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Embodiment, enaction, and developing spatial knowledge: Beyond deficit egocentrism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1997

Julie C. Rutkowska
Julie C. Rutkowska
Affiliation:
Cognitive & Computing Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, United Kingdomjulier@cogs.susx.ac.uk www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/julier/index.html
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Abstract

Traditional cognitivism treats a situated agent's point of view in terms of deficit egocentrism. Can Ballard et al.'s framework remedy this characterization? And will its fusion of computational and enactivist explanations change assumptions about what cognition is? “Yes” is suggested by considering human infants' developing spatial knowledge, but further questions are raised by analysis of their robot counterparts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 4 , December 1997 , pp. 754 - 755
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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