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Internalizing communication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2003

Gerard O'Brien
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5005 gerard.obrien@adelaide.edu.aujon.opie@adelaide.edu.au http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/gobrien.htm http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/jopie.htm
Jon Opie
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5005 gerard.obrien@adelaide.edu.aujon.opie@adelaide.edu.au http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/gobrien.htm http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/jopie.htm

Abstract

Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular integration of information in human subjects which appears to support the “cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, language is not just a means of communication, but also a representational medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepresentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium we think in, but a tool we think with. The evidence he cites is equivocal when it comes to choosing between the cognitive conception and this radical communicative conception of language.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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