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Conscious will in the absence of ghosts, hypnotists, and other people

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

Johannes Schultz ,
Natalie Sebanz  and
Chris Frith
Johannes Schultz*
Affiliation:
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, London, WC1N 3BG, United Kingdomhttp://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukhttp://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/princdir/frith.html
Natalie Sebanz*
Affiliation:
Max-Planck Institute for Psychological Research, 80799Munich, Germanyhttp://www.mpipf-muenchen.mpg.de/cgibin/mitarbeiter.cgi?name=SENA&filetype=personal&language=g
Chris Frith*
Affiliation:
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, London, WC1N 3BG, United Kingdomhttp://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukhttp://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/princdir/frith.html
*
j.schultz@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
sebanz@psy.mpg.de
c.frith@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
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Abstract:

We suggest that certain experiences reported by patients with schizophrenia show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not sufficient for the experience of willing an action. Furthermore, we argue that even if priority, consistency, and exclusivity cause the experience of being the author of an action, this does not mean that conscious will is an illusion.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 5 , October 2004 , pp. 674 - 675
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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