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The myth of computational level theory and the vacuity of rational analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2011

Barton L. Anderson
Barton L. Anderson
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. barta@psych.usyd.edu.auhttp://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/barta/
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Abstract

I extend Jones & Love's (J&L's) critique of Bayesian models and evaluate the conceptual foundations on which they are built. I argue that: (1) the “Bayesian” part of Bayesian models is scientifically trivial; (2) “computational level” theory is a fiction that arises from an inappropriate programming metaphor; and (3) the real scientific problems lie outside Bayesian theorizing.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , August 2011 , pp. 189 - 190
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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