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Chance, utility, rationality, strategy, equilibrium

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Anatol Rapoport
Anatol Rapoport*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada
*
anatol.rapoport@utoronto.ca
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Abstract:

Almost anyone seriously interested in decision theory will name John von Neumann's (1928) Minimax Theorem as its foundation, whereas Utility and Rationality are imagined to be the twin towers on which the theory rests. Yet, experimental results and real-life observations seldom support that expectation. Over two centuries ago, Hume (1739–40/1978) put his finger on the discrepancy. “Reason,” he wrote “is, and ought to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” In other words, effective means to reach specific goals can be prescribed, but not the goals. A wide range of experimental results and daily life behavior support this dictum.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 172 - 173
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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