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Culpable control or moral concepts?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Mark Alicke  and
David Rose
Mark Alicke
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701. alicke@ohio.edu
David Rose
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15235. davidros@andrew.cmu.edu
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Abstract

Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 330 - 331
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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Alicke, M. (2000) Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin 126:556–74.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
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