flop” The Diplomat (2 March 2017), online: The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/the-philippines-south-china-sea-flip-flop/>.
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55. The Philippines is reported to have sent a note verbale to China in 2017, protesting China’s development of military infrastructure and installation of anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons on seven artificial islands that China constructed in the South China Sea. See “Philippines Issues First Protest vs China under Duterte” PhilStar (16 January 2017), online: PhilStar <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/01/16/1663254/philippines-issues-first-protest-vs-china-under-duterte>; Lindsay MURDOCH, “South China Sea: Philippines Quietly Protests China’s Weaponry on Artificial Islands” The Sydney Morning Herald (17 January 2017), online: The Sydney Morning Herald <http://www.smh.com.au/world/south-china-sea-philippines-quietly-protests-chinas-weaponry-on-artificial-islands-20170117-gtsw60.html>.
56. Charter of the United Nations, art. 39.
57. United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/377(V) (“Uniting for Peace”) at para. 1.
58. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (13 July 2016), online: Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1380615.shtml>; and LIU Zhen, “China, Philippines to Set Up Negotiation Mechanism to Resolve South China Sea Disputes” South China Morning Post (21 October 2016), online: South China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2038993/china-philippines-agree-set-negotiation-mechanism>.
59. There are alleged reported conversations between the Philippines and China on Chinese coast guards’ enforcement activities at Scarborough Shoal. See Emily RAUHALA, “Philippines Says China Has Stopped Chasing Fishermen from Contested Shoal” Washington Post (28 October 2016), online: Washington Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/report-filipino-fishermen-return-to-fish-shoal-contested-with-china/2016/10/28/51d51eb4-9cb3-11e6-b4c9-391055ea9259_story.html?utm_term=.571c4e79a228>. Although note that China has announced a 2017 summer fishing moratorium over many parts of the South China Sea. See Julian KU and Christopher MIRASOLA, “Tracking Compliance with the South China Sea Arbitral Award: China’s 2017 Summer Fishing Moratorium May Rekindle Conflict with the Philippines” Lawfare (7 March 2017), online: Lawfare <https://www.lawfareblog.com/tracking-compliance-south-china-sea-arbitral-award-chinas-2017-summer-fishing-moratorium-may>.
60. Note that the Philippines has declared a unilateral ban on all fishing at Scarborough Shoal. See Ben BLAND, “Duterte ‘Bans’ All Fishing in the Disputed Area of South China Sea” The Financial Times (21 November 2016), online: The Financial Times <https://www.ft.com/content/d0ef9402-afd4-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0>.
61. See Tim DAISS, “China, Philippines Reportedly Set to Agree on Joint South China Sea Oil Exploration” Forbes (18 October 2016), online: Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/10/18/china-philippines-oil-deal-underway-in-south-china-sea-says-report/#5292ddde7352>.
62. See Minnie CHAN, “Beijing Ready to Impose Air Defence Identification Zone in South China Sea Pending US Moves” South China Morning Post (1 June 2016), online: South China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1960954/beijing-ready-impose-air-defence-identification-zone-south-china-sea>.
63. See “Manila Expects China to Build on Scarborough Shoal” South China Morning Post (7 February 2017), online: South China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2068863/manila-expects-china-build-scarborough-shoal>.
64. See, among others, “South China Sea: US Reports ‘Unsafe Encounter’ with Chinese Military Aircraft” The Guardian (10 February 2017), online: The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/south-china-sea-us-navy-aircraft-encounter>; Tom PHILLIPS, “Images Show ‘Significant’ Chinese Weapons Systems in South China Sea” The Guardian (23 November 2016), online: The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/15/images-show-significant-chinese-weapons-systems-in-south-china-sea>; Catherine WONG, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to be Based Near South China Sea, as Tensions with Washington Rise” South China Morning Post (1 February 2017), online: South China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2067130/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-stay-near-south-china-sea>.
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