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Goals are not implied by actions, but inferred from actions and contexts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2008

Iris van Rooij ,
Willem Haselager  and
Harold Bekkering
Iris van Rooij
Affiliation:
Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands. i.vanrooij@nici.ru.nlw.haselager@nici.ru.nlh.bekkering@nici.ru.nl
Willem Haselager
Affiliation:
Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands. i.vanrooij@nici.ru.nlw.haselager@nici.ru.nlh.bekkering@nici.ru.nl
Harold Bekkering
Affiliation:
Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands. i.vanrooij@nici.ru.nlw.haselager@nici.ru.nlh.bekkering@nici.ru.nl
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Abstract

People cannot understand intentions behind observed actions by direct simulation, because goal inference is highly context dependent. Context dependency is a major source of computational intractability in traditional information-processing models. An embodied embedded view of cognition may be able to overcome this problem, but then the problem needs recognition and explication within the context of the new, layered cognitive architecture.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , February 2008 , pp. 38 - 39
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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