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Is language processing different in dialogue?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2004

Dale J. Barr  and
Boaz Keysar
Dale J. Barr*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, CA92521
Boaz Keysar*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL60637
*
dale.barr@ucr.edu
boaz@uchicago.edu
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Abstract

Pickering & Garrod (P&G) claim that the automatic mechanisms that underlie language processing in dialogue are absent in monologue. We disagree with this claim, and argue that dialogue simply provides a different context in which the same basic processes operate.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 190 - 191
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Note

1. In their seminal work on common ground, Clark and Marshall (1981) clearly make the case that common ground is a form of metaknowledge that is conceptually distinct from shared knowledge. What P&G are referring to by “implicit common ground” is really just shared knowledge, not common ground, because interlocutors need not represent the fact that their representations are shared. Such usage is certain to contribute to the legacy of confusion that has plagued discussions of mutual knowledge and common ground (see Keysar 1997 and Lee 2001 for discussion).