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Can metacognition be explained in terms of perceptual symbol systems?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1999

Ruediger Oehlmann
Ruediger Oehlmann
Affiliation:
University of Essex, The Data Archive, Psychology Unit, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, Englandoehlmann@essex.ac.uk dawww.essex.ac.uk/~roehl
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Abstract

Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbol systems is considered from a metacognitive perspective. Two examples are discussed in terms of the proposed perceptual symbol theory. First, recent results in research on feeling-of-knowing judgement are used to argue for a representation of familiarity with input cues. This representation should support implicit memory. Second, the ability of maintaining a theory of other people's beliefs (theory of mind) is considered and it is suggested that a purely simulation-based view is insufficient to explain the available evidence. Both examples characterize areas where Barsalou's theory would benefit from additional detail.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , August 1999 , pp. 629 - 630
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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