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Causation, supervenience, and special sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

Graham Macdonald
Graham Macdonald*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand; Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT06269-2054
*
graham.macdonald@canterbury.ac.nz
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Abstract:

Ross & Spurrett (R&S) argue that Kim's reductionism rests on a restricted account of supervenience and a misunderstanding about causality. I contend that broadening supervenience does nothing to avoid Kim's argument and that it is difficult to see how employing different notions of causality helps to avoid the problem. I end by sketching a different solution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 5 , October 2004 , pp. 631
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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