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Bridging the gap: Dynamics as a unified view of cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2001

Derek Harter ,
Arthur C. Graesser  and
Stan Franklin
Derek Harter
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical and Computer Sciences and the Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152 dharter@memphis.edu www.msci.memphis.edu/~harterd/
Arthur C. Graesser
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and the Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152 a-graesser@memphis.edu www.mnemosyne.csl.psyc.memphis.edu/home/graesser/
Stan Franklin
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical and Computer Sciences and the Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152 franklin@memphis.edu www.msci.memphis.edu/~franklin/
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Abstract

Top-down dynamical models of cognitive processes, such as the one presented by Thelen et al., are important pieces in understanding the development of cognitive abilities in humans and biological organisms. Unlike standard symbolic computational approaches to cognition, such dynamical models offer the hope that they can be connected with more bottom-up, neurologically inspired dynamical models to provide a complete view of cognition at all levels. We raise some questions about the details of their simulation and about potential limitations of top-down dynamical models.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , February 2001 , pp. 45 - 46
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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