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Overlooking the resources of functionalism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Zoltán Jakab
Affiliation:
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, K1S 5B6 Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.zjakab@ccs.carleton.ca

Abstract

Although the author's critical view of functionalism has a considerable intuitive pull, his argument based on the color room scenario does not work. Functionalism and other relational views of the mind are capable of providing coherent accounts of conscious experience that meet the challenge set up by the “color room argument.” A simple example of such an account is presented.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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