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What is the narrow content of fence (and other definitionally and interpretationally primitive concepts)?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Eric Mandelbaum
Eric Mandelbaum
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, The Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1PT, United Kingdom. eric.mandelbaum@philosophy.ox.ac.ukhttp://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/our_staff/research/eric_mandelbaum
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Abstract

It's unclear what narrow content is interpersonally shared for concepts that don't originate from core cognition yet are still definitionally and interpretationally primitive. A primary concern is that for these concepts, one cannot draw a principled distinction between inferences that are content determining and those that aren't. The lack of a principled distinction imperils an account of interpersonally shared concepts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 138
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

Carey, S. (2009) The origin of concepts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1998) Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar