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Ultrasociality and the division of cognitive labor
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 June 2016
Abstract
Gowdy & Krall describe the development of ultrasociality in terms of economics and the division of labor. We propose that the division of cognitive labor allows humans to behave in an ultrasocial manner without the radical evolutionary changes that are experienced by other species, suggesting that species may traverse different paths to achieve ultrasociality.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016
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Target article
The economic origins of ultrasociality
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