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Reduction, supervenience, and physical emergence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

John Collier
John Collier*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Programme, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041, South Africa http://www.nu.ac.za/philund/collier
*
collierj@nu.ac.za
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Abstract:

After distinguishing reductive explanability in principle from ontological deflation, I give a case of an obviously physical property that is reductively inexplicable in principle. I argue that biological systems often have this character, and that, if we make certain assumptions about the cohesion and dynamics of the mind and its physical substrate, then it is emergent according to Broad's criteria.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 5 , October 2004 , pp. 629 - 630
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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