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Complexity provides a better explanation than probability for confidence in syllogistic inferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Graeme S. Halford
Graeme S. Halford
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Griffith University, Nathan, Queensland, 4111, Australia. g.halford@griffith.edu.au
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Abstract

Bayesian rationality is an important contribution to syllogistic inference, but it has limitations. The claim that confidence in a conclusion is a function of informativeness of the max-premise is anomalous because this is the least probable premise. A more plausible account is that confidence is inversely related to complexity. Bayesian rationality should be supplemented with principles based on cognitive complexity.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 91
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

Halford, G. S., Cowan, N. & Andrews, G. (2007) Separating cognitive capacity from knowledge: A new hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11(6):236–42.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
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