Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 September 2011
Water security issues arising from the Central Asian states’ heavy reliance on, and competition over, the shared waters of the Aral Sea Basin have attracted urgent political and academic discussion. However, any analysis of the role that international law plays in addressing these substantive complex problems remains incomplete and imprecise. This article sets the stage for a deeper understanding of international law and of its potential operation in the context of the transboundary waters in the Aral Sea Basin. It seeks to explore the substantive norms operating in the field, namely, the rule of equitable and reasonable use, the no-harm rule, and obligations relating to environmental protection, with a view to understanding how these substantive norms work and ascertaining what conduct is required of the states with respect to their shared watercourses.
PhD Research Scholar, IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science under the auspices of UNESCO, University of Dundee, Scotland, United Kingdom; Legal Adviser, Scientific Information Centre of Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia. I would like to thank my colleagues Hugo Tremblay, Jing Lee, and Mónica García Quesada, participants in the NUS-AsianSIL 2nd Young Scholars Workshop, “Asian Approaches to International Law: Theory, Institutions, Processes and Practices”, Singapore, from 30 September to 1 October 2010, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts. All translations in the text are done by me.
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98. International Law Commission Commentary to 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 29 at 103.
99. Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 72 at 556 give another example of Articles 7 and 8 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement,
which require parties to make every effort to “avoid, minimize and mitigate” harmful effects to the environment, but also call for cessation of uses causing substantial damage, and compensation thereof. In effect this latter provision amounts to a prohibition of such harmful uses.
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108. International Law Commission Commentary to 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 29 at 119.
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110. See MCCAFFREY, Stephen C., The Law of International Watercourses—Non-Navigational Uses, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 257 and 462Google Scholar: “there is now at least an emerging obligation to protect international watercourses systems and their ecosystems against degradation”,
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111. Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 72 at 552.
112. 1992 UNECE Convention, supra note 13, art. 2(2).
113. Ibid., art. 1(2) reads:
“Transboundary impact” means any significant adverse effect on the environment resulting from a change in the conditions of transboundary waters caused by a human activity, the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party, within an area under the jurisdiction of another Party. Such effects on the environment include effects on human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical structures or the interaction among these factors; they also include effects on the cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those factors.
114. Ibid., art. 2(5).
115. Ibid., art. 3(1)(i).
116. Ibid., art. 2(6).
117. 1992 Commonwealth Agreement on Environmental Interaction, supra note 12, preamble.
118. Ibid., art. 2.
119. 1998 Commonwealth Agreement on Transboundary Waters, supra note 12, art. 1.
120. Ibid., art. 2.
121. 1993 Kzyl-Orda Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1.
122. A 1988 Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Measures for Radical Improvement of Ecological and Sanitary Situation in the Region of the Aral Sea, Enhancing the Efficiency and Use to Strengthen the Protection of the Water and Land Resources in its Basin. According to the Decree minimum inflows to the deltas of the Amudarya and Syrdarya and to the Aral Sea (including drainage waters) are as follows: 8.7 km3 in 1990; 11 km3 in 1995; 15 km3 in 2000; and 20 km3 by 2005.
123. See Diversion of Water from the River Meuse, 1937 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 70 at 21 (observing that “The Treaty brought into existence a certain regime which results from all of its provisions in conjunction. It forms a complete whole, the different provisions of which cannot be dissociated from others and considered apart by themselves”).
124. 1998 Environmental Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11, art. 2.
125. 2006 Framework Convention on Sustainable Development in CA, supra note 11, art. 3.
126. Ramsar Convention, supra note 16.
127. Ibid., supra note 16, art. 1 defines “wetlands” as:
areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six metres.
128. The wise use of wetlands, the cornerstone of the Convention, has been defined by the COP as the “sustainable use of wetlands for the benefit of mankind in a way that is compatible with maintaining the natural properties of the ecosystem”. See “Recomnendation 3.3. Wise Use of Wetlands”, Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (Regina, Canada, 27 May – 5 June 1987), online: Ramsar 〈www.ramsar.org/pdf/rec/key_rec_3.03e.pdf〉.
129. Ramsar Convention, supra note 16, preamble.
130. Ibid., art. 5.
131. Guidelines for the Allocation and Management of Water for Maintaining the Ecological Functions of Wetlands, Resolution VIII.1, 8th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971), Valencia, Spain, 18−26 November 2002, online: Ramsar 〈www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_viii_01_e.pdf〉. See also Guidelines for International Cooperation Under the Ramsar Convention, Resolution VII.19, 7th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Wetlands, San José, Costa Rica, 10−18 May 1999, online: Ramsar 〈www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_vii.19e.pdf〉.
132. The Aydar Arnasay Lakes System (the AALS) is the largest reservoir of Uzbekistan, consisting of freshwater lakes situated in the middle stream of the Syrdarya river and on the irrigated massif of the Golodnaya steppe and the Kyzylkum desert. It was formed as a result of emergency dumping of water from the Chardara reservoir in 1969 (20.1 km3). In recent decades, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were forced to divert water into the AALS regularly, due to a change in the operating regime of the Toktogul reservoir which resulted in a substantial shift in flow patterns, with the peak of water releases in winter rather than in summer. A low carrying capacity of the riverbed downstream of the Chardara reservoir (400 to 600 m3/sec in winter) did not allow for the direction of flow to the Aral Sea. Today, the AALS's size is about 42 km3. See The Aydar Arnasay Lake System (Uzbekistan), Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands—2008 Ramsar Uzbekistan 2UZ002, online: Ramsar 〈http://ramsar.wetlands.org〉; G. Glysin, “From Aral to Arnasay”, in Ecological Almanac Simply Writing on Environment (in Russian 2005), online: Kungrad 〈http://kungrad.com/aral/book/arnasai/〉.
133. “The Aydar Arnasay Lakes System” (July 2008), Ramsar site No.1841, online: Ramsar 〈http://ramsar.wetlands.org〉.
134. Convention on Biodiversity, supra note 16, pursues the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.
135. Ibid., art. 6(b).
136. Ibid., art. 8(d).
137. Ibid., art. 8(f).
138. Ibid., art. 8(h).
139. Ibid., art. 5.
140. See “Conference of the Parties Decisions”, online: Convention on Biological Diversity 〈www.cbd.int/decisions/cop/〉.
141. UNECE Guide to Implementing the Convention, supra note 47.
142. As Patterson explained:
Meaning—the basis of objectivity—is made possible by the harmony in action and judgment of participants in legal practice over time. Most importantly, it is in virtue of what participants in legal practice have in common that normativity and objectivity are possible.
PATTERSON, Dennis, “Interpretation in Law” (2005) 42 San Diego Law Review 685 at 686Google Scholar. See also Franck, supra note 23; Chayes and Chayes, supra note 23; and Abbott et al., supra note 24.
143. Bodansky, supra note 24 at 104; and OSPAR Award, supra note 34.
144. See The Arbitral Tribunal's hierarchy of obligations in OSPAR Award, supra note 34.
145. MCLACHLAN, Campbell, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention” (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279 at 286Google Scholar.
146. Rieu-Clarke and Loures, supra note 15Google Scholar.
147. WEERAMANTRY, Christopher Gregory, Universalising International Law (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 37Google Scholar.