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International Legal Fictions: Lessons from the South China Sea Award

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2021

Reece LEWIS Open the ORCID record for Reece LEWIS [Opens in a new window]
Reece LEWIS*
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University, UK
*
Corresponding author: Reece LEWIS, email: lewisr74@cardiff.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper examines the use of a specific international legal fiction. It is claimed that a legal fiction was confirmed by the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration (2016). The paper asks whether this is an effective legal fiction. The paper will argue that this is not so, pointing to the difficulties that the fiction necessarily creates. From this example, lessons may be learned of the phenomenon of legal fictions of international law generally, and, crucially, of their effectiveness.

Keywords

South China SeaChinaislandsartificial islandslegal fictionlaw of the sea
Type
Article
Information
Asian Journal of International Law , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , July 2021 , pp. 261 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

1 See e.g. FULLER, Lon L., Legal Fictions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar; MAR, Maksymilian DEL and TWINING, William, eds., Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice (Cham: Springer, 2015)Google Scholar; OLIVIER, Pierre J.J., Legal Fictions in Practice and Legal Science (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1975)Google Scholar; VAIHINGER, Hans, Die Philosphie des Als-Ob, 8th ed. (Leipzig: Meiner, 1922)Google Scholar; DEMELIUS, Gustav, Die Rechtsfiktion in ihrer geschichtlichen und dogmatischen Bedeutung (Weimer: Böhlau, 1858)Google Scholar; Glenn Scobey WARNER, Legal Fictions. Bachelor of Laws Thesis, Cornell Law School Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection, 1894; DEKKERS, René, La Fiction Juridique: étude de droit romain et de droit comparé (Paris: Sirey, 1935)Google Scholar; Henry Sumner MAINE, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas, 1st ed. (London: John Murray, 1861); Aviam SOIFER, “Reviewing Legal Fictions” (1986) 20 Georgia Law Review 871.

2 Jean SALMON, “The Device of Legal Fiction in Public International Law” (1974) 4 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 251; Annemarieke VERMEER-KüNZLI, “As If: The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection” (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 37; ROUCOUNAS, Emmanuel, A Landscape of Contemporary Theories of International Law (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2019) at 340–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 This phenomenon will be interrogated in greater detail in LEWIS, Reece, Legal Fictions in International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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5 John DUGARD, “Diplomatic Protection” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (May 2009), online: OUP <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1028> at para 1.

6 See e.g. Case Concerning the British Whaler Costa Rica Packet (Great Britain v. Netherlands), [1897] 5 Moore International Arbitrations 4948; J.H.W. VERZIJL, International Law in Historical Perspective Vol. IV (Leiden: A.W. Stijhoff, 1971) at 42–3.

7 See e.g. MCCLANAHAN, Grant V., Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1989) at 30Google Scholar; Maine, supra note 1 at 85–6; Eileen YOUNG, “The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations” (1964) 40 British Yearbook of International Law 170.

8 This forms the basis of the evaluation of the fiction in Section III.

9 The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award of 12 July 2016, [2016] PCA Case No. 2013-19, online: PCA-CPA <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086> [SCSA].

10 The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015, [2015[ PCA Case No. 2013-19, online: PCA-CPA <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2579>.

11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].

12 SCSA, supra note 9 at para. 306.

13 See e.g. DUPUY, Florian and DUPUY, Pierre-Marie, “A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea” (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 124CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “South China Sea Tables and Maps—US EIA” South China Sea, online: South China Sea <www.southchinasea.org/maps/territorial-claims-maps/>; Chinese Society of International Law, “The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study” (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of International Law 207; TALMON, Stefan and JIA, Bing Bing, eds., The China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2014)Google Scholar.

14 For explorations of the Award, see e.g. GAU, Michael SHENG-TI, “The Interpretation of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS by the Tribunal for the South China Sea Arbitration: A Critique” (2019) 50 Ocean Development & International Law 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; GUILFOYLE, Douglas, “The South China Sea Award: How Should We Read the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea?” (2018) 8 Asian Journal of International Law 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; DAVENPORT, Tara, “Island-Building in the South China Sea: Legality and Limits” (2018) 8 Asian Journal of International Law 76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; TANAKA, Yoshifumi, “Reflections on the Interpretation and Application of Article 121(3) in the South China Sea Arbitration (Merits)” (2017) 48 Ocean Development & International Law 365CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 See e.g. Fuller, supra note 1 at ch. 3.

16 “Fiction” Merriam-Webster, online: Merriam-Webster <www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fiction>.

17 The author acknowledges the existence of an emerging body of work focused on the relationship between international law and reality. See e.g. for constructivist accounts, HATHAWAY, Oona A. and SHAPIRO, Scott J., The Internationalists (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017)Google Scholar; SCOTT, Shirley V., International Law in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010)Google Scholar. For dynamic models of international law making, see e.g. BRUNNÉE, Jutta and TOOPE, Stephen J., Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Space precludes a full elaboration of this issue here. Suffice it to say that just as in the literature focused on legal presumptions, or assumptions, where discrepancies between actual reality and the legal position exist, this does not preclude an examination of such legal devices and of the kind examined here.

18 Fuller, supra note 1 at 104.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., at 105.

21 Ibid., at 103–6; VAIHINGER, Hans, The Philosophy of “As If”: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) at 2–5Google Scholar.

22 Of course, the law may produce abstract legal concepts that are used to deal with reality. Thus, in the law of the sea, there exists the concept of “baselines”. These are the legal reflections of the geographical interface between the land and the sea.

23 See e.g. Fuller, supra note 1; Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1.

24 Michael LOBBAN, “Legal Fictions Before the Age of Reform” in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 199.

25 See e.g. Fritz PRINGSHEIM, Gesammelte Abhandlungen Vol. II (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1961) at 382–400; Olivier, supra note 1 at 5; Heinrich HONSELL, Römisches Recht, 8th ed. (Cham: Springer, 2015); Cf. Vaihinger, supra note 1 at 232–6.

26 See e.g. Maine, supra note 1 at 30; Dekkers, supra note 1 at 117; Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 2 at 42; Clifford ANDO, “Fact, Fiction, and Social Reality in Roman Law” in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 295.

27 See e.g. Leib MOSCOVITZ, “Rabbinic Legal Fictions” in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 325; Yoram DINSTEIN, “International Law as a Primitive Legal System” (1986–1987) 19 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1 at 22.

28 See e.g. JENKS, Edward, A Short History of English Law (London: Methuen & Co., 1912)Google Scholar; Nancy KNAUER, “Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth” (2010) 23 St. Thomas Law Review 1.

29 See e.g. the varied contributions in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1.

30 In the international context, see Lewis, supra note 3.

31 Fuller, supra note 1 at 9.

32 An approach echoed elsewhere, see e.g. Karen PETROSKI, “Legal Fictions and the Limits of Legal Language” in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 132; Louise HARMON, “Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment” (1990) 100 Yale Law Journal 1; Kevin CAMPBELL, “Fuller on Legal Fictions” (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 339.

33 Salmon, supra note 2 at 251.

34 Maksymilian DEL MAR, “Legal Fictions and Legal Change” (2013) 9 International Journal of Law in Context 442.

35 See e.g. WILCOX, Henry S., Fallacies of the Law (Chicago, IL: Legal Literature Co., 1907) at 88Google Scholar.

36 See Fuller, supra note 1 at 9; Maine, supra note 1; Olivier, supra note 1 at 81; and in legal dictionaries such as GARNER, Bryan A., Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (Chicago, IL: West Publishing Co., 1999) at 804Google Scholar; BOUVIER, John, A Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Childs & Peterson, 1856) at 1213Google Scholar; Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law (Merriam-Webster, Inc.: Springfield, MA, 1996); JACOB, Giles, A New Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (London: Printed by E. and R. Nutt, and R. Gosling, 1739) at 551Google Scholar.

37 See e.g. Frederick SCHAUER, “Legal Fictions Revisited” in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 113; Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 2 at 42–3; Raymundo GAMA, “Presumptions and Fictions: A Collingwoodian Approach” in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 347.

38 MAR, Maksymilian DEL, “Recovering Legal Fictions: An Introduction” (2013) 9 International Journal of Law in Context 437 at 440Google Scholar.

39 See e.g. Jeremy BENTHAM, “The Elements of the Art of Packing as Applied to Special Juries: Particularly in Cases of Libel Law” in John BOWRING, ed., The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838–43) at 92; Oliver R. MITCHELL, “The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or Detrimental to Its Growth?” (1893) 7 Harvard Law Review 249 at 262; Daniel KLERMAN, “Legal Fictions as Strategic Instruments” (2009) UC Berkeley: Law and Economics Workshop; William PRYNNE, Animadversions on the Fourth Part of Coke's Institutes (London: Printed by T. Ratcliffe, and T. Daniel, 1669) at 95.

40 See e.g. ROUBIER, Paul, Theorie Générale du Droit, 2nd ed. (Paris: Sirey, 1951) at 115Google Scholar: “fiction represents a direct assault on that which seems natural, deliberately distorting the truth in order to impose the desired solutions.”

41 Even Fuller, supra note 1 at 2, likened fictions to “supports” and acknowledged that “the fiction has generally been regarded as something of which the law ought to be ashamed, and yet which the law cannot, as yet, dispense”. See similarly, Rudolf von JHERING, Geist des römischen Recht auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, 6th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1924) at 297.

42 Bentham, supra note 39 at 92.

43 See e.g. Demelius, supra note 1 at 77–9; ESSER, Josef, Wertund Bedeutung der Rechtsfiktionen (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1940) at 4, 21, 39Google Scholar; SOMLÓ, Felix, Juristische Grundlehre, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Meiner, 1927) at 524–5Google Scholar.

44 Lon L. FULLER, “Legal Fictions” (1930–1931) 25 Illinois Law Review 363 at 368.

45 Legal fictions may also be expressly or indirectly incorporated into legislation; these are what Fuller and Olivier have described as “statutory fictions”.

46 Fuller, supra note 44 at 367–8.

47 Knauer, supra note 28 at 49 (emphasis added); Maksymilian DEL MAR, “Legal Fictions and Legal Change in the Common Law Tradition” in Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 225–6, 229–30.

48 See e.g. Fuller, supra note 1; Del Mar and Twining, supra note 1 at 238.

49 Fuller, supra note 44 at 369.

50 Peter J. SMITH, “New Legal Fictions” (2006–2007) 95 Georgia Law Journal 1435 at 1446, states that legal scholars are “divided on the utility and desirability” of legal fictions in the first place.

51 Maine, supra note 1 at 11.

52 Del Mar, supra note 38 at 444.

53 Fuller, supra note 1 at 56.

54 Ibid., at 1.

55 See e.g. JAYAKUMAR, S., KOH, Tommy, BECKMAN, Robert, DAVENPORT, Tara, and PHAN, Hao Duy, eds., The South China Sea Arbitration: The Legal Dimension (Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Talmon and Jia, supra note 13; Chinese Society of International Law, supra note 13; COGLIATI-BANTZ, Vincent, “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China)” (2016) 31 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 759CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thi Lan-Anh NGUYEN, “The South China Sea Dispute: A Reappraisal in the Light of International Law”. PhD thesis, School of Law, University of Bristol, 2008.

56 Defined by UNCLOS art. 13(1) as “a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide”.

57 See for instance, Nguyen, supra note 55. See SAUNDERS, I., “The South China Sea Award, Artificial Islands and Territory” (2016) 34 Australian Yearbook of International Law 31Google Scholar, who describes the Tribunal's consideration on the question of the appropriation of some of the features in the South China Sea as a “fiction”.

58 For the transformation of the features, see Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative [AMTI], “Occupation and Island Building”, online: AMTI <https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/>.

59 BOWETT, Derek, The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law (New York: Oceana Publications, 1979) at 2Google Scholar; International Law Commission, “Summary Records of the Sixth Session” (1954) Vol. I, ILCYB at 91; International Law Commission, “Documents of the Eighth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly” (1956) Vol. II, International Law Commission Yearbook at 270.

60 SCSA, supra note 9 at para. 305.

61 Ibid., at para. 305.

62 Ibid., at para. 481; This is consistent with Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012, [2012] I.C.J. Rep. 624 at para. 37.

63 Ibid., at paras. 488–503; for a critique. see e.g. Alex G. OUDE ELFERINK, “The South China Sea Arbitration's Interpretation of Article 121(3) of the LOSC: A Disquieting First” (2016), online: The NCLOS Blog <https://site.uit.no/nclos/2016/09/07/the-south-china-sea-arbitrations-interpretation-of-article-1213-of-the-losc-a-disquieting-first/>; Alina MIRON, “South China Sea Award: Are the Tribunal's Considerations on Islands Part of an Acquis Judiciaire?”, 9th ABLOS Conference, Day One—Session 2, 2017, online: ABLOS <www.iho.int/mtg_docs/com_wg/ABLOS/ABLOS_Conf9/PDF.zip>.

64 SCSA, supra note 9 at para. 510 (emphasis added).

65 Ibid., at para. 578.

66 Ibid., especially at paras. 305, 578.

67 Ibid., at para. 306.

68 Ibid.

69 See AMTI, supra note 58.

70 SCSA, supra note 9 at para. 869.

71 Ibid., at para. 869.

72 Ibid., at para. 870.

73 Ibid., at paras. 340–2, such as the surveys by HMS Rifleman in 1866 and HMS Herald in 1936, China Sea Directory of 1868, and China Sea Pilot of 1951.

74 Ibid., at para. 564.

75 Ibid., at s. E.

76 Ibid., at para. 1008.

77 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Mischief Reef”, online: AMTI <https://amti.csis.org/mischief-reef/>.

78 SCSA, supra note 9 at para. 1037.

79 Ibid., at para. 378.

80 Ibid., at paras. 335–9.

81 Ibid., at paras. 340–3.

82 Ibid., at paras. 344–51.

83 Ibid., at paras. 359–66.

84 Ibid., at paras. 355–8.

85 Ibid., at paras. 352–4.

86 Ibid., at para. 374–8.

87 Ibid., at paras. 359–66.

88 Ibid., at paras. 367–73. Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal were considered by the Tribunal, but since they have not been subject to any significant human modification, they are not dealt with by this paper.

89 Ibid., at para. 306.

90 It is not in doubt that there are strong policy considerations at play behind such an approach. The territorialization of the high seas through the artificial expansion and transformation of small insignificant features into fully juridical islands is clearly contrary to the spirit of the UNCLOS. However, the question whether the application of the fiction—as understood—in this paper assists the “restoration” of the high seas is dubious. These matters are explored in Section III of this paper.

91 FORSYTH, Christopher, “‘The Metaphysic of Nullity’, Invalidity, Conceptual Reasoning and the Rule of Law” in FORSYTH, Christopher and HARE, Ivan, eds., The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at 160CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 Ibid., at 147.

93 See e.g. SCSA, supra note 9 at paras. 515–20.

94 Save for Mischief Reef as the Tribunal concluded that the feature was located within the Philippines’ EEZ and that China's modification of the feature contravened art. 60 of the UNCLOS, specifically the state's exclusive right to build artificial islands there and the absence of their authorisation (ibid., at paras. 399, 1037–8). However, the Tribunal's reticence to fully describe Mischief Reef as an artificial island is significant. Earlier in the Judgment, it concluded that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation (ibid., at para. 378).

95 UNCLOS, art. 121(3).

96 UNCLOS, art. 13(1). Art. 13(2) states that “where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own”.

97 UNCLOS, art. 7.

98 UNCLOS, art. 47.

99 UNCLOS, art. 10.

100 UNCLOS, art. 9.

101 SCSA, supra note 9 at para. 306.

102 Ibid., at para. 306.

103 Ibid., at paras. 1175(a), 1175(b).

104 Ibid., at para. 1117.

105 Ibid., at 149.

106 Ibid., at 171.

107 The same is true of the other “rocks” identified by the Tribunal.

108 UNCLOS, art. 87(1).

109 Perhaps, thereby, producing an even more unpalatable result?

110 SCSA, supra note 9 at paras. 338, 394, 402, 413–5, 445, 461–2, 464.

111 Ibid., at paras. 399, 1037–8.

112 Ibid., at para. 378.