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Access to phenomenality: A necessary condition of phenomenality?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Katalin Balog
Katalin Balog
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8306. katalin.balog@yale.eduhttp://pantheon.yale.edu/~kb237
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Abstract

Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience show that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I argue that while Block's thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block's argument.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 499 - 500
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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