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Imagination is only as rational as the purpose to which it is put

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Andrew Shtulman
Andrew Shtulman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA 90041. shtulman@oxy.eduhttp://faculty.oxy.edu/shtulman/
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Abstract

Byrne's criteria for considering imagination rational do not accord with standard notions of rationality. A different criterion – that is, the correspondence between an inference strategy and its domain of application – is offered and illustrated with recent work on possibility judgment. This analysis suggests that, although imagination can be put to rational purposes, imagination itself should not be considered rational.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 465 - 466
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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