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Philosophy and WEIRD intuition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2010

Stephen Stich
Stephen Stich
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1107. sstich@ruccs.rutgers.edu http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/
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Abstract

From Plato to the present, philosophers have relied on intuitive judgments as evidence for or against philosophical theories. Most philosophers are WEIRD, highly educated, and male. The literature reviewed in the target article suggests that such people might have intuitions that differ from those of people in other groups. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that they do.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 110 - 111
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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