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Classical logic, conditionals and “nonmonotonic” reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Nicholas Allott  and
Hiroyuki Uchida
Nicholas Allott
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics, University College London, London WC1N 1PF, United Kingdom. n.allott@ucl.ac.ukuclyhuc@ucl.ac.ukwww.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/nick/
Hiroyuki Uchida
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics, University College London, London WC1N 1PF, United Kingdom. n.allott@ucl.ac.ukuclyhuc@ucl.ac.ukwww.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/nick/
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Abstract

Reasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 85
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar