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Dynamic sets of potentially interchangeable connotations: A theory of mental objects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2008

Alexandre Linhares
Alexandre Linhares
Affiliation:
Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro 22250-900, Brazil. linhares@clubofrome.org.brhttp://www.intuition-sciences.com/linhares
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Abstract

Analogy-making is an ability with which we can abstract from surface similarities and perceive deep, meaningful similarities between different mental objects and situations. I propose that mental objects are dynamically changing sets of potentially interchangeable connotations. Unfortunately, most models of analogy seem devoid of both semantics and relevance-extraction, postulating analogy as a one-to-one mapping devoid of connotation transfer.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , August 2008 , pp. 389 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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