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Ambiguity of “intention”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Thomas M. Scanlon
Thomas M. Scanlon
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. scanlon@fas.harvard.edu
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Abstract

Knobe reports that subjects' judgments of whether an agent did something intentionally vary depending on whether the outcome in question was seen by them as good or as bad. He concludes that subjects' moral views affect their judgments about intentional action. This conclusion appears to follow only if different meanings of “intention” are overlooked.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 348 - 349
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) Intention. Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. (2008) Moral dimensions: Permissibility, meaning, blame. Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar