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What is argument for? An adaptationist approach to argument and debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

David Pietraszewski
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205. david.pietraszewski@yale.edu

Abstract

A consideration of selection pressures on the psychology of argument suggests that fixing the truth value of claims is not the primary criterion for argument generation or evaluation. Instead, argument psychology is designed to change representations in other minds as a way to negotiate conflicts of interest and as a way to signal social coordination.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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