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Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of others' psychological states, not theory-of-mind judgments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Florian Cova ,
Emmanuel Dupoux  and
Pierre Jacob
Florian Cova
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France. florian.cova@gmail.comjacob@ehess.frpiotrjacob@gmail.com
Emmanuel Dupoux
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France. emmanuel.dupoux@gmail.com
Pierre Jacob
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France. florian.cova@gmail.comjacob@ehess.frpiotrjacob@gmail.com
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Abstract

We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 334 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Pettit, D. & Knobe, J. (2009) The pervasive impact of moral judgment. Mind and Language 24:586–604.CrossRefGoogle Scholar