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Three fallacies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2001

Jonathan E. Adler
Jonathan E. Adler
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY 11210 jadler@brooklyn.cuny.edu
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Abstract

Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 23 , Issue 5 , October 2000 , pp. 665 - 666
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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