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Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties of South Asian Countries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2016

Amit Kumar SINHA
Amit Kumar SINHA*
Affiliation:
College of Legal Studies, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Indiaadv.amitkrsinha@gmail.com
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Abstract

This paper provides a first-ever detailed study of NPM provisions in all stand-alone BITs which are in force in South Asian countries. It studies 147 BITs of South Asian countries in order to map the NPM provisions in them. It makes an in-depth analysis of the NPM provisions found in these BITs, and then makes an analysis of the consequences of not having NPM provisions in BITs. This follows the dissection of the NPM provisions found, so as to study each and every permissible objective and nexus requirement link in these provisions. This is followed by suggestions and conclusions, where the paper holds that NPM provisions are not sufficiently used in the BITs of these countries and these countries should incorporate this provision more frequently in order to ensure some much-needed regulatory latitude to these countries.

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Articles
Information
Asian Journal of International Law , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , July 2017 , pp. 227 - 263
Copyright
© Asian Journal of International Law 2016 

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Footnotes

*

Assistant Professor, College of Legal Studies, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun (India). LLM (South Asian University, New Delhi, India), BA LLB (Hons) (Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur, India). The author can be reached at adv.amitkrsinha@gmail.com. This paper is a part of my LLM dissertation thesis “Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties of South Asian Countries: A Legal Study”, submitted at South Asian University, New Delhi, India. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude towards Dr Prabhash Ranjan, Assistant Professor, South Asian University, for his help and suggestions. I would also like to thank Professor Jeswald W. Salacuse, Henry J. Braker Professor of Law, Tufts University, for his comments. I am also thankful to Pushkar Anand, Assistant Professor, College of Legal Studies, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun (India) for his suggestions. Views, and any errors, are solely the author’s responsibility.

References

1. BURKE-WHITE, William W. and Von STADEN, Andreas, “Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation of Non-Precluded Measure Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of International Law 307 Google Scholar; KURTZ, Jűrgen, “Adjudging the Exceptional at International Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis” (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 325 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; NEWCOMBE, Andrew, “The Use of General Exceptions in IIAs: Increasing Legitimacy or Uncertainty?” in Armand De MESTRAL and Céline LÉVESQUE, eds., Improving International Investment Agreements (London: Routledge, 2013), 275 Google Scholar.

2. RANJAN, Prabhash, “Non-Precluded Measures in Indian International Investment Agreements and India’s Regulatory Power as a Host Nation” (2012) 2 Asian Journal of International Law 21 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. India has signed eighty-four BITs, of which seventy-two are in force (10 December 2014), online: Ministry of Finance, Government of India <http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp>.

4. Pakistan has signed forty-six BITs, of which twenty-five are in force; UNCTAD IIA database (21 January 2015), online: Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/160#iiaInnerMenu>.

5. Sri Lanka has signed twenty-nine BITs, of which twenty-four are in force; UNCTAD IIA database (21 January 2015), online: Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/198#iiaInnerMenu>.

6. Bangladesh has signed thirty BITs, of which twenty-four are in force; UNCTAD IIA database (21 January 2015), online: Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/16#iiaInnerMenu>; BITs signed by Bangladesh can also be found at the website of the Ministry of Industries, Government of Bangladesh, Bilateral Agreements (21 January 2015), online: MOIND <http://www.moind.gov.bd/site/page/f7aa7575-5196-476b-907b-3ea65e885717>.

7. Nepal has four BITs in force out of six BITs that it has signed, UNCTAD IIA database (21 January 2015), online: Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/147#iiaInnerMenu>.

8. Afghanistan has signed three BITs; all are in force; UNCTAD IIA database (21 January 2015), online: Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/1#iiaInnerMenu>.

9. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 314.

10. Ibid., at 401.

11. VANDEVELDE, Kenneth J., “Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs” (1993) International Tax and Business Lawyer 159 at 170 Google Scholar.

12. Kurtz, supra note 1 at 343.

13. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Annulment Proceedings, [2005] ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 [CMS Annulment]; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, [2005] ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 [CMS]; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp v. Argentina, Annulment Proceedings, [2010] ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 [Enron Annulment]; Enron Corporation v. Argentina, [2007] ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 [Enron]; Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Annulment Proceedings, [2010] ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 [Sempra Annulment]; Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, [2007] ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 [Sempra]; LG&E Energy Corporation v. Argentina, [2006] ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 [LG&E]; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, [2008] ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 [Continental].

14. See supra note 13; BINDER, Christina, “Necessity Exceptions, the Argentine Crisis and Legitimacy Concerns” in Tulio TREVES, Francesco SEATZU, and Seline TREVISANUT, eds., Foreign Investment, International Law and Common (Routledge, 2014), 71 Google Scholar.

15. Kurtz, supra note 1 at 347.

16. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States 5, ICSID 236; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (2005) 44 I.L.M. 1345; Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, [1998] 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998); for further study, FOOTER, Mary E., “Bits and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of Foreign Investment” (2009) 18 Michigan State International Law Review 33 Google Scholar.

17. Eureko BV v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, [2005] UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration; Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, [2005] 20 ICSID REV. 450 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2005); Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Rep. of Tanzania, [2008] ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2008).

18. MTD Equity v. Republic of Chile, [2005] 44 I.L.M. 91.

19. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Rep., [2007] 47 I.L.M. 445 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2007); Suez/InterAguas v. Argentina, [2004] ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2004); Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, [2004] ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2004); see supra note 13.

20. Occidental Exploration and Production Co v. Republic of Ecuador, Award, [2004] LCIA Case No. UN 3467.

21. DOLZER, Rudolf and SCHREUER, Christoph, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 7–8 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Asha KAUSHAL, “Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime” (2009) 50 Harvard Journal of International Law 491 at 511–12.

22. Dolzer and Schreuer, supra note 21.

23. SALACUSE, Jeswald W., The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 340–341 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24. E.g. Restricting the application of a specific treaty provision to a particular circumstance or transaction, Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the Republic of Korea for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, November 2000, art. 6(3).

25. E.g. Controlling exceptions which allows the contracting parties to deny the benefits of treaty to investments of companies controlled by third country nationals if the companies lack “substantial business activities” in the home country—Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 19 May 1992 (entered into force 12 January 1994), art. 1(2).

26. NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluís, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 481 Google Scholar.

27. Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 26 February 1999 (emphasis added).

28. NPM provisions can also be called by other names, such as General Exception clauses—Ranjan, supra note 2 at 25.

29. Supra note 4.

30. Investor-State Dispute Settlement, (UNCTAD Series on Issues in Investment Agreements II, UN 2014) (10 April 2015), online: UNCTAD <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeia2013d2_en.pdf>.

31. Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of the Investments, 12 February 1989 (entered into force 30 September 1990) [China-Pakistan BIT].

32. Agreement Between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Promotion and Mutual Protection Investments, 1 June 1983 (entered into force 14 December 2015) [France-Pakistan BIT].

33. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 25 November 1959 (entered into force 29 July 1961).

34. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 25 May 1988 (entered into force 15 April 1990) [Korea-Pakistan BIT].

35. Agreement on the Promotion and Safeguarding of Capital Movement and Investment Between the Government of the State of Kuwait and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 17 March 1983 (entered into force 15 March 1986) [Kuwait-Pakistan BIT].

36. Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 4 October 1988 (entered into force 1 October 1989) [Netherlands-Pakistan BIT].

37. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments Between Sweden and Pakistan, 12 March 1981 (entered into force on 14 July 1981) [Sweden-Pakistan BIT].

38. Supra note 4.

39. Supra note 5.

40. Ibid.; BITs with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) (1982), China (1986), Denmark (1985), Finland (1985), France (1980), Germany (now terminated, it has signed a new BIT with Germany) (1963), Italy (1987), Japan (1982), Korea (1980), Malaysia (1982), Netherlands (1984), Norway (1985), Romania (1981), Singapore (1980), Sweden (1982), Switzerland (1981), and the United Kingdom (1980).

41. Supra note 5.

42. Supra note 6.

43. Ibid.; BITs with BLEU (1987), France (1985), Germany (1981), Korea (1986), Turkey (1987), Canada (1990), Romania (1987), the United Kingdom (1980), and the USA (1986).

44. Supra note 6.

45. Supra note 7.

46. Agreement Between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal on the Promotion and Mutual Protection Investments, 2 May 1983 (entered into force 13 June 1985), and Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Nepal Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 20 October 1986 (entered into force 7 July 1988).

47. Supra note 7.

48. 7 December 2014, online: UNCTAD IIA Database <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu>.

49. Supra note 8.

50. Supra note 3.

51. RANJAN, Prabhash, “India and Bilateral Investment Treaties—A Changing Landscape” (2014) ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 419 at 421 Google Scholar.

52. Ibid.

53. 15 July 2015, online: UNCTADSTAT <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740>.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. World Investment Report 2015, Country Fact Sheet: Nepal (19 July 2015), online: UNCTAD <http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2015/wir15_fs_np_en.pdf>.

61. Supra note 53; zero does not denote that there was no FDI inflow at all, it just shows that the figure was not in US million dollars.

62. Supra note 53.

63. World Investment Report 2015, Country Fact Sheet: India (19 July 2015), online: UNCTAD <http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2015/wir15_fs_in_en.pdf>.

64. SAHOO, Pravakar, “Foreign Direct Investment in South Asia: Policy, Trends, Impact and Determinants” (2015), online: ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 56, <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156693/adbi-dp56.pdf>>Google Scholar.

65. SALACUSE, Jeswald W., “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries” (1990) 24 The International Lawyer 503 at 655 Google Scholar; for a listing of 309 bilateral investment treaties concluded up to 31 December 1988, PAPPAS, Anthena J., “References on Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1989) 4 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 189 at 194–203 Google Scholar.

66. Supra note 48.

67. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (UNCTAD Series on Issues in Investment Agreements II, UN 2014) (10 April 2015), online: UNCTAD <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeia2013d2_en.pdf>.

68. UNCTAD, “Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)”, IIA Issue Note No. 1 (April 2014), online: UNCTAD <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf> (25 April 2015).

69. UNCTAD, “Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS”, IIA Issue Note No. 1, Feb 2015, online: UNCTAD <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf> at 5.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3 (II); Agility for Public Warehousing Company K.S.C. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/8; Tethyan Copper Company Pty Limited v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1; Mr Ali Allawi v. Pakistan (12 January 2015), online: Italaw <http://www.italaw.com/cases/2032>; Progas Energy Ltd v. Pakistan (12 January 2015), online: Italaw <http://www.italaw.com/cases/2044>; Karkey Karadeniz Elektrik Uretim A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/1.

74. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3; Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2; Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2.

75. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7.

76. Bechtel Enterprises Holdings, Inc. and GE Structured Finance (GESF) v. The Government of India, Tribunal Rules for Bechtel and GE in Dabhol Power Project Arbitration (9 September 2003), online: Bechtel <http://www.bechtel.com/newsroom/releases/2003/09/tribunal-rules-dabhol-power-project-arbitration/>; ABN Amro N.V. v. Republic of India, (12 April 2015), online: Rimantas Daujotas blog <http://rdaujotas.com/lt/publikacijos/0/42/-icsid-foreign-investment-requirement-in-case-of-borrowed-funds>; ANZEF Ltd. v. Republic of India; BNP Paribas v. Republic of India; Credit Lyonnais S.A. (now Calyon S.A.) v. Republic of India; Credit Suisse First Boston v. Republic of India; Erste Bank Der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG v. Republic of India; Offshore Power Production C.V., Travamark Two B.V., EFS India-Energy B.V., Enron B.V., and Indian Power Investments B.V. v. Republic of India; Standard Chartered Bank v. Republic of India Bycell (Maxim Naumchenko, Andrey Polouektov and Tenoch Holdings Ltd) v. India (28 November 2014), online: Italaw <http://www.italaw.com/cases/1933>; Deutsche Telekom v. India (28 November 2014), online: Italaw <http://www.italaw.com/cases/2275>; Khaitan Holdings Mauritius v. India (28 November 2014), online: Italaw <http://www.italaw.com/cases/2262>; Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SAS (France) v. The Republic of India (28 November 2014), online: <http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/113>; Vodafone International Holdings BV v. India (28 November 2014), online: Italaw <http://www.italaw.com/cases/2544>; White Industries Australia Limited v. India (30 November 2011), online: Italaw <http://www.italaw.com/cases/1169>.

77. AAPL v. Sri Lanka, supra note 74; Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, supra note 74; Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, supra note 75; White Industries v. India, supra note 76.

78. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1.

79. See BITs signed by the US, Germany, BLEU, India, and Canada.

80. Email from Professor Jeswald W. SALACUSE to author (14 April 2015) (on file with author).

81. NEUMAYER, Eric and EPESS, Laura, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?” (23 February 2015), online: LSE Research <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_(BITs).pdf>>Google Scholar; GUZMAN, Andrew T., “Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639 at 651–657 Google Scholar; ELKINS, Zachary, GUZMAN, Andrew T., and SIMMONS, Beth A., “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 1960–2000” (2006) 60 International Organization 811 at 813 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ALVAREZ, Jose E., “The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime” (2005) 99 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 94–97 Google Scholar; VANDEVELDE, Kenneth J., “Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 36 Columbia Journal Transnational Law 501 at 516 Google Scholar; BEVERIDGE, Fiona, Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment under International Law, 1st edn (Manchester: Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82. Supra note 48.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. This study does not include the Afghanistan-Iran BIT because of its unavailability in the public domain.

86. Study could be undertaken on only twenty-one BITs, as the other three BITs signed by Bangladesh are not available in the public domain.

87. Sri Lanka-Malaysia BIT could not be studied because of its unavailability in the public domain.

88. Though the total number of BITs which are in force is 152, research could only be done on 147 BITs as the texts of five BITs were not available in the public domain. These five BITs are Afghanistan-Iran, Sri Lanka-Malaysia, Bangladesh-China, Bangladesh-Singapore, and Bangladesh-Canada.

89. India does not have NPM provisions in BITs with Argentina and Russia.

90. See Table 1.

91. Ibid.

92. E.g. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 23 May 2003, entered into force 30 May 2006); Agreement Between the Government of Republic of Finland and the Government of Nepal on the Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 3 February 2009, entered into force 28 January 2011), etc.

93. Ad art. 2, Protocol, Pakistan-Germany BIT; Ad art. 2, Protocol, Afghanistan-Germany BIT, etc.

94. If we see the exchange of letters between the parties in the Nepal-France BIT it provides for exceptions such as public morality and public order for fair and equitable treatment in art. 3. Little evidence has been found of NPM provisions in the exchange of notes in South Asian BITs. For more detail, see Table 2.

95. Inspiration has been taken from Ranjan, supra note 2.

96. Inspiration has been taken from Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1.

97. SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary, 9 January 2015, Southern African Development Community July 2012, online: IISD <http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf>.

98. Ibid.

99. Indian Model Text of Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, 2003, art. 13, online: <http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/icsection/Indian%20Model%20Text%20BIPA.asp>, “nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its essential security interests or in circumstances of extreme emergency in accordance with its laws normally and reasonably applied on a non-discriminatory basis”.

100. AL-KADY, Hamed, “Revision of Model BITs: Salient Features and Global Trends” (7 March 2015), online: Investment Policy Hub UNCTAD <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/DOWNLOAD13-UNCTAD_Revision%20of%20Model%20BITs.pdf> at 9 +at+9>Google Scholar.

101. MEHMOOD, Nida, “Pakistan’s BIT Dilemma” (19 January 2015), online: The Nation <http://nation.com.pk/columns/15-Jul-2013/pakistan-s-bit-dilemma>>Google Scholar.

102. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force 1 January 1948), art. XX [GATT]; For a detailed study on art. XX jurisprudence, MATSUSHITA, Mitsuo, SCHOENBAUM, Thomas J., and MAVROIDIS, Petros C., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, And Policy, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)Google Scholar; BARTELS, Lorand, “The Chapeau of Article XX GATT: A New Interpretation” (2014) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 40/2014Google Scholar; OCHOA, Juan, “General Exceptions of Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV of the GATS” (12 April 2015), online: University of Oslo <http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUS5850/h12/tekster/ochoa-general-exceptions.pdf>>Google Scholar.

103. General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [GATS], art. XIV.

104. NEWCOMBE, Andrew, “General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements”, Draft Discussion Paper BIICL Eighth Annual WTO Conference, London, 13–14 May 2008, online: <http://www.biicl.org/files/3866_andrew_newcombe.pdf>>Google Scholar.

105. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of India, 10 November 2009 (entered into force 3 July 2013) [India-Colombia BIT].

106. Art. 13(5), India-Columbia BIT:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against the investors of the other Contracting Party or a disguised restriction on investment of investors of a Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by a Contracting Party of measures:

  1. a)

    a) necessary to maintain public order;

  2. b)

    b) necessary to protect human, animal, plant life or health;

  3. c)

    c) relating to the protection of the environment or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;

  4. d)

    d) in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

107. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 331.

108. Black, Henry Campbell, Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edn (St Paul: West Publishing, 1968) at 812 Google Scholar.

109. Protocol, Afghanistan-Germany BIT, art. 2.

110. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2 February 2009 (entered into force 7 July 2011), art. 12 [India-Bangladesh BIT]; Treaty Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 12 March 1986 (entered into force 25 July 1989), art. X [US-Bangladesh BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of Republic of Uzbekistan on Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, 18 July 2000 (entered into force 24 January 2001), art. 11 [Uzbekistan-Bangladesh BIT]; and Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, 12 November 1987 (entered into force 21 June 1990), art. X [Turkey-Bangladesh BIT].

111. Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 6 May 1981 (entered into force 14 September 1986), Protocol, art. 2 [Bangladesh-Germany BIT].

112. All seventy BITs (in force) entered into by India except India-Argentina BIT and India-Russia BIT.

113. Art. 14, Finland-Nepal BIT.

114. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Nepal Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 20 October 1986 (entered into force 7 July 1988), Protocol, art. 3(a) [Nepal-Germany BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of France and the Government of the Majesty of the Kingdom of Nepal on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 2 May 1983 (entered into force 13 June 1985), Exchange of letter 1 para. 2 [Nepal-France BIT].

115. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 3 April 1997 (entered into force 3 April 1997), art. 12 [Mauritius-Pakistan BIT]; and Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 8 March 1995 (entered into force 4 May 1995), art. 11 [Singapore-Pakistan BIT].

116. Art. 2, Pakistan-Germany BIT; Exchange of Notes 3, Pakistan-Germany BIT.

117. Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 13 March 1986 (entered into force 25 March 1987), art. 11 [China-Sri Lanka BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 22 January 1997 (entered into force 13 February 1998), art. 12 [India-Sri Lanka BIT]; and Treaty Between the United States of America and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 20 September 1991 (entered into force 1 May 1993), art. X [US-Sri Lanka BIT].

118. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 7 February 2000 (entered into force 16 January 2004), Protocol, art. 3(a) [Sri Lanka-Germany BIT].

119. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 35.

120. Numbers given under every permissible objective are indicative of the number of times these permissible objectives have been used as an independent permissible objective in NPM provisions of the BITs of South Asian countries; for detailed study see Section III.

121. These miscellaneous provisions are: tax (India-Colombia BIT); illegal activities (India-Colombia BIT); measures relating to financial services for prudential reasons (India-Colombia BIT); measures relating to vital interests (India-Uzbekistan BIT); armed conflict (India-Italy BIT); national emergency situations (India-Italy BIT); civil disturbance (India-Italy BIT); and environment related measures (India-Colombia BIT).

122. Art. 11, China-Sri Lanka BIT, provides for, “protection of its national interest”.

123. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 47.

124. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 23 May 2015 (entered into force 30 May 2006) [India-Armenia BIT].

125. Art. 12 of Armenia-India BIT: “nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of …” (emphasis added).

126. India and Denmark, Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, New Delhi, 6 September 1995 (entered into force 28 August 1996) [India-Denmark BIT].

127. Art. 12 of Denmark-India BIT: “Nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking necessary measures in accordance with its laws normally and reasonably applied …” (emphasis added).

128. Supra note 124.

129. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 4 September 1998 (entered into force 20 June 2000) [India-Mauritius BIT].

130. India-BLEU BIT.

131. India-Colombia BIT.

132. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 47; e.g. “necessary” is stricter than “related to”; United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body of World Trade Organization, 21-2, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996), at 17–18.

133. India-Bangladesh BIT.

134. US-Bangladesh BIT, and Turkey-Bangladesh BIT.

135. Uzbekistan-Bangladesh BIT.

136. Armenia-India BIT, Bahrain-India BIT, Bangladesh-India BIT, Belarus-India BIT, Brunei-India BIT, Bulgaria-India BIT, China-India BIT, Croatia-India BIT, Cyprus-India BIT, Egypt-India BIT, Greece-India BIT, Hungary-India BIT, Iceland-India BIT, Portugal-India BIT, Indonesia-India BIT, Israel-India BIT, Jordon-India BIT, Kazakhstan-India BIT, Kyrgyzstan-India BIT, Lao-India BIT, Latvia-India BIT, Libya-India BIT, Lithuania-India BIT, Macedonia-India BIT, Mexico-India BIT, Mongolia-India BIT, Mozambique-India BIT, Myanmar-India BIT, Oman-India BIT, Philippines-India BIT, Poland-India BIT, Qatar-India BIT, Romania-India BIT, Serbia-India BIT, Slovakia-India BIT, Sri Lanka-India BIT, Sudan-India BIT, Syria-India BIT, Taiwan-India BIT, Tajikistan-India BIT, Thailand-India BIT, Trinidad and Tobago-India BIT, Turkey-India BIT, Turkmenistan-India BIT, Ukraine-India BIT, United Kingdom-India BIT, Vietnam-India BIT, Yemen-India BIT, Switzerland-India BIT.

137. Australia-India BIT, Austria-India BIT, BLEU-India BIT, Bosnia and Herzegovina-India BIT, Colombia-India BIT, Czech-India BIT, Denmark-India BIT, Finland-India BIT, France-India BIT, Germany-India BIT, Korea-India BIT, Kuwait-India BIT, Malaysia-India BIT, Morocco-India BIT, Netherlands-India BIT, Saudi Arabia-India BIT, Sweden-India BIT, Spain-India BIT; Nexus Requirement Link “necessary” has been used three times in India-Colombia BIT in its different subclauses.

138. Colombia-India BIT; Nexus Requirement Link “relating to” has been used twice in India-Colombia BIT in its different subclauses.

139. Mauritius-India BIT.

140. Italy-India BIT, and Uzbekistan-India BIT.

141. Colombia-India BIT.

142. Finland-Nepal BIT.

143. Mauritius-Pakistan BIT, and Singapore-Pakistan BIT.

144. China-Sri Lanka BIT.

145. India-Sri Lanka BIT.

146. US-Sri Lanka BIT.

147. Art. 13, India-Colombia BIT.

148. SCHILL, Stephen and BRIESE, Robyn, “If the State Considers: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement” (2009) 13 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 61–140 Google Scholar.

149. Ibid.

150. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1.

151. Schill and Briese, supra note 148.

152. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 376.

153. Schill and Briese, supra note 148.

154. Art. 13(4), India-Colombia BIT.

155. India-Bangladesh BIT, and Uzbekistan-Bangladesh BIT.

156. India-Bangladesh BIT.

157. India-Bangladesh BIT, and Uzbekistan-Bangladesh BIT.

158. India-Armenia BIT, Australia-India BIT, Austria-India BIT, Bahrain-India BIT, Bangladesh-India BIT, Belarus-India BIT, Bosnia and Herzegovina-India BIT, Brunei-India BIT, Bulgaria-India BIT, China-India BIT, Colombia-India BIT, Croatia-India BIT, Cyprus-India BIT, Czech-India BIT, Denmark-India BIT, Egypt-India BIT, Finland-India BIT, France-India BIT, Hungary-India BIT, Iceland-India BIT, Portugal-India BIT, Indonesia-India BIT, Israel-India BIT, Jordon-India BIT, Kazakhstan-India BIT, Korea-India BIT, Kuwait-India BIT, Kyrgyzstan-India BIT, Lao-India BIT, Latvia-India BIT, Libya-India BIT, Lithuania-India BIT, Macedonia-India BIT, Malaysia-India BIT, Mexico-India BIT, Mongolia-India BIT, Morocco-India BIT, Mozambique-India BIT, Myanmar-India BIT, Netherlands-India BIT, Oman-India BIT, Philippines-India BIT, Poland-India BIT, Qatar-India BIT, Romania-India BIT, Saudi Arabia-India BIT, Serbia-India BIT, Slovakia-India BIT, Sri Lanka-India BIT, Sudan-India BIT, Sweden-India BIT, Syria-India BIT, Taiwan-India BIT, Tajikistan-India BIT, Thailand-India BIT, Trinidad and Tobago-India BIT, Turkey-India BIT, Turkmenistan-India BIT, Ukraine-India BIT, United Kingdom-India BIT, Uzbekistan-India BIT, Vietnam-India BIT, Yemen-India BIT, Italy-India BIT, Spain-India BIT, Switzerland-India BIT.

159. India-Armenia BIT, Australia-India BIT, Bahrain-India BIT, Bangladesh-India BIT, Belarus-India BIT, Brunei-India BIT, Bulgaria-India BIT, China-India BIT, Colombia-India BIT, Croatia-India BIT, Cyprus-India BIT, Denmark-India BIT, Egypt-India BIT, Hungary-India BIT, Iceland-India BIT, Indonesia-India BIT, Israel-India BIT, Jordon-India BIT, Kazakhstan-India BIT, Korea-India BIT, Kyrgyzstan-India BIT, Lao-India BIT, Latvia-India BIT, Libya-India BIT, Lithuania-India BIT, Macedonia-India BIT, Malaysia-India BIT, Mexico-India BIT, Mongolia-India BIT, Morocco-India BIT, Mozambique-India BIT, Myanmar-India BIT, Oman-India BIT, Philippines-India BIT, Poland-India BIT, Qatar-India BIT, Romania-India BIT, Saudi Arabia-India BIT, Serbia-India BIT, Slovakia-India BIT, Sri Lanka-India BIT, Sudan-India BIT, Sweden-India BIT, Syria-India BIT, Taiwan-India BIT, Tajikistan-India BIT, Thailand-India BIT, Trinidad and Tobago-India BIT, Turkey-India BIT, Turkmenistan-India BIT, Ukraine-India BIT, United Kingdom-India BIT, Vietnam-India BIT, Yemen-India BIT, Italy-India BIT, Spain-India BIT, Switzerland-India BIT.

160. India-Armenia BIT, Australia-India BIT, Austria-India BIT, Bahrain-India BIT, Bangladesh-India BIT, Belarus-India BIT, Bosnia and Herzegovina-India BIT, Brunei-India BIT, Bulgaria-India BIT, China-India BIT, Colombia-India BIT, Croatia-India BIT, Cyprus-India BIT, Czech-India BIT, Denmark-India BIT, Egypt-India BIT, Finland-India BIT, France-India BIT, Greece-India BIT, Hungary-India BIT, Iceland-India BIT, Portugal-India BIT, Indonesia-India BIT, Israel-India BIT, Jordon-India BIT, Kazakhstan-India BIT, Korea-India BIT, Kuwait-India BIT, Kyrgyzstan-India BIT, Lao-India BIT, Latvia-India BIT, Libya-India BIT, Lithuania-India BIT, Macedonia-India BIT, Malaysia-India BIT, Mexico-India BIT, Mongolia-India BIT, Morocco-India BIT, Mozambique-India BIT, Myanmar-India BIT, Netherlands-India BIT, Oman-India BIT, Philippines-India BIT, Poland-India BIT, Qatar-India BIT, Romania-India BIT, Saudi Arabia-India BIT, Serbia-India BIT, Slovakia-India BIT, Sri Lanka-India BIT, Sudan-India BIT, Sweden-India BIT, Syria-India BIT, Taiwan-India BIT, Tajikistan-India BIT, Thailand-India BIT, Trinidad and Tobago-India BIT, Turkey-India BIT, Turkmenistan-India BIT, Ukraine-India BIT, United Kingdom-India BIT, Uzbekistan-India BIT, Vietnam-India BIT, Yemen-India BIT, Italy-India BIT, Spain-India BIT, Switzerland-India BIT.

161. Bosnia and Herzegovina-India BIT, Czech-India BIT, France-India BIT, Korea-India BIT, and Netherlands-India BIT.

162. Colombia-India BIT, and Croatia-India BIT.

163. Israel-India BIT.

164. India-Switzerland BIT.

165. Nepal-Finland BIT.

166. Nepal-Finland BIT.

167. India-Sri Lanka BIT.

168. India-Sri Lanka BIT.

169. India-Sri Lanka BIT.

170. See Table 1.

171. See Table 3.

172. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 36.

173. Ibid., at 37.

174. Black, supra note 108 at 718.

175. North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).

176. Energy Charter Treaty, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995); “Essential Security Interests Under International Investment Law, International Investment Perspectives: Freedom of Investment in a Changing World” (2007 edn, OECD) 93.

177. Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between Republic of India and Republic of Korea, 7 August 2009 (entered into force 1 January 2010), art. 10(18)(2).

178. Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between Republic of India and Republic of Singapore, 29 June 2005 (entered into force 1 January 2005), art. 6(12)(1)(b).

179. REINISCH, August, “Necessity in International Investment Arbitration—an Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases?” (2007) 7 Journal of World Investment and Trade 191 at 209 Google Scholar; ALVAREZ, José E. and KHAMSI, Kathryn, “The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors” (2008–09) 1 Oxford Yearbook of Investment Law and Policy 379 Google Scholar; MOON, William J., “Essential Security Interests in International Investment Agreements” (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 481 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

180. NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluís, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 497–499 Google Scholar; GAZZINI, Tarsicio, “Foreign Investment and Measures Adopted on Grounds of Necessity: Towards a Common Understanding” (2010) 7 Transnational Dispute Management, 1 Google Scholar at 17–18; RANJAN, Prabhash, “Protecting Security Interests in International Investment Law” in Mary FOOTER, Julia SCHMIDT, and Nigel D. WHITE, eds., Security and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016)Google Scholar.

181. Supra note 13.

182. CMS, supra note 13 at para. 360; LG&E, supra note 13 at para. 238; Sempra, supra note 13 at para. 374; Enron, supra note 13 at para. 332.

183. GATT, art. XX, supra note 102.

184. GATT, art. XXI, supra note 102.

185. Ranjan, supra note 180.

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193. Except for the Nepal-Finland BIT.

194. Uzbekistan-India BIT; Uzbekistan-Bangladesh BIT.

195. Italy-India BIT.

196. China-Sri Lanka BIT.

197. HAHN, Michael J., “Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception” (1991) 12 Michigan Journal of International Law 558 at 562 Google Scholar.

198. LG&E, supra note 13 at para. 244.

199. National emergency provisions in the constitutions of South Asian countries are quite different from each other; art. 352 of the Indian Constitution; arts. 232, 233 of the Constitution of Pakistan; arts. 141A, 141B, and 141C of the Constitution of Bangladesh; art. 220 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka; chapter 9, arts. 143–148 of the Constitution of Afghanistan; and part 19, art. 143 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal.

200. Finland-Nepal BIT.

201. North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2102(1)(b)(ii), 32 I.L.M. 605, 699–700 (1993).

202. Matsushita et al., supra note 102 at 596–7; AKANDE, Dapo and WILLIAMS, Sope, “International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?” (2003) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 365 at 400 Google Scholar.

203. Art. 13(4), India-Colombia BIT.

204. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 407.

205. See Table 3.

206. The chapeau puts limitations on measures; for example, the use of the exceptions must not be arbitrary or unjustifiable, and there must not be disguised restriction on investment.

207. “Defence Notes” (12 March 2015), online: Defence Journal <http://www.defencejournal.com/april98/security&defence2.htm>; Iftikhar Tariq KHANZADA, “Pakistan and the Daily Deteriorating Law and Order Situation” (10 April 2015), online: Liberty Voice <http://guardianlv.com/2013/11/pakistan-and-the-daily-deteriorating-law-and-order-situation/>; “Law and Order Situation in Pakistan” (12 March 2015), online: <http://prr.hec.gov.pk/Chapters/1834-3.pdf>.

208. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 357; DESSION, George H., “The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law” (1955) 5 Buffalo Law Review 22 Google Scholar.

209. Security-Related Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, OECD, May 2009.

210. United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Panel Report, WT/DS285/R (10 November 2004), para. 6.461.

211. Black, supra note 108 at 556.

212. GARNER, Bryan A., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edn (St Paul, MN: West Thompson Reuters Business, 2009) 538 Google Scholar.

213. DIEBOLD, Nicolas F., “The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger And the Undermining Mole” (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 43 at 54 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

214. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001, para. 172; WTO Agreements and Public Health, Summary Executive at p. 11, online: <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who_wto_e.pdf>.

215. Ranjan, supra note 180 at ftn. 38:

While BITs do not prohibit states from adopting regulatory measures of any kind, states will have to pay damages to foreign investors if these regulatory measures are found to be inconsistent with their BIT obligations. This dissuades states from adopting such regulatory measures.

216. See Table 3.

217. Australia-India BIT.

218. China-Sri Lanka BIT.

219. Colombia-India BIT.

220. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 46.

221. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 361.

222. For further study, Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos–Containing Products, paras. 16, 27, WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001); Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of Cigarettes, BISD 37S/200; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm>; art. XX(b) of GATT.

223. Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 26 February 1999 (entered into force 4 May 2000), art. 15.

224. Agreement Between the Government of The Republic of India and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 31 October 1997 (entered into force 8 January 2001), art. 12(2).

225. Agreement Between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 12 September 2006 (entered into force 13 February 2008), art. 12.

226. Art. 13(5)(b), India-Colombia BIT.

227. Agreement Between the Czech Republic and the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 10 October 1996 (entered into force 6 February 1998), art. 12.

228. India and Denmark, Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 6 September 1995 (entered into force 28 August 1996), art. 12(2).

229. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of France on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2 September 1997 (entered into force 17 May 2000), art. 12.

230. Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 10 July 1995 (entered into force 13 July 1998), art. 12.

231. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 26 February 1996 (entered into force 5 July 1996), art. 10(2).

232. Agreement Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of India for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 27 November 2001 (entered into force 28 June 2003), art. 14(2).

233. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1 August 1995 (entered into force 12 April 1997), art. 10(2).

234. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 4 September 1998 (entered into force 20 June 2000), art. 11.

235. Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 6 November 1995 (entered into force 1 December 1996), art. 12.

236. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Italian Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 13 November 1995 (entered into force 26 March 1998), art. 12.

237. Agreement on the Promotion and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Republic of India and the Kingdom of Spain, 30 September 1997 (entered into force 15 December 1998), art. 13.

238. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 3 April 1997 (entered into force 3 April 1997), art. 12.

239. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 8 March 1995 (entered into force 4 May 1995), art. 11.

240. Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 13 March 1986 (entered into force 25 March 1987), art. 11.

241. See Table 3. This study does not take account of the NPM provisions with limited scope, as there are instances where Nepal is found to have a limited scope NPM provision in one of its BITs having public health exception. However, Bangladesh does not have any public health exception in any of its NPM provisions.

242. Australia-India BIT, BLEU-India BIT, Denmark-India BIT, Malaysia-India BIT, and Kuwait-India BIT.

243. BLEU-India BIT; it uses “for” as a nexus requirement link.

244. Bosnia and Herzegovina-India BIT, Czech-India BIT, France-India BIT, Germany-India BIT, Korea-India BIT, Mauritius-India BIT, Netherlands-India BIT, Italy-India BIT, Mauritius-Pakistan BIT, Singapore-Pakistan BIT, and China-Sri Lanka BIT.

245. Bosnia and Herzegovina-India BIT, Czech-India BIT, France-India BIT, Germany-India BIT, Korea-India BIT, and Netherlands-India BIT.

246. Mauritius-India BIT, Mauritius-Pakistan BIT, Singapore-Pakistan BIT, and China-Sri Lanka BIT.

247. Italy-India BIT.

248. Supra note 246.

249. Supra note 102.

250. “South Asia: The End of Poverty” (14 April 2015), online: The World Bank <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20969099~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html>.

251. “Poverty and Health” (14 April 2015), online: World Health Organisation <http://www.who.int/hdp/poverty/en/>.

252. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 42.

253. See Table 3.

254. Agreement on Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 18 May 1999 (entered into force 28 July 2000), art. 13(2).

255. Art. 12, India-Italy BIT.

256. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 43.

257. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2 February 2009 (entered into force 7 July 2011).

258. Agreement Between the Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of Republic of Uzbekistan on Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, 18 July 2000 (entered into force 24 January 2001), art. 11.

259. Ibid.

260. Agreement Between the Government of Republic of Finland and the Government of Nepal on the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 3 February 2009 (entered into force 28 January 2011).

261. Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 22 January 1997 (entered into force 13 February 1998).

262. Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, 12 November 1987 (entered into force 21 June 1990).

263. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of Qatar for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 4 April 1999 (entered into force 15 December 1999).

264. Art. 10 “… maintenance of public order and morals …”, Turkey-Bangladesh BIT.

265. GATS, supra note 103, art. XIV(a).

266. GATT, supra note 102, art. XX(a).

267. Art. 11(2), Qatar-India BIT.

268. United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Appellate Body Report, para. 5, 296, WT/DS285/AB/R (2005); United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Panel Report, para. 1.1, 3.278, WT/DS285/R (2004).

269. United States–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 268 at para. 6.465.

270. US—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R (2004) at para. 6.461 [US—Gambling].

271. China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc WT/DS363/AB/R, AB-2009-3 (2009).

272. Ibid., at 332. However, the Appellate Body later rejected it as there was an alternative available for China.

273. WTO European Communities-Measures Prohibiting The Importation And Marketing Of Seal Products, 22 May 2014, WT/DS400/AB/R, AB-2014-1,3

274. EU-Seal Ban case, ibid., at para. 6.1.c.ii-iii; Rob HOWSE, Joanna LANGILLE, and Katie SYKES, “Sealing the Deal: The WTO’s Appellate Body Report in EC—Seal Products” (4 June 2014), online: American Society of International Law <http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/12/sealing-deal-wto%E2%80%99s-appellate-body-report ec%E2%80%93-seal-products>.

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276. Art. 13(5)(d) of India-Colombia BIT.

277. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 355; OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Commentary to the Consolidated Text, 41, OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1 (22 April 1998), online: <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf>.

278. Art. 103, “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”, UN Charter; for a detailed study on art. 103, BERNHARDT, Rudolf, “Article 103” in Bruno SIMMA, The Charter of the United Nations—A Commentary, 2nd edn, vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1292 Google Scholar; LIIVOJA, Rain, “The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter” (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 583–612 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; KOLB, Robert, “Does Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations Apply Only to Decisions or Also to Authorizations Adopted by the Security Council?” (2004) 64 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 21–35 Google Scholar; FASSBENDER, Bardo, “The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community” (1997) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529 Google Scholar; Separate Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] I.C.J. Rep 16; BOWETT, Derek, “The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures” (1994) 5 European Journal of International Law 89 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ORAKHELASHVILI, Alexander, “The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions” (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 59 at 88 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; R (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] U.K.H.L. 58.

279. Art. 13(1).

280. Art. 13(2).

281. Art. 13(3).

282. Art. 13(2).

283. Art. 12.

284. Art. 12.

285. Art. 12.

286. Art. 13(5)(c).

287. Art. 11.

288. See Table 4.

289. Ibid.

290. Ibid.

291. Ibid.

292. MCGRADY, Benn, “Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures” (2008) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 153 at 154 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

293. Jim SAXTON, “Argentina’s Economic Crisis: Causes and Cures” (June 2003) Joint Economic Committee United States Congress; ALVAREZ, José E. and KHAMSI, Kathryn, “The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime” (2008/2009) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 379 Google Scholar, online: Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment <http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/Alvarez-final_000.pdf>; Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2008/5; BURKE-WHITE, William W., “The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System” (2008) 3 Asian Journal of International Health Law and Policy 199 Google Scholar; Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1; WAIBEL, Michael, “Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E” (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 637 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; SCHILL, Sarah, “The ‘Necessity Defense’ and the Emerging Arbitral Conflict in its Application to the U.S-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty” (2007) 13 Law and Business Review of the Americas 547 Google Scholar; SCHILL, Stephen W., “International Investment Law and Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises—Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina” (2007) 24 Journal of International Arbitration 265 Google Scholar; and FOSTER, David, “Necessity Knows no Law!—LG&E v. Argentina” (2006) 9 International Arbitration Law Review 149 Google Scholar.

294. CMS, supra note 13.

295. Sempra, supra note 13.

296. Enron, supra note 13.

297. CMS Annulment, supra note 13.

298. Ibid., at para. 131.

299. LG&E (decision on liability), supra note 13.

300. Continental, supra note 13.

301. Ibid., para. 168.

302. Ibid., para. 85.

303. BURKE-WHITE, William W. and von STADEN, Andreas, “Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations” (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 283 Google Scholar, 325.

304. Ranjan, supra note 2 at 50.

305. Ibid.

306. See Table 4.

307. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 1 at 342.

308. See Table 4.

309. India-Colombia BIT.

310. LESTER, Simon, MERCURIO, Bryan, and DAVIES, Arwel, World Trade Law: Text, Material and Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) at 368 Google Scholar.

311. Appellate Body Reports, US—Shrimp, para. 136; China—Raw Materials, para. 355; China Rare Earth Appellate Body Report, para. 5.105.

312. See supra note 311.

313. See Table 4.

314. India-Colombia BIT.

315. See Table 4.